{"paper":{"title":"Improving the Price of Anarchy for Selfish Routing via Coordination Mechanisms","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Evangelia Pyrga, George Christodoulou, Kurt Mehlhorn","submitted_at":"2012-02-13T21:41:11Z","abstract_excerpt":"We reconsider the well-studied Selfish Routing game with affine latency functions. The Price of Anarchy for this class of games takes maximum value 4/3; this maximum is attained already for a simple network of two parallel links, known as Pigou's network. We improve upon the value 4/3 by means of Coordination Mechanisms.\n  We increase the latency functions of the edges in the network, i.e., if $\\ell_e(x)$ is the latency function of an edge $e$, we replace it by $\\hat{\\ell}_e(x)$ with $\\ell_e(x) \\le \\hat{\\ell}_e(x)$ for all $x$. Then an adversary fixes a demand rate as input. The engineered Pri"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1202.2877","kind":"arxiv","version":2},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}