{"as_of":"2026-08-14T18:05:00Z","caps":{"database_statements":6,"inbound":100,"outbound":100},"context_digest":"sha256:8049af5f45506100be1506b97b88ab08a11bcd18d1f94d1809c9a18b3fc7b53e","coverage":[{"denominator":53,"lane":"reference_resolution","note":"Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.","records_observed":53,"source":"paper_references, paper_reference_links","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:16.121861Z","state":"measured"},{"denominator":55,"lane":"standing_notices","note":"One-hop event checks from named stored sources.","records_observed":55,"source":"scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache","source_observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","state":"measured"},{"denominator":2,"lane":"inbound_itemization","note":"Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.","records_observed":2,"source":"paper_references, paper_reference_links","source_observed_at":"2026-05-19T22:04:21.032669Z","state":"measured"},{"denominator":1,"lane":"external_citation_measurements","note":"A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.","records_observed":0,"source":"arxiv_reference","source_observed_at":"2026-05-19T22:07:49.234449Z","state":"measured"}],"external_citation_measurements":[],"inbound":[{"citation":{"cited_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","doi":null,"metadata_source":"arxiv_reference","pith_arxiv_id":"2507.11509","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-07-30T01:19:00.845716Z","title":"On the complexity of the optimal correlated equilibria in extensive-form games","venue":null,"work_id":"8e8f963a-ed9d-403e-9c46-2b406cfd647b","year":2025},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2604.25256","last_updated":"2026-04-28T06:05:17Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:41:56.096543Z","submitted_at":"2026-04-28T06:05:17Z","title":"AutoResearchBench: Benchmarking AI Agents on Complex Scientific Literature Discovery","version":1},"reference_index":52,"source":"pdf_text","source_observed_at":"2026-05-07T16:38:40.938722Z"},"links":{"cited_paper":"/paper/2507.11509","citing_paper":"/paper/2604.25256"},"observation_digest":"sha256:0a2f7f8ac594998490093aedb6c3947f79aea4b843ef94c0a9fd67dcefb5af3a","observation_id":"af3fd4be-bcfc-4582-bdd8-17cafd6aa299","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-07-30T01:19:00.845716Z","resolver_source":"arxiv_id","status":"metadata_mismatch"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","doi":null,"metadata_source":"arxiv_reference","pith_arxiv_id":"2507.11509","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-07-30T01:19:00.845716Z","title":"On the complexity of the optimal correlated equilibria in extensive-form games","venue":null,"work_id":"8e8f963a-ed9d-403e-9c46-2b406cfd647b","year":2025},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2605.17665","last_updated":"2026-05-17T21:50:52Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T05:34:01.032891Z","submitted_at":"2026-05-17T21:50:52Z","title":"On the Complexity of Correlated Equilibria Beyond Normal-Form Games","version":1},"reference_index":20,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-05-19T22:04:21.032669Z"},"links":{"cited_paper":"/paper/2507.11509","citing_paper":"/paper/2605.17665"},"observation_digest":"sha256:5707bdabe42713e05bcf85b6617286b1c22551c4dc3f6c2f055b16df9e83328e","observation_id":"3851855d-4a85-423e-8b9f-07a487227fa6","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-07-30T01:19:00.845716Z","resolver_source":"arxiv_id","status":"verified_exact"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}}],"links":{"evidence":"/evidence","html":"/paper/2507.11509/citation-record","integrity":"/paper/2507.11509/integrity","json":"/paper/2507.11509/citation-record.json","paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"outbound":[{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:24.820084Z","title":null,"venue":null,"work_id":"7da7c13c-df85-4e93-b7af-fcaff4025054","year":1974},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":1,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:09.224919Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:106a1c12f142aa05d2a41574ab09979a64ae9a93a269efbac988f374c7cfc295","observation_id":"6c0991d8-268e-4a4f-b6dd-945321eda57c","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:24.871967Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:24.696887Z","title":"A catalog of exists-r-complete decision problems about nash equilibria in multi-player games","venue":null,"work_id":"aa2ef320-4704-4856-96da-952f4cd3e4da","year":2016},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":2,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:10.158275Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:944b4a3f7d6008119fc9b5ae1d86c4d51fd507906fc85591de014f93c45330c6","observation_id":"1d4465b7-eb86-4cee-aff1-9ebadcee8304","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:24.747235Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:24.572045Z","title":null,"venue":null,"work_id":"fe138265-17b4-4b81-ae14-dd3b87b7d61c","year":1996},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":3,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:10.239063Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:e009004d761505f516d73390253f1ba485cd5c13e7c82510440421a0d30e38dc","observation_id":"df3026fd-c869-4f70-90cf-1fdf3f7deec0","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:24.631043Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:24.462059Z","title":"Computing