{"paper":{"title":"Optimal (and Benchmark-Optimal) Competition Complexity for Additive Buyers over Independent Items","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Hedyeh Beyhaghi, S. Matthew Weinberg","submitted_at":"2018-12-05T03:05:01Z","abstract_excerpt":"The Competition Complexity of an auction setting refers to the number of additional bidders necessary in order for the (deterministic, prior-independent, dominant strategy truthful) Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism to achieve greater revenue than the (randomized, prior-dependent, Bayesian-truthful) optimal mechanism without the additional bidders.\n  We prove that the competition complexity of $n$ bidders with additive valuations over $m$ independent items is at most $n(\\ln(1+m/n)+2)$, and also at most $9\\sqrt{nm}$. When $n \\leq m$, the first bound is optimal up to constant factors, even when th"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1812.01794","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}