{"paper":{"title":"From Nash Equilibrium to Social Optimum and vice versa: a Mean Field Perspective","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["math.OC"],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Francois Delarue, Gokce Dayanikli, Mathieu Lauriere, Rene Carmona","submitted_at":"2023-12-16T19:52:39Z","abstract_excerpt":"Mean field games (MFG) and mean field control (MFC) problems have been introduced to study large populations of strategic players. They correspond respectively to non-cooperative or cooperative scenarios, where the aim is to find the Nash equilibrium and social optimum. These frameworks provide approximate solutions to situations with a finite number of players and have found a wide range of applications, from economics to biology and machine learning. In this paper, we study how the players can pass from a non-cooperative to a cooperative regime, and vice versa. The first direction is reminis"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"2312.10526","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"integrity":{"clean":true,"summary":{"advisory":0,"critical":0,"by_detector":{},"informational":0},"endpoint":"/pith/2312.10526/integrity.json","findings":[],"available":true,"detectors_run":[],"snapshot_sha256":"c28c3603d3b5d939e8dc4c7e95fa8dfce3d595e45f758748cecf8e644a296938"},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}