{"paper":{"title":"Jamming in multiple independent Gaussian channels as a game","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.IT","cs.NI","math.IT"],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Anthony Ephremides, Apostolos Traganitis, Michail Fasoulakis","submitted_at":"2018-07-25T17:55:06Z","abstract_excerpt":"We study the problem of \\emph{jamming} in multiple independent \\emph{Gaussian channels} as a zero-sum game. We show that in the unique Nash equilibrium of the game the best-response strategy of the transmitter is the \\emph{waterfilling} to the sum of the jamming and the noise power in each channel and the best-response strategy of the jammer is the \\emph{waterfilling} only to the noise power."},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1807.09749","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}