{"paper":{"title":"When Effort May Fail: Equilibria of Shared Effort with a Threshold","license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["math.CO"],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Gleb Polevoy, Mathijs de Weerdt, Stojan Trajanovski","submitted_at":"2023-12-03T22:04:59Z","abstract_excerpt":"People, robots, and companies mostly divide time and effort among projects, and \\defined{shared effort games} model people investing resources in public endeavors and sharing the generated values. In linear $\\theta$ sharing (effort) games, a project's value is linear in the total contribution, thus modelling predictable, uniform, and scalable activities. The threshold $\\theta$ for effort defines which contributors win and receive their share, equal share modelling standard salaries, equity-minded projects, etc. Thresholds between 0 and 1 model games such as paper co-authorship and shared assig"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"2312.01513","kind":"arxiv","version":3},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"integrity":{"clean":true,"summary":{"advisory":0,"critical":0,"by_detector":{},"informational":0},"endpoint":"/pith/2312.01513/integrity.json","findings":[],"available":true,"detectors_run":[],"snapshot_sha256":"c28c3603d3b5d939e8dc4c7e95fa8dfce3d595e45f758748cecf8e644a296938"},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}