optimal ex ante correlated equilibria in two-player sequential games","venue":null,"work_id":"78357043-06c2-43df-a6e8-1f2a68ba25e1","year":2019},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":4,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:10.389140Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:e5b6cd2d03a06ae50a3b701e8f3e34581892ef02606f2edd039e5463dc4f8911","observation_id":"b658555c-bb5b-4803-94a2-732c0630631d","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:24.487935Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:24.366625Z","title":"Settling the complexity of two-player nash equilibrium","venue":null,"work_id":"706d2b83-915d-4455-b50d-a4cde4c588ea","year":2006},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":5,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:10.538337Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:4151648b2c595bf710af9088d7ff4992bbcd7a8d80d625614e3524fb5076e0f1","observation_id":"4ca3d806-51a4-443f-bdff-49f60dde8cde","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:24.435582Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:24.270024Z","title":"Computing nash equilibria: Approximation and smoothed complexity","venue":null,"work_id":"a3188d66-43b0-409a-8f47-e89fa785daa7","year":2006},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":6,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:10.664033Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:4b85c0a1540981050d77c4ced24148c9a8fbf40267f9aac10c15c26c87ef1e3e","observation_id":"6a2036b8-3662-449c-9f90-24c1f08eb700","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:24.311757Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:24.167760Z","title":"Learning to correlate in multi-player general-sum sequential games","venue":null,"work_id":"05fc648b-1b8a-47cb-b00c-1e4bb3657d3b","year":2019},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":7,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:10.754254Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:8b037618e3327f2d826a56d32ebcb8d2375e0dcc767530bc20c08d1377c63c99","observation_id":"05dbb2f7-94a6-4398-831c-59d53b3bf709","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:24.218796Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:23.971294Z","title":"Finding correlated equilibrium of constrained markov game: A primal-dual approach","venue":null,"work_id":"0907ae58-2e21-4f9d-9948-abff16ad22a3","year":2022},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":8,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:10.866378Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:e4ce9a1dbda77e630963384c7e9242a6ce0214f1db4323d39610d65f0fd33d29","observation_id":"183b0902-1242-4a34-bbf3-fd38fbe9a27b","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:24.094970Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:23.834627Z","title":"New complexity results about nash equilibria","venue":null,"work_id":"02a60d97-20c6-4b9d-9fe2-04acc2b84c2b","year":2008},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":9,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:10.928457Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:2d25f963eee538580465e31b2c7666648715a58db457d60323d744619c4c1b9c","observation_id":"fb492257-b4d7-4827-9a77-20b8d7630145","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:23.886216Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:23.645663Z","title":"On the complexity of approximating a nash equilibrium","venue":null,"work_id":"81b6e512-7f08-4832-9ea1-60a558f0dc7c","year":2013},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":10,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:11.007208Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:071f08a7ea89b0649120311e7bfce99b0ad6e89f592d1dcbafdd8dcb1655bd0f","observation_id":"b6e7f59f-bc41-4e3f-8128-e575ce221f39","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:23.727223Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:23.415001Z","title":"From external to swap regret 2.0: An efficient reduction for large action spaces","venue":null,"work_id":"29424dd3-f11d-496d-926f-71eaec62d485","year":2024},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":11,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:11.069522Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:042333746ec944012d8016ab34e4f8d977d603f2053f47ebadd0586256498d75","observation_id":"44b70f1b-8815-4324-93c3-04f42766fdeb","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:23.522570Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:23.208420Z","title":"Efficient learning and computation of linear correlated equilibrium in general convex