{"as_of":"2026-08-14T22:15:00Z","caps":{"database_statements":6,"inbound":100,"outbound":100},"context_digest":"sha256:855629b0bff063ed3347673c1f791b69f586392554ab0479e7075c1798de56f1","coverage":[{"denominator":295,"lane":"reference_resolution","note":"Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.","records_observed":100,"source":"paper_references, paper_reference_links","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.380142Z","state":"measured"},{"denominator":100,"lane":"standing_notices","note":"One-hop event checks from named stored sources.","records_observed":100,"source":"scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache","source_observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","state":"measured"},{"denominator":0,"lane":"inbound_itemization","note":"Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.","records_observed":0,"source":"paper_references, paper_reference_links","source_observed_at":null,"state":"measured"},{"denominator":1,"lane":"external_citation_measurements","note":"A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.","records_observed":0,"source":"cited_works","source_observed_at":null,"state":"measured"}],"external_citation_measurements":[],"inbound":[],"links":{"evidence":"/evidence","html":"/paper/2608.01889/citation-record","integrity":"/paper/2608.01889/integrity","json":"/paper/2608.01889/citation-record.json","paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"outbound":[{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.920930Z","title":"Auto-bidding and auctions in online advertising: A survey","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2024},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":1,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.920930Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:aeae7e76e11286d46230a6c19aa3c78a780d175e67ea3aaf969f49d096dba838","observation_id":"9792269f-1fc8-4858-9d89-d847e0f042ef","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.920930Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.925490Z","title":"Selling joint ads: A regret minimization perspective","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2024},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":2,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.925490Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:477f9d577e28f2f9a2dcbd4d84257094ab73dd5e3966932e5b78995f6ff92605","observation_id":"609c3554-7993-4f78-bb38-583e3dccfee9","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.925490Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.929822Z","title":"Aggarwal, A","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2019},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":3,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.929822Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:d7af6c8087a78d4261f0b542be3ed968a34398abd362d8b8348a282820b4896a","observation_id":"b62e7d98-c7cd-40e6-90d1-374d69437a5a","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.929822Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.934252Z","title":"Existence of an equilibrium for a competitive economy","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2024},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":4,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.934252Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:85283c89f0b79e362cefdd72a82d26d97d03efe35a86297629a8eb6818809ba1","observation_id":"89c98a8f-a0fe-449d-949c-0d91387bb4c6","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.934252Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.938898Z","title":"Online bandit learning against an adaptive adversary: from regret to policy regret","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2012},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":5,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.938898Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:89d441c1dd20b164f17c2a328d1c3101c4f8279f77fa185a06c3e4b70746e757","observation_id":"4b4ce119-42ee-4706-9eca-f3d8ff98333c","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.938898Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.944354Z","title":"A convergence theory for saddle functions","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":1983},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":6,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.944354Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:2f4492e59786dd4f4e2dab3a6b4f75758e15b127ae350369ad236f96746781e8","observation_id":"a00b1aaa-e1da-4eb6-9adf-cd1f91a30726","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.944354Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.953865Z","title":"A dynamic near-optimal algorithm for online linear programming","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2014},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":8,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.953865Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:ba3735e7df835a03675ef56299ea7c55a82048b2380928f816001adec876eefd","observation_id":"a6a18918-bca3-4b46-885c-3a442de6b5d2","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.953865Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.958034Z","title":"Approximating nash equilibria and dense bipartite subgraphs via an approximate version of carath\\'eodory's theorem","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2015},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":9,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.958034Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:f02923de75cd04beb273976a056944c681f6c69b467002d0b7544a35b644d03d","observation_id":"0778320a-78ce-40ea-9820-054e3a73c68c","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.958034Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.962207Z","title":"Smoothed complexity of 2-player nash equilibria","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2020},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":10,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.962207Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:a575ac0f2405bbc30a4a83e77d70c87e355a575b1d5efec7e9fe4118726ae3ac","observation_id":"899c04c7-8d5f-4a6b-82f0-95c0f7f58e66","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.962207Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.966754Z","title":"Repeated auctions with budgets in ad exchanges: Approximations and design","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2015},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":11,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.966754Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:b28daca0b13fa5654bddcb2b91b70a6d1ba8b5f591dc3dc9a8fd7c2bc059b047","observation_id":"317bf487-c98b-44bb-ad53-342d44522e6f","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.966754Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.971163Z","title":"The best of both worlds: Asymptotically efficient mechanisms with a guarantee on the expected gains-from-trade","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2018},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":12,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.971163Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:fcc80e0386176269dda2e08a6a227dfd816b9ab2ae5d3121837f07a3671930db","observation_id":"53c10042-e60a-4d76-b66b-24827bcf3c09","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.971163Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.975505Z","title":"Dynamics