{"paper":{"title":"Revenue Guarantees of No-Swap-Regret Dynamics in First Price Auctions","license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Anders Bo Ipsen, Stratis Skoulakis","submitted_at":"2026-06-04T12:23:35Z","abstract_excerpt":"We study the revenue of approximate correlated equilibrium in discrete first price auctions - the set of allowable bids is $\\mathcal{B} = \\{0, 1/k, \\dots, 1 - 1/k, 1\\}$ for some $k \\in \\mathbb{N}$. We show that the revenue of any $\\epsilon$-approximate correlated equilibrium is at least $v_2 - \\Theta(1/k)- \\Theta(\\epsilon k^2)$, where $v_2 \\geq 0$ is the second-highest valuation. Our results establish the first polynomial convergence rates on the revenue generated by no-swap regret bidders in first-price auctions.\n  For instance, if bidders admit the optimal swap regret of $\\mathcal{O}(\\sqrt{k"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"2606.06085","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"integrity":{"clean":true,"summary":{"advisory":0,"critical":0,"by_detector":{},"informational":0},"endpoint":"/pith/2606.06085/integrity.json","findings":[],"available":true,"detectors_run":[],"snapshot_sha256":"c28c3603d3b5d939e8dc4c7e95fa8dfce3d595e45f758748cecf8e644a296938"},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}