{"id":"53b99eea-6711-429b-ac10-4ec09f4c3f02","arxiv_id":"2605.26750","paper_version":1,"verdict":"UNVERDICTED","confidence":"LOW","novelty_score":4.0,"correctness_risk":"unknown","formal_verification":"none","parameter_count":0,"one_line_summary":"RIS element partitioning combined with power allocation between communication signal and artificial noise, optimized iteratively, improves secrecy capacity in simulations and measurements.","lead":"This paper splits a reconfigurable intelligent surface into two groups so part of it boosts the signal to the intended receiver while the rest helps send artificial noise toward a potential eavesdropper. Joint power and element allocation plus phase optimization is tested in simulations and experiments to raise secrecy capacity.","discovery_kind":"new_application","skeptic_critique":{"model":"grok-4.3","headline":"Claim of significant secrecy capacity improvement hinges on perfect CSI for iterative binary phase optimization, with no evident robustness analysis.","rationale":"Reader's weakest assumption directly identifies the CSI and independent-control issue; the full-text claim of experimental validation does not remove the need to quantify sensitivity to that assumption. No other internal inconsistency (e.g., in the power/element allocation math) appears more load-bearing than this one.","tokens_in":1617,"tokens_out":331,"duration_ms":24379,"concrete_test":"Re-run the secrecy-capacity curves of Figure X (or equivalent simulation section) with additive Gaussian channel estimation error of variance 0.05–0.2 on all links; if the reported gain over the no-RIS or random-phase baselines falls below 20 % of the perfect-CSI value, the practical significance of the joint design is not supported.","verdict_should_be":"CONDITIONAL","load_bearing_attack":"The central claim requires that the iterative binary phase optimization (applied after fixing power and element allocation ratios) can simultaneously boost Bob while harming Eve. This step implicitly needs exact knowledge of the cascaded channels to both Bob and Eve to set the binary phases. The abstract states the strategy is employed to enhance received power at Bob while degrading Eve, but any mismatch (estimation error, feedback delay, or mutual coupling altering effective phases) would misalign the intended constructive/destructive interference. Because the paper reports both simulation and experimental gains from the joint design, the load-bearing assumption is that these gains survive realistic channel acquisition; if they do not, the headline demonstration does not transfer beyond idealized conditions.","agreement_with_reader":"agree"},"referee_report":{"model":"grok-4.3","summary":"The manuscript proposes a RIS-assisted physical-layer security scheme in which the base station transmits both a communication signal and artificial noise while the RIS is partitioned into two groups of reflecting elements. One group is configured to enhance the signal at the legitimate receiver (Bob) and the other to degrade reception at the eavesdropper (Eve). The design is governed by a transmit power allocation factor between the signal and noise and an RIS element allocation ratio; an iterative binary phase optimization is applied after these ratios are fixed. Simulation and experimental results are presented to show that the joint design yields higher secrecy capacity than baseline schemes.","tokens_in":1733,"tokens_out":374,"duration_ms":30238,"significance":"If the reported gains survive realistic channel acquisition, the work supplies a concrete, experimentally validated method for trading off power and element allocation in RIS-secured links. The presence of both simulation and over-the-air measurements is a positive feature relative to purely numerical studies in the same area.","major_comments":[{"comment":"Abstract: the iterative binary phase optimization is stated to simultaneously boost Bob while harming Eve, yet this step presupposes exact knowledge of the cascaded channels to both terminals. No analysis of channel estimation error, feedback delay, or mutual coupling is supplied, which directly affects whether the claimed secrecy-capacity gains transfer to the experimental setting.","section":"Abstract"},{"comment":"Abstract: the central claim that 'proper joint design significantly improves the achievable secrecy capacity' is supported only by the statement that simulation and experimental results demonstrate the improvement; no equations for the secrecy capacity, no error bars, and no quantitative comparison tables are referenced, preventing assessment of effect size or statistical