of bid optimization in online advertisement auctions","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2007},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":13,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.975505Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:3dc670febff85dfd22b9f7378f1bf6cb3df9d5488662928193b3356915e76758","observation_id":"aeda1e01-8508-4a66-a776-ae1753bc883b","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.975505Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.980160Z","title":"Smoothed online learning is as easy as statistical learning","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2022},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":14,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.980160Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:dbb5cde0666da53cbe2c38e177380a0c1eaeb979dbf30ecb86be8b47d5301688","observation_id":"b913ac32-418a-4add-bd97-3527da064158","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.980160Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.984692Z","title":"Achieving optimal backlog in multi-processor cup games","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2019},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":15,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.984692Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:704e9a9add43ce6af8c9bd51acce57a4fb971760809b6d812eeecc344756b3b0","observation_id":"9cf91bc4-0308-4d8f-8b88-34b900705f05","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.984692Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.989124Z","title":"Nash stability in social distance games","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2017},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":16,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.989124Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:426cc611d9dfecfcffa9dd8737d9e32251ce34382a35cf8ae5be80fc3e972e55","observation_id":"cbaaa86a-2e2e-461e-8dee-2a213c8d6882","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.989124Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.993144Z","title":"Learning in repeated auctions with budgets: Regret minimization and equilibrium","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2019},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":17,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.993144Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:6daf51563462a9c1645603b5061893e0d5a06d549fc31964f496772f77188a08","observation_id":"4e90bf56-3823-4c8d-923d-090ee3701a01","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.993144Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.997305Z","title":"Bulow-klemperer-style results for welfare maximization in two-sided markets","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2020},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":18,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.997305Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:63b910cad2e4a3ba6b4143d815fcb43ac63f9253f8b4f495ce57ee4b910c051c","observation_id":"e7607dcf-9f0f-4102-9675-ac210da77b40","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:43.997305Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2105.15032","last_updated":"2021-05-31T15:12:27Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-13T22:16:52.484753Z","submitted_at":"2021-05-31T15:12:27Z","title":"Truthful Mechanisms for Two-Sided Markets via Prophet Inequalities","version":1},"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":"2105.15032","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.001614Z","title":"Truthful mechanisms for two-sided markets via prophet inequalities","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2021},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":19,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.001614Z"},"links":{"cited_paper":"/paper/2105.15032","citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:430c3d7a08478150ca3a97179539d7f040d0c50624b74755b4b53c57236edbfd","observation_id":"11a92938-6504-4d71-9493-e16f44da023a","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.001614Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.006419Z","title":"Balseiro, C","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2023},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":20,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.006419Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:1a617d551fc7d28f7846db4ea30be490307e5592beefb14d4c7db7c3704db7ac","observation_id":"4f0e5f98-0363-4306-b5be-e84ec2368108","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.006419Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.010662Z","title":"Budget-management strategies in repeated auctions","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2021},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":21,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.010662Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:0d4c0a3d465483d141a3875e6a1335c5713f07b1f70cb837ea5a41d25fc3ef00","observation_id":"bb3877fa-baca-4c52-8079-cd59b3f64f46","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.010662Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.014953Z","title":"One-dimensional empirical measures, order statistics, and Kantorovich transport distances , volume 261","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2019},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":22,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.014953Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:dea27f91a06db07321c465879ae75baf123c948e9b0c96d90e20cdd7dcd65d6e","observation_id":"d9550984-f3d1-4ac4-ba05-5d9e0e7aad88","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.014953Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.019115Z","title":"Agnostic smoothed online learning","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":1997},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":23,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.019115Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:f001046363d7f28729cfcd7336c605abc26ebf8351d6a0634bb0811df7085753","observation_id":"18e73c04-1957-48c4-a6b8-9f15fce3f92a","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.019115Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.023151Z","title":"Balseiro, H","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2023},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":24,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.023151Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:fc86d362ab7e9f5bf75624843379dbc9de6ded6483fa180606e23cacf6c22c5e","observation_id":"55b6f64c-102b-4bd4-a796-61818f6241ec","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.023151Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.027128Z","title":"Approximation algorithms for the weighted nash social welfare via convex and non-convex