{"paper":{"title":"Games With Tolerant Players","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Arpita Ghosh (Cornell University), Joseph Y. Halpern (Cornell University)","submitted_at":"2017-07-27T07:49:37Z","abstract_excerpt":"A notion of pi-tolerant equilibrium is defined that takes into account that players have some tolerance regarding payoffs in a game.  This solution concept generalizes Nash and refines epsilon-Nash equilibrium in a natural way.  We show that pi-tolerant equilibrium can explain cooperation in social dilemmas such as Prisoner's Dilemma and the Public Good game.  We then examine the structure of particularly cooperative pi-tolerant equilibria, where players are as cooperative as they can be, subject to their tolerances, in Prisoner's Dilemma.   To the extent that cooperation is due to tolerance, "},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1707.08748","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}