{"paper":{"title":"Complexity Dichotomies for Unweighted Scoring Rules","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.CC","authors_text":"Edith Hemaspaandra, Henning Schnoor","submitted_at":"2016-04-18T17:49:58Z","abstract_excerpt":"Scoring systems are an extremely important class of election systems. We study the complexity of manipulation, constructive control by deleting voters (CCDV), and bribery for scoring systems.\n  For manipulation, we show that for all scoring rules with a constant number of different coefficients, manipulation is in P. And we conjecture that there is no dichotomy theorem.\n  On the other hand, we obtain dichotomy theorems for CCDV and bribery problem. More precisely, we show that both of these problems are easy for 1-approval, 2-approval, 1-veto, 2-veto, 3-veto, generalized 2-veto, and (2,1,...,1"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1604.05264","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}