programs","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2024},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":25,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.027128Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:f708172dee950808ea40e5663b6a874ff0d0b7b451d3193ea2b71f65ebd8df9e","observation_id":"a90a131e-453b-46e2-a434-ab52f4531778","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.027128Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.031109Z","title":"Convex optimization: Algorithms and complexity","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2015},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":26,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.031109Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:cb6e6751f73ba9e8c7bf6a38bc860ebb270d927a1b980669166ae1312793fbb7","observation_id":"edc94fd1-edf5-498f-9d2e-d93b04a87fcf","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.031109Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.035295Z","title":"Convex optimization","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2004},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":27,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.035295Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:fe2b769615ed26ece3d3f08fd6f92ff18dab52c3607e2271f2af41577c15db2b","observation_id":"89cf03a4-f097-4147-a02a-76a0f4dd2b79","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.035295Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.039603Z","title":"Online learning with switching costs and other adaptive adversaries","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2013},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":28,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.039603Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:497f12be61476215434effef7b8d43f769694710ce2aa4e0989734263f34fe0a","observation_id":"c02a9e10-2c76-470c-80c2-a21f5c51a0e7","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.039603Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.043794Z","title":"Fair division of indivisible goods for a class of concave valuations","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2022},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":29,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.043794Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:1523ac592cee53a3fae75249b5f818f0303e8ddd96fadb3269bfb478f2f67ad3","observation_id":"f8f76e9c-d32a-4159-a087-8183aebd9185","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.043794Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.048574Z","title":"Online learning with knapsacks: the best of both worlds","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2022},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":30,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.048574Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:3192cdb765af9c95bdd1d613566aa08a29f8d366a61b6c8cb1b57d32beb27ecd","observation_id":"a90c57cd-ddff-4029-9731-1dbab1c16d12","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.048574Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.053172Z","title":"Recent development in computational complexity characterization of nash equilibrium","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2007},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":31,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.053172Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:2d8e7c69f3da530e58c749c5f43dfecea56955f409cfcd735c083b934bb50c56","observation_id":"64f6baca-d7b3-411b-96b1-d6dac86613e5","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.053172Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.057300Z","title":"Convex program duality, fisher markets, and nash social welfare","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2017},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":32,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.057300Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:c86943887862e25c20bedbd9948064113bddea455dcbe145dfafae922a70d9fa","observation_id":"6cdcf98f-9d9f-4f11-8428-7c9bb0c8450e","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.057300Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.061754Z","title":"Playing anonymous games using simple strategies","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2017},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":33,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.061754Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:f161edc7bcad9e69518fcc4cb7de4fc5dfa1447e739a616c249064d1686c609b","observation_id":"fc1ff525-ba85-4a65-bcbd-8a2c03aae5d8","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.061754Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.066249Z","title":"Computing nash equilibria: Approximation and smoothed complexity","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2006},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":34,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.066249Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:a1abe90ba1c0fcf8063218f6fd764d56583f79ce6fe842493030e8757dd437ad","observation_id":"1325a3e5-c3f4-4347-8d9f-aa10048d1ccb","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.066249Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.071041Z","title":"Settling the complexity of computing two-player nash equilibria","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2009},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":35,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.071041Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:084a2e11526b94e725d94f3537c9e556a4141f111dd46fc3046e46a1cd5b3413","observation_id":"00a423be-38fc-44d2-8356-81bc7862e885","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.071041Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.075396Z","title":"A simple mechanism for a budget-constrained buyer","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2018},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":36,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.075396Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:02fe2cda39bcf712feaef937a1fbcdd43bdc00c3a132666f81cfe7f5c76c64d3","observation_id":"ffa3c0b5-f6ec-4719-b99b-b87469a0213c","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.075396Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.079845Z","title":"The query complexity of uniform pricing","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2026},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":37,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.079845Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:c53bb3ea2d6dc73936ff4e4b2236e1f963d204b2e671c0a7e2dcf6743322da0e","observation_id":"71587d68-2f94-42dd-ac90-f70b45591f8e","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.079845Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.084437Z","title":"The complexity of pacing for second-price auctions","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2021},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":38,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.084437Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:3ef36e32762296e359145645f9a5177697cb2175711bc5476dcc808e34dee3d4","observation_id":"a075d39f-bb2a-475f-9e07-53e90243c010","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.084437Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.093566Z","title":"Pacing equilibrium in first price auction