{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2015:4OOP6GUAHRNZCXOZ4L4ULV7XVW","short_pith_number":"pith:4OOP6GUA","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"e39cff1a803c5b915dd9e2f945d7f7ad879b848e3b0f9f6defe4edf2cdaafbf4","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"1503.06273","version":1},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"Evolutionary stable strategies in networked games: the influence of topology","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["physics.soc-ph","q-bio.PE"],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Dharshana Kasthurirathna, Mahendra Piraveenan, Shahadat Uddin","submitted_at":"2015-03-21T07:11:31Z","abstract_excerpt":"Evolutionary game theory is used to model the evolution of competing strategies in a population of players. Evolutionary stability of a strategy is a dynamic equilibrium, in which any competing mutated strategy would be wiped out from a population. If a strategy is weak evolutionarily stable, the competing strategy may manage to survive within the network. Understanding the network-related factors that affect the evolutionary stability of a strategy would be critical in making accurate predictions about the behaviour of a strategy in a real-world strategic decision making environment. In this "},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"1503.06273","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.GT","submitted_at":"2015-03-21T07:11:31Z","cross_cats_sorted":["physics.soc-ph","q-bio.PE"],"title_canon_sha256":"9034378a3d385a6c389a4670447123d4b8bddea2a8f6183ee95c4337164ac02a","abstract_canon_sha256":"5ef78ba772efcb7c67f206b2a96e820ed9b238904bd48234ec81ff1503ed9eb3"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-05-18T02:20:38.868245Z","signature_b64":"XQsf5P3RNHILsayQ1B1cdijBJrYl9OesE7vkv0vQ1BTibOGuCbQ9nKsw5VGqZyOXTC72pOsCcizMMLONXh2ZBQ==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"e39cff1a803c5b915dd9e2f945d7f7ad879b848e3b0f9f6defe4edf2cdaafbf4","last_reissued_at":"2026-05-18T02:20:38.867604Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-05-18T02:20:38.867604Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"Evolutionary stable strategies in networked games: the influence of topology","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["physics.soc-ph","q-bio.PE"],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Dharshana Kasthurirathna, Mahendra Piraveenan, Shahadat Uddin","submitted_at":"2015-03-21T07:11:31Z","abstract_excerpt":"Evolutionary game theory is used to model the evolution of competing strategies in a population of players. Evolutionary stability of a strategy is a dynamic equilibrium, in which any competing mutated strategy would be wiped out from a population. If a strategy is weak evolutionarily stable, the competing strategy may manage to survive within the network. Understanding the network-related factors that affect the evolutionary stability of a strategy would be critical in making accurate predictions about the behaviour of a strategy in a real-world strategic decision making environment. In this "},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1503.06273","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"1503.06273","created_at":"2026-05-18T02:20:38.867695+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"1503.06273v1","created_at":"2026-05-18T02:20:38.867695+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.1503.06273","created_at":"2026-05-18T02:20:38.867695+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"4OOP6GUAHRNZ","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:29:05.191682+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"4OOP6GUAHRNZCXOZ","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:29:05.191682+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"4OOP6GUA","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:29:05.191682+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":0,"internal_anchor_count":0,"sample":[]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/4OOP6GUAHRNZCXOZ4L4ULV7XVW","json":"https://pith.science/pith/4OOP6GUAHRNZCXOZ4L4ULV7XVW.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/4OOP6GUAHRNZCXOZ4L4ULV7XVW/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/4OOP6GUAHRNZCXOZ4L4ULV7XVW/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/4OOP6GUA"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/4OOP6GUAHRNZCXOZ4L4ULV7XVW","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/4OOP6GUAHRNZCXOZ4L4ULV7XVW.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/4OOP6GUA","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=1503.06273&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/4OOP6GUAHRNZCXOZ4L4ULV7XVW/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/4OOP6GUAHRNZCXOZ4L4ULV7XVW/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/4OOP6GUAHRNZCXOZ4L4ULV7XVW/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/4OOP6GUAHRNZCXOZ4L4ULV7XVW/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/4OOP6GUAHRNZCXOZ4L4ULV7XVW/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/4OOP6GUAHRNZCXOZ4L4ULV7XVW/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/4OOP6GUAHRNZCXOZ4L4ULV7XVW/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-05-18T02:20:38.867695+00:00","updated_at":"2026-05-18T02:20:38.867695+00:00"}