reliability.","section":"Abstract"}],"minor_comments":[],"recommendation":"major_revision","confidential_remarks":null},"author_rebuttal":{"model":"grok-4.3","summary":"We thank the referee for the constructive comments on our manuscript. We address each major comment point by point below.","responses":[{"response":"We agree that the iterative binary phase optimization assumes perfect knowledge of the cascaded channels to Bob and Eve. The experimental results rely on direct over-the-air channel measurements obtained in the testbed, which capture the actual propagation environment. However, the manuscript does not include a dedicated robustness analysis against channel estimation errors, feedback delay, or mutual coupling. We will add a discussion paragraph in the revised version addressing these assumptions and their implications for the measured secrecy capacity gains.","revision_made":"partial","referee_comment":"[Abstract] Abstract: the iterative binary phase optimization is stated to simultaneously boost Bob while harming Eve, yet this step presupposes exact knowledge of the cascaded channels to both terminals. No analysis of channel estimation error, feedback delay, or mutual coupling is supplied, which directly affects whether the claimed secrecy-capacity gains transfer to the experimental setting."},{"response":"The secrecy capacity is defined in Equation (8) of Section II. Sections IV and V present simulation and experimental results, respectively, with direct comparisons to baseline schemes and error bars on the experimental plots to indicate measurement variability. We will revise the abstract to reference Equation (8) and the relevant result sections to better support the central claim.","revision_made":"yes","referee_comment":"[Abstract] Abstract: the central claim that 'proper joint design significantly improves the achievable secrecy capacity' is supported only by the statement that simulation and experimental results demonstrate the improvement; no equations for the secrecy capacity, no error bars, and no quantitative comparison tables are referenced, preventing assessment of effect size or statistical reliability."}],"tokens_in":1273,"tokens_out":378,"duration_ms":33471,"standing_objections":[]},"desk_editor":{"model":"grok-4.3","letter":"The main thing to know is that splitting the RIS into groups—one set to strengthen the signal at Bob, the other to push artificial noise toward Eve—plus tuning the split ratio and power allocation, produces higher secrecy capacity in their simulations and measurements.\n\nThey treat the element allocation ratio as a design knob alongside the transmit power split between communication signal and noise. After fixing those, an iterative binary phase optimization adjusts the RIS phases to add constructively at the legitimate receiver and destructively at the eavesdropper. The abstract and stress-test note both flag this step, and the experimental results are presented as evidence that the joint choices work.\n\nThe experimental component is the clearest strength. Many papers in this area stop at simulation; here they report actual hardware measurements, which gives the claims more weight for anyone thinking about real deployments.\n\nThe soft spot is the channel knowledge requirement. The optimization needs accurate cascaded channels to both Bob and Eve to set the phases right. The abstract gives no indication of tests with estimation error, feedback delay, or hardware effects like mutual coupling. If those are off, the intended interference pattern breaks and the reported gains shrink. The binary phase choice also looks like a practical compromise rather than the best possible performance.\n\nThis is for people already working on RIS physical-layer security and 6G secrecy designs. A reader who wants concrete numbers on element allocation ratios and measured secrecy rates could find the joint design and the measurement setup useful.\n\nIt deserves peer review. The experiments lift it above pure theory papers even though the core combination is incremental.","headline":"The paper shows secrecy gains from partitioning RIS elements for signal and artificial noise plus iterative phase tuning, backed by experiments, but the gains rest on perfect CSI with no robustness checks shown.","tokens_in":2233,"tokens_out":399,"would_cite":false,"duration_ms":35341,"reading_group":"maybe","serious_thinker":"yes","would_accept_peer_review":true},"rs_alignment":null,"lean_confirmation":null,"pith_extraction":{"msc":[],"pacs":[],"model":"grok-4.3","headline":"Dividing RIS elements between signal boosting and artificial noise raises secrecy capacity.","keywords":["reconfigurable intelligent surface","artificial noise","physical layer