markets","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2022},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":40,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.093566Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:d6ee9b90e0ae212c31f41aa874cdec5b5a51b7bfde36f9480fd3f3231ab64c6b","observation_id":"c85ac551-3f72-4e35-a8aa-a687b8be50a7","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.093566Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.097772Z","title":"Multiplicative pacing equilibria in auction markets","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2022},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":41,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.097772Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:7ebcf27bf44cb20e0d5562036bd30dbc700a096ee98986297ac9d5dd2aa4ebb1","observation_id":"4f5f0dc9-8b97-4cbb-8938-141c7589cb06","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.097772Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.106586Z","title":"Restricted max-min fair allocation","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2018},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":43,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.106586Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:8692f809bdf4414eea2f216ed63007bc48f4d675ad66fb857a28f21cb159e878","observation_id":"c0a120cf-f511-46c2-af13-d08bebf05af1","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.106586Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.110947Z","title":"Theoretical properties of the log-concave maximum likelihood estimator of a multidimensional density","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2009},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":44,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.110947Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:99ec3482c831227e8567d69a29059edb896a4a678760f0ee0be38dfa761dff96","observation_id":"0b451be1-0fd3-48f0-ac81-8ed80f68884b","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.110947Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.115251Z","title":"Dynamic budget throttling in repeated second-price auctions","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2024},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":45,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.115251Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:1b69b86199142e2973d309fde69be133752d1c000a35d35ac9c1dd7e2fc7d395","observation_id":"734965c0-9478-408a-b122-2d0d0b51e37f","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.115251Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.119651Z","title":"Faster stochastic algorithms for minimax optimization under polyak- \\ L \\ ojasiewicz condition","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2022},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":46,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.119651Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:ffb884fd16237676241f1b127aa5b17d93716d29681caeb3ccfbd7936ee64294","observation_id":"9ca845b1-679c-4633-a4b1-6c25c3b555ab","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.119651Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.124370Z","title":"Budget-constrained auctions with unassured priors: Strategic equivalence and structural properties","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2024},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":47,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.124370Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:cfed2fd4234b8bbdda09d82f589df738e98245ca971cbd3f576b50caeb0b3f7c","observation_id":"651a0bba-59a1-45d3-b89a-836b5305c239","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.124370Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.128300Z","title":"Proximally guided stochastic subgradient method for nonsmooth, nonconvex problems","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":1908},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":48,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.128300Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:96770a10b5c8af415c054ae43542522728bfb8d82aadabf964f8bc5d3a8234e1","observation_id":"abd330f3-deae-4b4d-a7eb-85cb8e3356e1","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.128300Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.137552Z","title":"Nonsmooth optimization reformulations characterizing all solutions of jointly convex generalized nash equilibrium problems","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2011},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":50,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.137552Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:1b95372860019a79838949aa10e303e0a07b92c352ad3ae87662a22e7939e6a6","observation_id":"74e42118-5067-469b-a764-aa3af5b46e98","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.137552Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.141782Z","title":"Efficiency guarantees in auctions with budgets","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2014},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":51,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.141782Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:72acd8cb8fad732b2ba1d085a9d4370c6f8cf0b4e26a7c6d20bf4e86630f0dea","observation_id":"e700c137-03a8-4c7e-bc52-0ee0048a3738","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.141782Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.146238Z","title":"Autobidding equilibria in sponsored shopping","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2026},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":52,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.146238Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:5b3717511ebb6bb4788fc143631f89d9e5b456ebd17d0fc732b6bfe3f6407a66","observation_id":"a42cd72c-fc98-4d95-b425-397caa1b58a0","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.146238Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.150310Z","title":"Secretaries with advice","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2021},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":53,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.150310Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:4de4c4f6a57d9cabda5846b66d6b5c08b3ba56b0f93b689fd1e6e8122a4af121","observation_id":"89b5fa68-bf25-446b-91b1-afbbc029425d","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.150310Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.154906Z","title":"A combinatorial polynomial algorithm for the linear arrow-debreu market","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2013},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":54,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.154906Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:c2158424a9871614c5429d71e261538469458e6e2de4a55e613c4d63bf38432d","observation_id":"123e9b76-2094-4a5e-a38a-13b3014068b2","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.154906Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.159173Z","title":"Online markov decision processes","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2009},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":55,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.159173Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:e1c9de48310f6d979b7f10348795f24d617547b9bf3cd3665dedbf4f53722c43","observation_id":"cf80c217-14ff-461d-81e3-37161c9044e9","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.159173Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.163874Z","title":"Consensus