{"paper":{"title":"A game theoretic approach to lowering incentives to violate speed limits in Finland","license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["q-fin.EC"],"primary_cat":"econ.GN","authors_text":"Mika Sutela, Nino Lindstr\\\"om","submitted_at":"2024-02-14T20:12:59Z","abstract_excerpt":"We expand on earlier research on the topic by discussing an infinitely repeated game model with a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy profile (SPE) as a solution concept that diminishes incentives to violate speed limits in a carrot and stick fashion. In attempts to construct an SPE strategy profile, the initial state is chosen such that the drivers are playing a mixed strategy whereas the police is not enforcing with certainty. We also postulate a short period version of the repeated game with generalized stage game payoffs. For this game, we construct a multistage strategy profile that is a"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"2402.09556","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"integrity":{"clean":true,"summary":{"advisory":0,"critical":0,"by_detector":{},"informational":0},"endpoint":"/pith/2402.09556/integrity.json","findings":[],"available":true,"detectors_run":[],"snapshot_sha256":"c28c3603d3b5d939e8dc4c7e95fa8dfce3d595e45f758748cecf8e644a296938"},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}