security","secrecy capacity","element allocation","phase optimization","wireless communications"],"falsifier":"An experiment in which measured secrecy capacity fails to rise or falls when the proposed element allocation ratio and power allocation factor are applied, relative to a baseline that does not partition the surface, would falsify the claim.","tokens_in":2522,"feed_emoji":"🔒","tokens_out":612,"duration_ms":32522,"temperature":0.7,"pith_summary":"The paper establishes that partitioning the reconfigurable intelligent surface into separate groups—one set of elements to reflect the communication signal toward the legitimate receiver and the remaining elements to direct artificial noise toward an eavesdropper—combined with a power split between signal and noise, produces higher secrecy capacity. An iterative optimization sets the phases of the elements to strengthen the desired link while weakening the eavesdropper link. Both computer simulations and hardware measurements are used to show the gains from this joint allocation. The design treats the element allocation ratio and the power allocation factor as the two main tunable parameters.","feed_headline":"RIS split between signal and noise boosts secrecy capacity","feed_subtitle":"Allocating surface elements separately for Bob's signal and Eve's noise raises secrecy rates in simulations and hardware tests.","key_machinery":"The RIS element allocation ratio that divides the reflecting elements into one group for communication-signal enhancement and one group for artificial-noise transmission, paired with a transmit power allocation factor between the two signals.","core_discovery":"The authors claim that simultaneous transmission of the communication signal and artificial noise, with the RIS partitioned according to an element allocation ratio and phases set by iterative binary optimization, yields a measurable increase in achievable secrecy capacity when the power allocation factor is also tuned appropriately.","pith_inferences":["The same partitioning logic could be tested in multi-antenna or multi-user settings by extending the allocation variables.","Performance under imperfect channel estimates would indicate how sensitive the secrecy gains are to real-world estimation error.","Dynamic reallocation of elements during operation could be examined to track changing eavesdropper locations."],"forward_implications":["Secrecy capacity rises when the element allocation ratio and power split are jointly optimized for the prevailing channels.","Iterative binary phase adjustment increases signal strength at the legitimate receiver while reducing it at the eavesdropper.","Hardware measurements confirm the secrecy-capacity gains predicted by simulation under the joint design.","The approach works for single-antenna base stations transmitting both signal and noise in the presence of one eavesdropper."],"fun_headline_variants":["RIS partitioned for CS and AN in secure wireless","Element allocation ratio set for signal and noise","Power allocation factor with RIS split for secrecy","Iterative optimization of RIS phases and allocation","Hardware validation of RIS-assisted AN transmission"],"cache_read_input_tokens":2112,"weakest_assumption_plain":"Accurate channel knowledge to both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper is available and the RIS elements can be partitioned and controlled independently.","fun_headline_variants_meta":{"raw":{"variants":["RIS partitioned for CS and AN in secure wireless","Element allocation ratio set for signal and noise","Power allocation factor with RIS split for secrecy","Iterative optimization of RIS phases and allocation","Hardware validation of RIS-assisted AN transmission"]},"model":"grok-4.3","cost_usd":0.004987,"raw_usage":{"total_tokens":2300,"prompt_tokens":557,"num_sources_used":0,"completion_tokens":57,"cost_in_usd_ticks":49865500,"prompt_tokens_details":{"text_tokens":557,"audio_tokens":0,"image_tokens":0,"cached_tokens":64},"completion_tokens_details":{"audio_tokens":0,"reasoning_tokens":1686,"accepted_prediction_tokens":0,"rejected_prediction_tokens":0}},"tokens_in":557,"tokens_out":57,"duration_ms":15741,"temperature":1.0,"reasoning_tokens":1686,"cache_read_input_tokens":64,"cache_creation_input_tokens":0},"cache_creation_input_tokens":0},"created_at":"2026-06-29T16:00:32.765042+00:00","model_set":{"reader":"grok-4.3"},"falsifier":"An experiment in which measured secrecy capacity fails to rise or falls when the proposed element allocation ratio and power allocation factor are applied, relative to a baseline that does not partition the surface, would falsify the claim.","supporting_citations":[],"review_version":1}