of subjective probabilities: The pari-mutuel method","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":1959},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":56,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.163874Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:f85f69bf8729284464dbe3d8e88028dcd621e31fe2bc25bc853a2bc9131a3b87","observation_id":"2f0a91e8-43fc-4147-a3f0-39ebd6dc8cb1","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.163874Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.168600Z","title":"Online allocation with traffic spikes: Mixing adversarial and stochastic models","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2015},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":57,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.168600Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:f06e2afee7c5c6ddf65ecb4b3834ca8b0be7ed6f943548dfb36b61e68ac0c145","observation_id":"20e8ffbf-81a3-4333-a870-8f49861ba728","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.168600Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.172959Z","title":"Internet advertising and the generalized second-price auction: Selling billions of dollars worth of keywords","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2007},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":58,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.172959Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:cce112356b875ebe63e9f9d4ad899880b675b4f3601360142bef009e6df06fba","observation_id":"871756e1-6fb7-494f-a3a5-1a3bf21ca5c3","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.172959Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.177075Z","title":"Finite-dimensional variational inequalities and complementarity problems, 2003","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2003},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":59,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.177075Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:8db5b17d0aa952979118fda17e659f0bde76a3f3f1a84c10c5e61b53bda8c240","observation_id":"7b6ab88f-e5f8-4a68-8df1-821985d97aad","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.177075Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.181061Z","title":"Generalized nash equilibrium problems and newton methods","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2009},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":60,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.181061Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:10bc1741606302913d4f0b2c48e6a50448201125dc5c93ffada15760deb15d8b","observation_id":"82dc8a75-1d6d-4c64-9c2a-ed03ec8c8a61","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.181061Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.185164Z","title":"Convergence analysis of no-regret bidding algorithms in repeated auctions","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2021},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":61,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.185164Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:a675fe92128118270861469e8aa0bdcb7ee8806228893f4753dd9b87e414f35d","observation_id":"23a6000e-02a0-4d64-bd73-246da6dbd41b","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.185164Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.189693Z","title":"Constant approximation for weighted nash social welfare with submodular valuations","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2025},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":62,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.189693Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:95737ae9839f0c5eeeebac0c90315760e6e5936503a7dc4ab860b3a3cacef0fd","observation_id":"75d92271-cce5-4705-a3b0-e65fe7335864","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.189693Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.194040Z","title":"Generalized nash equilibrium problems","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2010},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":63,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.194040Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:6d505c5d3300cab458b0f5c8f569b4df499c59f266e269f66329ee3c46e37c75","observation_id":"e29e0b66-7159-4030-a29f-9d536c219c2a","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.194040Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.198169Z","title":"Penalty methods for the solution of generalized nash equilibrium problems","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2010},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":64,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.198169Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:71c3e4831fd07baa0278d98e22eb06e09c566e2cfdd5cf1c91d1df8a87688c12","observation_id":"a2dffa9a-2350-4bf1-8682-a0df5cce737e","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.198169Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2411.04843","last_updated":"2025-06-12T09:43:27Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-14T00:34:22.885118Z","submitted_at":"2024-11-07T16:31:31Z","title":"Learning in Budgeted Auctions with Spacing Objectives","version":2},"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":"2411.04843","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.202387Z","title":"Learning in budgeted auctions with spacing objectives","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2025},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":65,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.202387Z"},"links":{"cited_paper":"/paper/2411.04843","citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:8d60b08397d4e746f5c46a84459ba0e8de547a8a794fc218b0186b3cb4eadef3","observation_id":"da89f84e-ad70-43d0-b483-c3ab7af523ff","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.202387Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.207079Z","title":null,"venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":1999},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":66,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.207079Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:35f1e6fb69f8f605a8bf3049f7b552a208d7ae7a930e96f117335b5ca3dc8da3","observation_id":"f7cd7541-6d8f-4ea2-8e5f-3b9ce1380267","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.207079Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.211756Z","title":null,"venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2023},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":67,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.211756Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:24120e036f6ca638f3ca3cf1920ae3c222ebfed6640400e4dd100ced7559b98f","observation_id":"0af92452-ed73-4074-8448-db074a22e403","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.211756Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.216483Z","title":"Consensus-halving: Does it ever get easier? In Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC) , 