{"paper":{"title":"Condorcet-Consistent and Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Ariel Schvartzman, Jon Schneider, S. Matthew Weinberg","submitted_at":"2016-05-31T17:25:30Z","abstract_excerpt":"We consider the manipulability of tournament rules for round-robin tournaments of $n$ competitors. Specifically, $n$ competitors are competing for a prize, and a tournament rule $r$ maps the result of all $\\binom{n}{2}$ pairwise matches (called a tournament, $T$) to a distribution over winners. Rule $r$ is Condorcet-consistent if whenever $i$ wins all $n-1$ of her matches, $r$ selects $i$ with probability $1$.\n  We consider strategic manipulation of tournaments where player $j$ might throw their match to player $i$ in order to increase the likelihood that one of them wins the tournament. Regar"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1605.09733","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}