games","venue":null,"work_id":"b4bfd827-72cd-4cab-8d48-fc20af457e70","year":2025},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":12,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:11.176726Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:c7d62a21c0764f620044360a84934d05ca2ed9b536922b80c3eaa3906b4ef5ec","observation_id":"42b69fd5-c041-4513-b77c-75c7a075ebfd","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:23.308127Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:22.980114Z","title":"Papadimitriou","venue":null,"work_id":"0a70cef1-4b5e-4f9a-a5bf-993c199c4b09","year":2006},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":13,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:11.272648Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:0edb35e124a6673d24fe98c7a61bb20bedb43a965ab18c131be8b3163ee5b713","observation_id":"02f64a01-ef37-4ede-bdb0-1e2a35143e0c","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:23.065709Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:22.848693Z","title":"The complexity of computing a nash equilibrium","venue":null,"work_id":"7d375624-2441-4c5f-92f2-34dea6e0ea94","year":2009},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":14,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:11.440422Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:13115fcff8d6db4e4c495c1df7d0fac24d2add773845ab01102c05946f97442d","observation_id":"89c0e865-dfd9-49bd-8e27-9c2be24432bf","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:22.945630Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:22.680196Z","title":"On the complexity of nash equilibria and other fixed points","venue":null,"work_id":"a63b7dc6-1699-41d6-ac81-f4a86f5f2ebf","year":2010},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":15,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:11.606477Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:5f3f7ed864bda06e588b162128e37beb928d00b0c105290055ef5a4cbc868d2f","observation_id":"88d87755-5748-4035-8214-9eb69dd9044a","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:22.757404Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:22.549262Z","title":"Coarse correlation in extensive-form games","venue":null,"work_id":"b055ff9b-868c-46ac-821e-55743e8c2956","year":2020},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":16,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:11.732328Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:a17500796feac64d4780caf78293df5c61e4209bb97f3380a129c4c0dee60c12","observation_id":"3611643f-dafa-44fa-9b92-10a29cfdb940","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:22.622921Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:22.398891Z","title":"Connecting optimal ex-ante collusion in teams to extensive-form correlation: Faster algorithms and positive complexity results","venue":null,"work_id":"9ce718cb-a22a-43db-8183-fabdd3e9f8fb","year":2021},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":17,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:11.890373Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:8d53aaa842c0cb561e67ad6307587a7e3923461aa5d81bd5ed06f13c02132b2b","observation_id":"fff51ffd-c4a6-438a-9f4e-1ccac1850217","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:22.475358Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:22.310458Z","title":"Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information","venue":null,"work_id":"47c2ccfa-2a66-40d4-a95c-c92210dcf11b","year":1993},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":18,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:12.093063Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:95ab20b1bed59aee567ea69980e5ba58ff90063dd8fb275eaf0a006e2e917f96","observation_id":"0f54ca02-67c8-4cf5-a3ea-cd4ce94651b2","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:22.345111Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:22.187304Z","title":"Polynomial-time linear-swap regret minimization in imperfect-information sequential games","venue":null,"work_id":"d971f9a3-0245-4020-9817-5cfe517d7858","year":2023},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":19,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:12.218092Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:497caf499483141a0b5ef6ac0873ec65bece349c81395a90b2891c06a31cfdb9","observation_id":"270cd17b-6204-4bfc-9a20-97d538b1ae69","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:22.261281Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:22.019945Z","title":"The complexity of pure nash equilibria","venue":null,"work_id":"cb3c3fda-c427-4cb4-bb34-37741e7cf13e","year":2004},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":20,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:12.366218Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:1ddde9f407c135173627b6cfe56ef520b3f789cd1dc4fcd340b20bb2ec81f16e","observation_id":"545cef6b-4768-4704-8fb9-93e034446f45","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:22.094335Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:21.896907Z","title":"Polynomial-time computation of optimal correlated equilibria in two-player extensive-form games with public chance moves and