2020","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2020},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":68,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.216483Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:5e3875ac00533047f7fb1543aa1e39cb875c8847d2f3e9d9e96765e5f3cc1482","observation_id":"de8642b5-ba9c-4e89-a283-ee33c9478c8d","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.216483Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.221076Z","title":"Liquid welfare guarantees for no-regret learning in sequential budgeted auctions","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2023},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":69,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.221076Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:6019ed0e4f8295d179a51360a9197596815d6934512621ad570a808c2793fff3","observation_id":"545893b1-79ff-485f-a14b-49c448447b15","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.221076Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.227371Z","title":"On profit-maximizing envy-free pricing","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2005},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":70,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.227371Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:549213d9e373e2a44146247779ec8a1d7e471d88c5753e40004719c8df1d1b6a","observation_id":"7f310aa6-d7a6-4150-b01a-1fabc7501fb0","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.227371Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.233426Z","title":"A smoothed fptas for equilibria in congestion games","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2024},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":71,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.233426Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:5b01c554b0910c6d7d0bbd0bf4030a1b1997463a3706d04b899ec0a9bb106995","observation_id":"aa48a17b-5105-40c2-b2ef-8359e2d86321","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.233426Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.237625Z","title":"First-order methods for large-scale market equilibrium computation","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2020},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":72,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.237625Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:11d5942bc0fcdce0322ed6cd72298fe36cf277706a8d0e06565fb9f755bea269","observation_id":"3e62e8de-9e2d-43ee-9c46-fe6e2829f039","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.237625Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.242432Z","title":"Budget pacing in repeated auctions: Regret and efficiency without convergence","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2023},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":73,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.242432Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:f2b12f8ec85d73ffc5af84f592c8c7889c9fc6edbed6ad6c1a02a884c0fb475b","observation_id":"7d2ee81c-6cbc-46dd-98c5-3be9c773efa7","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.242432Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.247291Z","title":"The landscape of the proximal point method for nonconvex--nonconcave minimax optimization","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2023},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":74,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.247291Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:9a28f62cf0d10c31accb549e88041584e60a7b241a70203eea0f7455bf474e00","observation_id":"e0326fa1-3496-4fd8-8e11-8ee623387178","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.247291Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2503.10910","last_updated":"2025-03-13T21:50:54Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T17:05:35.573197Z","submitted_at":"2025-03-13T21:50:54Z","title":"Procurement Auctions with Best and Final Offers","version":1},"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":"2503.10910","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.251702Z","title":"Procurement auctions with best and final offers","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2025},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":75,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.251702Z"},"links":{"cited_paper":"/paper/2503.10910","citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:132f0344cf9f6b4b64c6d39fe26ca91090c44df4610a4bbf11f85dc6a8b962f9","observation_id":"cd686e04-f7a3-4947-a805-1e15dbaaf094","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.251702Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.260879Z","title":"Generalized nash games and quasi-variational inequalities","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":1991},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":77,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.260879Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:e7e1284a268a1a2344289cc9e4b397606806b7964a44928b46b8d7660d935c8e","observation_id":"b49660df-a11b-451b-b85b-780687273cc8","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.260879Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.265408Z","title":"Matrix analysis","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2012},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":78,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.265408Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:3e3ece0a12a24be65743c9f169ce0b334cf19e073128ab44ac9fb347f96d4a46","observation_id":"bea27b34-c23e-4208-bd6b-6f4638b8debd","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.265408Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.269503Z","title":"Smoothed analysis with adaptive adversaries","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2024},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":79,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.269503Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:bead3837045d0c95c8b8cfe56e749080f82dd31bafd044746dcaac33cc1a22b8","observation_id":"0ef27898-a6a9-4d77-b176-a3b66880d793","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.269503Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2502.00260","last_updated":"2025-02-01T01:36:53Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-10T08:24:30.262683Z","submitted_at":"2025-02-01T01:36:53Z","title":"Strong Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Bounded Group Size","version":1},"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":"2502.00260","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.273620Z","title":"Strong equilibria in bayesian games with bounded group size","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2025},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":80,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.273620Z"},"links":{"cited_paper":"/paper/2502.00260","citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:76a3644c694b619bc526dd7f83dcdcc21b1624c33b8d6bcc5474638ca7edaee5","observation_id":"595db013-bb64-4c9c-b361-cc8118c47999","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.273620Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.278062Z","title":"Adwords in a