{"paper":{"title":"Approximate well-supported Nash equilibria in symmetric bimatrix games","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Artur Czumaj, Marcin Jurdzi\\'nski, Michail Fasoulakis","submitted_at":"2014-07-11T01:44:49Z","abstract_excerpt":"The $\\varepsilon$-well-supported Nash equilibrium is a strong notion of approximation of a Nash equilibrium, where no player has an incentive greater than $\\varepsilon$ to deviate from any of the pure strategies that she uses in her mixed strategy. The smallest constant $\\varepsilon$ currently known for which there is a polynomial-time algorithm that computes an $\\varepsilon$-well-supported Nash equilibrium in bimatrix games is slightly below $2/3$. In this paper we study this problem for symmetric bimatrix games and we provide a polynomial-time algorithm that gives a $(1/2+\\delta)$-well-suppo"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1407.3004","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}