beyond","venue":null,"work_id":"3b283931-e70b-4ac3-b44b-016f6e71040d","year":2020},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":21,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:12.491240Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:cf2c1468a44779b5207f3fa113c1a0f9d105251bde776f042fa7e20c45ef98f9","observation_id":"5c113327-3535-470f-be3e-d814bb8e0b90","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:21.955408Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2304.05005","last_updated":"2025-06-29T13:53:00Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-13T12:05:14.637455Z","submitted_at":"2023-04-11T06:22:51Z","title":"Bayes correlated equilibria, no-regret dynamics in Bayesian games, and the price of anarchy","version":2},"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":"2304.05005","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:12.688152Z","title":"Bayes correlated equilibria and no-regret dynamics","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2023},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":22,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:12.688152Z"},"links":{"cited_paper":"/paper/2304.05005","citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:52e561ec59783f43c281001443d26c251fe43729b21a07f50233809a3fb8f670","observation_id":"0f6b9cd2-c5b1-42b6-9ea6-bc3e7096c275","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:12.688152Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:21.771470Z","title":"Garey and David S","venue":null,"work_id":"07660855-d0cf-4df9-9e27-68a2b9db069e","year":1979},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":23,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:13.094956Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:8a2160901274f2e73ee0c6695e55a720f4552d50633ecf9029e826178e13ff21","observation_id":"2aa72a0c-b26b-4181-be36-a7df96020151","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:21.835853Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:21.660392Z","title":"Goldberg and Christos H","venue":null,"work_id":"e878ac08-54b6-4bb6-b3d3-f5ffd73c591a","year":2006},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":24,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:13.298391Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:8c6745c0706f13b289c9f7c1284a21084c974c672bf8007383f0e5c65f977091","observation_id":"61123400-69e9-4271-bd2c-b39301ce5c00","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:21.702347Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:21.550376Z","title":"Goodfellow, Jean Pouget - Abadie, Mehdi Mirza, Bing Xu, David Warde - Farley, Sherjil Ozair, Aaron C","venue":null,"work_id":"57d1c34c-869d-46eb-9052-4fa9b596aef5","year":2014},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":25,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:13.373431Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:a15bc6ca88ab12afc6b20ed729354d46bfb91f828d3acc51a8b709bd1f2302ea","observation_id":"3b116d02-5e35-4abe-9d30-23db8101f075","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:21.608740Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:13.458899Z","title":"Nash and correlated equilibria: Some complexity considerations","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":1989},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":26,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:13.458899Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:e1a8b7ce10cdcaca93e39e843dc79e0f26380d4da0115a138e0e17834dca4dd8","observation_id":"3222087f-59ff-4d2d-975b-68f3f720251f","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:13.458899Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:21.371626Z","title":"Finding equilibria in games of no chance","venue":null,"work_id":"ff1b19f8-9ee7-425f-8629-581a5d889c53","year":2007},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":27,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:13.573500Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:7510b483e0d218d83ccbdc968bdfbb9c5da7f06526d2f3f80545e1437b35d4e8","observation_id":"a3d1af1a-269b-4559-ad2d-cdcbd7fe9ffe","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:21.452021Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:21.295235Z","title":"Computing an extensive-form correlated equilibrium in polynomial time","venue":null,"work_id":"f0c437ad-9441-4d8d-97b8-9afe739a3544","year":2008},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":28,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:13.790995Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:7a869302c97b5e4f94a059922bf94950c39a96375b3e60bdeb3d08f8521cc73d","observation_id":"aed4d264-ecc7-4721-99db-9f6dffdd925c","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:21.330839Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:21.067006Z","title":"Polynomial-time computation of exact correlated equilibrium in compact games","venue":null,"work_id":"53f96b9b-c932-485c-850e-43eb882506f9","year":2015},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":29,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:14.160496Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:1df8d901c84e5867494373cd70656524502b4939ea1a1d331a6fe03ddbb0a5ef","observation_id":"5f48ecd3-92a8-420b-a8d2-0781a051c6e2","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:21.195424Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:20.947692Z","title":"u cken, Germany (Virtual Conference) , volume 168 of LIPIcs , pages 3:1--3:18. Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum f \\","venue":null,"work_id":"03557d57-ed76-4dc9-8775-dbfd82784de4","year":2020},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":30,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:14.445561Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:26e21ba90b504c52ddbcbb6e47c8350535d9426b861c045f806313b42b37e8b9","observation_id":"ef955bc4-4f2f-42ce-b103-7ab2bd459edc","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:21.010711Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:20.778413Z","title":"Strategy complexity of B üchi objectives in concurrent stochastic games","venue":null,"work_id":"af4002ac-ad1c-43b4-82c7-5e0e88efd072","year":2025},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":31,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:14.490930Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:09f203629b634bb5a700fbc3260985f6a82c2582b7776615d8b82e4afe74c90e","observation_id":"c3f54aa9-3118-4870-9ef3-156487551d37","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:20.860314Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:20.645395Z","title":"Efficient computation of equilibria for extensive two-person games","venue":null,"work_id":"5e90ee23-9fdc-4d54-85ec-9c5e2c9458be","year":1996},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":32,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:14.516102Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:5a99c0c17947fcaca4f8851c2393135146e6ad022bd7e981b84b242d0a30adfd","observation_id":"22b67490-0cf3-4399-8501-90a2391c99fc","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:20.689807Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:20.534155Z","title":"Auction theory","venue":null,"work_id":"599a005d-5c03-4908-a389-925923a0e0c0","year":2009},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":33,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:14.568567Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:483c53faf42ba9ab64088184bc2eb94035ee60a07a561f1edd4559d5667d7ab4","observation_id":"b1a6770b-1feb-4fac-af9b-3c40cf33017f","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:20.589797Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:20.338223Z","title":null,"venue":null,"work_id":"b92afb78-3052-4f6e-97ab-b1841411dc01","year":1953},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":34,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:14.673909Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:3cfacf6867608c55067e86f0b8015fbd03d5482e7261edf4e28fac07a88e4d4c","observation_id":"2c7b6c09-2ccb-49ce-bb2f-e27db05eda97","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:20.418827Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:20.199815Z","title":"A decentralized parallel algorithm for training generative adversarial nets","venue":null,"work_id":"2f0e4833-fcd7-4240-a269-57a291662003","year":2020},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":35,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:14.733465Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:d7947b966ce668c1a95e75b40eb05f47d331cdfa5e4af981529fff3577e6254d","observation_id":"767c91e2-1dd0-41ba-92da-01873d963e17","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:20.258665Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2102.06973","last_updated":"2022-06-22T23:16:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-13T20:14:52.382990Z","submitted_at":"2021-02-13T18:12:53Z","title":"Efficient Deviation Types and Learning for Hindsight Rationality in Extensive-Form Games","version":7},"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":"2102.06973","doi":null,"metadata_source":"pith","pith_arxiv_id":"2102.06973","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:16.245556Z","title":"Efficient Deviation Types and Learning for Hindsight Rationality in Extensive-Form Games","venue":"cs.GT","work_id":"55e2af60-b811-49ee-a304-bea4c3a05b4a","year":2021},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":36,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:14.774776Z"},"links":{"cited_paper":"/paper/2102.06973","citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:e2a0172f97e1a1f205707cf16fe280221de446812f5659ffb472bcae179fa6a9","observation_id":"eb595a69-0af1-4d49-805d-306571b4ada6","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:16.369560Z","resolver_source":"local_arxiv","status":"verified_exact"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:20.076921Z","title":"Hindsight and sequential rationality of correlated play","venue":null,"work_id":"fbbe07fb-c936-4552-87cc-7c6920e58dc8","year":2021},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":37,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:14.824000Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:86e635d9e2fd94698487b320a396904eed7abd63fa7f925c44b7b2952bf8840f","observation_id":"f0f6803d-7d35-4b6e-9e44-d26191f05e0f","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:20.124724Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:19.943660Z","title":"Moulin