panorama","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2020},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":81,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.278062Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:18dc6b4a0449ca1675792625b37375e0cef6af337daef179ce331e9237907e2b","observation_id":"60e33854-bf69-4197-9358-01f2c292c351","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.278062Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.282254Z","title":"Selfishmigrate: A scalable algorithm for non-clairvoyantly scheduling heterogeneous processors","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2014},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":82,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.282254Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:6bb24a0650c510eaba92ee5ec458906fbaf8dc01a84b4826632be9c899779e96","observation_id":"f636bbd3-c88c-41ba-b86d-c852c7b90741","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.282254Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.286815Z","title":"Immorlica, K","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2022},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":83,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.286815Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:562b6eab264a57934e6ff68993c2feb81cf18e3ba8dc2b8acaa33be8e63e97ea","observation_id":"14daf18f-200d-467e-9cb4-783c1837e52f","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.286815Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.291347Z","title":"First-order algorithms for nonlinear generalized nash equilibrium problems","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2023},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":84,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.291347Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:5c8caa0c0d22c03dfdfbb0543b7d9cbc6a7e505dda9e21f578e9e567b7f75e98","observation_id":"8c9e08db-8acb-4871-8555-db6ced6cb5ed","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.291347Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.295622Z","title":"Efficiently computing nash equilibria in adversarial team markov games","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2023},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":85,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.295622Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:09de79f07b6841f60f537d94499f146ac8b0a9adbd55c8a6a72697eb92a1f049","observation_id":"f7660794-84e7-4948-bf6e-0be018d25db1","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.295622Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.300385Z","title":"Equilibrium computation of generalized nash games: A new lagrangian-based approach","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2021},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":86,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.300385Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:f7378f6d62b44ed15e1404873f0c7dfad787afb390d537b6c5aba97af660633a","observation_id":"9c96e927-e349-4231-9039-6c9092f4b296","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.300385Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.304538Z","title":"User satisfaction in competitive sponsored search","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2014},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":87,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.304538Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:8171fa026bfc673567a498726e4d2966a025da6dfa8828565f4515fe78d8d70e","observation_id":"1ca818d9-b5e3-4b94-b771-0919be7292b8","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.304538Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.308934Z","title":"Beyond the nash equilibrium barrier","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2011},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":88,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.308934Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:69ef5c8ebe94411949fa87b0881633110023f0fd489e47ab6d4313971921d91c","observation_id":"ff7ba1f3-eb9f-4020-bf65-25a5c184d10f","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.308934Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.313082Z","title":"Linear convergence of gradient and proximal-gradient methods under the polyak- ojasiewicz condition","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2016},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":89,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.313082Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:fcd75538aaf6eaac69ba31dae6aee2be7089026316d0e95880d5c58db7bf9baf","observation_id":"84a1fb6a-6d2d-4269-85b0-1ee48c5c6ab2","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.313082Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.317362Z","title":"Beyond competitive analysis","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2000},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":90,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.317362Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:86910248067e2ccc567b170ba46a8815d04f564b6dc35103e7be33b94ffbd3f3","observation_id":"dad59e6e-84fd-4777-b361-c655d4ee4486","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.317362Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.321519Z","title":"Computing the nucleolus of weighted cooperative matching games in polynomial time","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2019},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":91,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.321519Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:7a5e11c8da10bbf013805fa0122de444a4ac971987248a8cf6b5fcd0d520e4a0","observation_id":"26651a51-bdd2-470b-8f5b-2c1c11fbdead","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.321519Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.325505Z","title":"No-regret online autobidding algorithms in first-price auctions","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2026},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":92,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.325505Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:9057531dbcb07a62c19d0564fc82b7e74625470cf687eb97e9fd4ca7c84f0bcf","observation_id":"4be8868c-c84f-4ea3-bb24-b35c57f3f985","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.325505Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.329631Z","title":"Relatively smooth convex optimization by first-order methods, and applications","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2018},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":93,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.329631Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:65b7d3b578f670f9c01673f7799f6b42f162bc96ec171d05e4a47676615c9978","observation_id":"7bfc6ae2-6103-4fe9-b4a0-f148d9a73442","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.329631Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.334432Z","title":"Partitioning friends fairly","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2023},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":94,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.334432Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:f1e413cbf7a0c7216397ce76ef191e9f3598ce5928e9ccf15eee086ae4071204","observation_id":"275b8621-9396-4a87-858f-fc9efdafd355","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.334432Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.338515Z","title":"Adaptive accelerated (extra-)gradient