{"paper":{"title":"Leveraging information in vehicular parking games","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.NI","physics.soc-ph"],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Evangelia Kokolaki, Ioannis Stavrakakis, Merkouris Karaliopoulos","submitted_at":"2012-07-24T17:01:25Z","abstract_excerpt":"Our paper approaches the parking assistance service in urban environments as an instance of service provision in non-cooperative network environments. We propose normative abstractions for the way drivers pursue parking space and the way they respond to partial or complete information for parking demand and supply as well as specific pricing policies on public and private parking facilities. The drivers are viewed as strategic agents who make rational decisions attempting to minimize the cost of the acquired parking spot. We formulate the resulting games as resource selection games and derive "},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1207.5747","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}