and J","venue":null,"work_id":"a59cc855-383e-4321-bf5b-7454219b51f0","year":1978},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":38,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:14.904162Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:f0a07fe3ec0f09e85da29c396a0c673cd320c10af9e96212cf1afe3a32d13a48","observation_id":"a6f93ea6-af89-4f83-ba0a-816671cc3fcb","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:19.997237Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:19.737630Z","title":null,"venue":null,"work_id":"4982c445-a666-419a-9c7f-06671eb0711d","year":1986},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":39,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:14.988736Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:9861b92fbad1987f73a1ccc618e09d41ced20f2ef611d14735bc5677020ac7fc","observation_id":"510ae22a-b822-41fb-aa30-5ad5cfaca648","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:19.835428Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:19.584455Z","title":"The bitcoin lightning network: Scalable off-chain instant payments","venue":null,"work_id":"80427710-1e59-415f-a270-660428c27807","year":2016},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":40,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:15.064528Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:9ae33fe8623035050c36e80039c1b29e06baa3ae1cdb8f4e59b9a31b31d07401","observation_id":"8f7f6e9e-2209-40a2-9a1c-d9aaa33cbc45","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:19.646580Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:19.348636Z","title":"Computing correlated equilibria in multi-player games","venue":null,"work_id":"2e6a3f48-08e7-406b-993c-8c13d864112f","year":2008},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":41,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:15.133715Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:022fd2947fcd10e6d2d90797de4e20328d6c6c86c3b8e379cd5c4660bb9e72d1","observation_id":"75e6f4aa-3078-4ba9-a3a7-6de49aedbcc3","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:19.468798Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:19.240622Z","title":"Modern applications of game-theoretic principles (invited paper)","venue":null,"work_id":"c0b4abca-74a7-4884-ba70-9a4e83d35ed2","year":2020},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":42,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:15.229017Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:c43369ac7b24e236c98687e7c6ffda619641dbbea71d8eec9dd2e61f3e00939e","observation_id":"b2fde0ce-6d35-4fe8-a1ef-cc1c75fa9f7c","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:19.298713Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:18.998329Z","title":"Fast swap regret minimization and applications to approximate correlated equilibria","venue":null,"work_id":"8715e45f-5110-44e8-b126-852de3dbdf0a","year":2024},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":43,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:15.289051Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:0660820882e73f0b19c8b53b16675e32075240702277eb60d81cec65343100c0","observation_id":"54d32be6-eda5-4c5e-a093-f36813032644","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:19.124869Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:18.866324Z","title":"Towards a Game-Theoretic Security Analysis of Off-Chain Protocols","venue":null,"work_id":"6a55cec4-bc4c-4e07-ac08-1966c4bf5782","year":2023},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":44,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:15.358299Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:db0b0b2f0e7735d3ae1b9dafb1379ea68d354519d93babfd8eb3abc809893a71","observation_id":"494a8653-d7ab-41f9-bb81-90b8a78eec33","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:18.926164Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:18.628945Z","title":"A beginner's tutorial on strategy complexity in stochastic games: Can the king cautiously eliminate robin hood? ACM SIGLOG News , 9(4):27--43, 2023","venue":null,"work_id":"6bc20cea-1624-4d9e-8086-9356152eca33","year":2023},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":45,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:15.413812Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:fbb4b2c9d9cd7673a9cc26a05c84f0da6bd020d68cdf4e9af60c206f0b0ade98","observation_id":"ca0e894b-f88d-4c43-809a-8b21e2c4756e","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:18.707518Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:18.369285Z","title":"The computational complexity of nash equilibria in concisely represented games","venue":null,"work_id":"c924758e-21f4-4187-8456-be6d55558069","year":2012},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":46,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:15.478461Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:47a042c2877b2c7cedd72b9c9d23e24418b2774422b4cab937a80b772731d221","observation_id":"27c0fa4c-2ac1-4da9-8db8-e4c5909937c7","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:18.495980Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:18.117287Z","title":"Computational