methods with variance reduction","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2022},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":95,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.338515Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:8e27c673d01c4628cd7e92116a8e1f692ca65a9f0a4169bea81f2a87d69573db","observation_id":"acf11fdf-0ca8-49e4-855f-ca28deffa5f6","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.338515Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.342498Z","title":"Une propri \\'e t \\'e topologique des sous-ensembles analytiques r \\'e els","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":1963},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":96,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.342498Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:86cf715e17788954224fd4d12f444ec00a46933d849bba853f9f3f53e3d8ca7a","observation_id":"43618fdf-1cbb-45b6-a53a-be6644e17680","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.342498Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.346624Z","title":"On the competition complexity of dynamic mechanism design","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2008},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":97,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.346624Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:8dca63b6f601151f3b4f3229eda91b817bed6556adbba87cfc9a0747d7f26573","observation_id":"62a95ed2-80a2-432a-af1f-96328ff4eb03","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.346624Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.350939Z","title":"Autobidders with budget and roi constraints: Efficiency, regret, and pacing dynamics","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2024},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":98,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.350939Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:2395d057aac1eab7c61670926ebfbd45ece9f34af67950291662e6b91e2219ba","observation_id":"77aaa233-8926-4a2f-91ed-ffc65a009de9","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.350939Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2505.19453","last_updated":"2025-05-26T03:19:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T14:11:44.730966Z","submitted_at":"2025-05-26T03:19:14Z","title":"Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers","version":1},"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":"2505.19453","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.355010Z","title":"Approximately optimal mechanism design for competing sellers","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2025},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":99,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.355010Z"},"links":{"cited_paper":"/paper/2505.19453","citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:d3f890951292589baec822d4f169d90c0bb1095d5f69d2c1da70d5f0d46955de","observation_id":"e944c896-d798-4e26-9153-0580209616d4","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.355010Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.359183Z","title":"Proximit\\'e et dualit\\'e dans un espace hilbertien","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":1965},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":100,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.359183Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:729e7784e5a8aba196b40dfcf98fee833d76f1331f385ce2acbed240d21e15a4","observation_id":"c0ef3df7-dd45-466a-b680-9c92a4b41396","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.359183Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.363148Z","title":"Note on non-cooperative convex games","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":1955},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":101,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.363148Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:8d78d52793198843f9c89876af840b46ba92a7704e0ba81210c45bcb5f983182","observation_id":"965c65ce-819c-49f5-8c88-a2b62cdac286","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.363148Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.367628Z","title":"Solving a class of non-convex min-max games using iterative first order methods","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2019},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":102,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.367628Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:8b6d2dec1cc01a27063e3b1ef38a834d2800e001b390b15365c3f76c6b0f5920","observation_id":"1bf6a8dc-553d-410f-9a9d-595dc6019d7e","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.367628Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.371807Z","title":"Proximal algorithms","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2014},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":103,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.371807Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:c45a6cd57758d9cf2bf6c9b7d0f3fe68c988af6aecd1f84e5ebe46291ab61530","observation_id":"c1679e7b-ff82-431a-aa1c-d18445617586","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.371807Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.375871Z","title":"Quasi-variational inequalities, generalized nash equilibria, and multi-leader-follower games","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2005},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":104,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.375871Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:15eb45c73320cb5b60e27eb214a55be237f4c3a2912fcad3b4f96ccda90aba2d","observation_id":"345cdeb7-3ba8-4658-8704-45ed42444823","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.375871Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.380142Z","title":"Paes Leme, G","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2024},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions","version":1},"reference_index":105,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.380142Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2608.01889"},"observation_digest":"sha256:e68acd6d41953dc8f5bb9db10f9d0ef29d90c2988cc6f9630b969a73d5a5daa1","observation_id":"a2e272dc-9eb7-4258-8e7f-3654796789e1","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-04T18:54:44.380142Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}}],"paper":{"arxiv_id":"2608.01889","last_updated":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","latest_version":1,"primary_category":"cs.GT","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T04:08:28.481442Z","submitted_at":"2026-08-03T08:30:14Z","title":"Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions"},"reference_resolution":{"displayed":100,"state_counts":{"malformed_identifier":0,"metadata_mismatch":0,"parse_uncertain":0,"unresolved":100,"verified_exact":0,"verified_fuzzy":0},"total_outbound_references":295},"refusal":"A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.","schema":"pith.paper-citation-record.v1","standing_sources":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-14T06:32:18.44784+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"thesis":"As of 14 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 100 of 295 outbound references and 0 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2608.01889."}