{"paper":{"title":"The menu complexity of \"one-and-a-half-dimensional\" mechanism design","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Ariel Schvartzman, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, S. Matthew Weinberg","submitted_at":"2017-11-06T20:48:11Z","abstract_excerpt":"We study the menu complexity of optimal and approximately-optimal auctions in the context of the \"FedEx\" problem, a so-called \"one-and-a-half-dimensional\" setting where a single bidder has both a value and a deadline for receiving an [FGKK16]. The menu complexity of an auction is equal to the number of distinct (allocation, price) pairs that a bidder might receive [HN13]. We show the following when the bidder has $n$ possible deadlines:\n  - Exponential menu complexity is necessary to be exactly optimal: There exist instances where the optimal mechanism has menu complexity is $2^n-1$. This matc"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1711.02165","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}