complexity of correlated equilibria for extensive games","venue":null,"work_id":"16e96fd0-a5d4-4214-a442-dca50f61618c","year":2001},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":47,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:15.556558Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:3ea1830a14caa0076d5a6267c853f65e70e5e0d46eef56570a485dbdcc068394","observation_id":"74871bb3-eb8e-46fb-8cce-6ca60c7fe459","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:18.234029Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:17.889154Z","title":"Extensive-form correlated equilibrium: Definition and computational complexity","venue":null,"work_id":"dd62f704-d49d-41b8-8960-5530abca3f00","year":2008},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":48,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:15.630902Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:92cd1f8555c01802f934209b5e1ebd5ebb8594403dad69546418d950d8429a08","observation_id":"90e681ee-502b-423b-b332-534808506da9","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:17.997423Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:17.570067Z","title":"Towards a bayesian network game framework for evaluating ddos attacks and defense","venue":null,"work_id":"7429c87f-a193-492e-8195-516b066aab77","year":2012},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":49,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:15.701802Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:1c9b4256a8bb95220a4065bd866db6e1d67a5a9d8690e129bec739595b2055fc","observation_id":"0a86e9b3-b276-40a7-913b-177920e88826","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:17.756542Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:17.361024Z","title":"Efficiently solving turn-taking stochastic games with extensive-form correlation","venue":null,"work_id":"3873f3f1-6a0b-4409-b221-e60839fd296a","year":2023},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":50,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:15.773491Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:7aecef1104f0481f0c8c46b8c7bf5d3609a98131d1f2e319b61c4189379cff4d","observation_id":"1fca128f-33e1-47b5-b92b-0ed2c1360816","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:17.476659Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:17.106342Z","title":"Optimal correlated equilibria in general-sum extensive-form games: Fixed-parameter algorithms, hardness, and two-sided column-generation","venue":null,"work_id":"f1da9c64-a62f-4f7a-9f65-7f87d8141db2","year":2022},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":51,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:15.862554Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:06aee578f640aee0748c30905aea12c8e9b9b4e1429236143582a841f3bffa1b","observation_id":"47dcf3d7-5b67-4b34-bf20-42b9bc294902","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:17.223995Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:16.824817Z","title":"Game theory meets network security: A tutorial","venue":null,"work_id":"a95421c2-679b-43e7-af61-ec42e26d5bfa","year":2018},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":52,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:15.984201Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:faee8ee3a2e8288eb112a60f410c4f46ade7ac5aa07ccba05230f12e5d2a055a","observation_id":"250c6a4b-884e-44f4-abdb-9abf79b6e3c6","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:16.985531Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:16.592979Z","title":"Polynomial-time optimal equilibria with a mediator in extensive-form games","venue":null,"work_id":"a0273bea-c022-420c-85a6-4f6e565e7c11","year":2022},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games","version":2},"reference_index":53,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:16.121861Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2507.11509"},"observation_digest":"sha256:09f2da38d7c839eb397bf337a18f67ea9a9bfe1875f09dec912fd5b1251d26c4","observation_id":"2583ee19-f6fc-4dc2-8e33-e1e3e4a8d562","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-06T17:20:16.671166Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}}],"paper":{"arxiv_id":"2507.11509","last_updated":"2026-07-29T08:52:48Z","latest_version":2,"primary_category":"cs.GT","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T05:04:12.234530Z","submitted_at":"2025-07-15T17:24:16Z","title":"On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games"},"reference_resolution":{"displayed":53,"state_counts":{"malformed_identifier":0,"metadata_mismatch":0,"parse_uncertain":0,"unresolved":6,"verified_exact":1,"verified_fuzzy":46},"total_outbound_references":53},"refusal":"A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.","schema":"pith.paper-citation-record.v1","standing_sources":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"thesis":"As of 14 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 53 of 53 outbound references and 2 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2507.11509."}