{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2026:6RXZMSJKNQFQ57E65DA2TP6FHY","short_pith_number":"pith:6RXZMSJK","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"f46f96492a6c0b0efc9ee8c1a9bfc53e2e556d91b54dd31d1bd36bbcea3da5e8","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"2604.26076","version":3},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"The Financialization of Proof-of-Stake: Asymptotic Centralization under Exogenous Risk Premiums","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"External risk premiums force Proof-of-Stake networks into complete institutional capture as internal staking yields collapse to zero.","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"q-fin.GN","authors_text":"Mikhail Perepelitsa","submitted_at":"2026-04-28T19:40:04Z","abstract_excerpt":"This paper introduces a heterogeneous macroeconomic model of a Proof-of-Stake (PoS) network to analyze the long-term centralizing effects of external traditional finance (TradFi) yields. We model a continuum of rational actors divided into two distinct classes: investors, who optimize portfolios between staking and external variance-dominated investments, and consumers, who balance staking yields against the transactional utility of holding liquid assets. By employing a quasi-linear utility function to model consumer behavior, we derive a cubic polynomial that strictly defines the unique macro"},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"2604.26076","kind":"arxiv","version":3},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"q-fin.GN","submitted_at":"2026-04-28T19:40:04Z","cross_cats_sorted":[],"title_canon_sha256":"1c7300a16852fb51d8a842fc9311acb5a9c6698af4c2c5c3db97e7209a993bfc","abstract_canon_sha256":"7f51b8090dc036afa10de796ac503f558abf7fae2fea7931a13c5069959b6e98"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-06-08T01:04:05.850183Z","signature_b64":"c0Za8r2tljW2dNRQ/y+TQKjyVxOp++k+PCqvxcKiGQ1KkYyTxUVh8/fPhCslUxnUGgns81jdxqO8vmUc3Ul5AQ==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"f46f96492a6c0b0efc9ee8c1a9bfc53e2e556d91b54dd31d1bd36bbcea3da5e8","last_reissued_at":"2026-06-08T01:04:05.849617Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-06-08T01:04:05.849617Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"The Financialization of Proof-of-Stake: Asymptotic Centralization under Exogenous Risk Premiums","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"External risk premiums force Proof-of-Stake networks into complete institutional capture as internal staking yields collapse to zero.","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"q-fin.GN","authors_text":"Mikhail Perepelitsa","submitted_at":"2026-04-28T19:40:04Z","abstract_excerpt":"This paper introduces a heterogeneous macroeconomic model of a Proof-of-Stake (PoS) network to analyze the long-term centralizing effects of external traditional finance (TradFi) yields. We model a continuum of rational actors divided into two distinct classes: investors, who optimize portfolios between staking and external variance-dominated investments, and consumers, who balance staking yields against the transactional utility of holding liquid assets. By employing a quasi-linear utility function to model consumer behavior, we derive a cubic polynomial that strictly defines the unique macro"},"claims":{"count":4,"items":[{"kind":"strongest_claim","text":"at scale, external macroeconomic factors force the complete institutional capture of the PoS consensus layer. Because investors have access to external risk premiums, their wealth compounds exponentially, leading to massive capital inflows that crush the protocol's internal staking yield to effectively zero.","source":"verdict.strongest_claim","status":"machine_extracted","claim_id":"C1","attestation":"unclaimed"},{"kind":"weakest_assumption","text":"The model assumes a continuum of rational actors split into investors optimizing between staking and external variance-dominated investments and consumers using quasi-linear utility to balance staking yields against transactional liquidity needs, producing a unique equilibrium via a cubic polynomial.","source":"verdict.weakest_assumption","status":"machine_extracted","claim_id":"C2","attestation":"unclaimed"},{"kind":"one_line_summary","text":"External TradFi risk premiums cause asymptotic centralization in PoS networks by driving investor wealth to dominate and eliminating consumer staking participation.","source":"verdict.one_line_summary","status":"machine_extracted","claim_id":"C3","attestation":"unclaimed"},{"kind":"headline","text":"External risk premiums force Proof-of-Stake networks into complete institutional capture as internal staking yields collapse to zero.","source":"verdict.pith_extraction.headline","status":"machine_extracted","claim_id":"C4","attestation":"unclaimed"}],"snapshot_sha256":"32c9559d5b97f35e554b70ea29f6243c891503a3513cd3dddb7b784ef5865b2c"},"source":{"id":"2604.26076","kind":"arxiv","version":3},"verdict":{"id":"f33c8878-b37d-4b3f-a024-1244c7352a97","model_set":{"reader":"grok-4.3"},"created_at":"2026-05-07T13:49:38.133228Z","strongest_claim":"at scale, external macroeconomic factors force the complete institutional capture of the PoS consensus layer. Because investors have access to external risk premiums, their wealth compounds exponentially, leading to massive capital inflows that crush the protocol's internal staking yield to effectively zero.","one_line_summary":"External TradFi risk premiums cause asymptotic centralization in PoS networks by driving investor wealth to dominate and eliminating consumer staking participation.","pipeline_version":"pith-pipeline@v0.9.0","weakest_assumption":"The model assumes a continuum of rational actors split into investors optimizing between staking and external variance-dominated investments and consumers using quasi-linear utility to balance staking yields against transactional liquidity needs, producing a unique equilibrium via a cubic polynomial.","pith_extraction_headline":"External risk premiums force Proof-of-Stake networks into complete institutional capture as internal staking yields collapse to zero."},"integrity":{"clean":true,"summary":{"advisory":0,"critical":0,"by_detector":{},"informational":0},"endpoint":"/pith/2604.26076/integrity.json","findings":[],"available":true,"detectors_run":[{"name":"ai_meta_artifact","ran_at":"2026-05-21T03:35:57.677451Z","status":"completed","version":"1.0.0","findings_count":0},{"name":"doi_compliance","ran_at":"2026-05-19T20:34:09.475371Z","status":"completed","version":"1.0.0","findings_count":0}],"snapshot_sha256":"ca43656cc932fb4a9f878104101a42c3404a56c8375481dfd81c372e7decb41b"},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"2604.26076","created_at":"2026-06-08T01:04:05.849702+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"2604.26076v3","created_at":"2026-06-08T01:04:05.849702+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.2604.26076","created_at":"2026-06-08T01:04:05.849702+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"6RXZMSJKNQFQ","created_at":"2026-06-08T01:04:05.849702+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"6RXZMSJKNQFQ57E6","created_at":"2026-06-08T01:04:05.849702+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"6RXZMSJK","created_at":"2026-06-08T01:04:05.849702+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":0,"internal_anchor_count":0,"sample":[]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/6RXZMSJKNQFQ57E65DA2TP6FHY","json":"https://pith.science/pith/6RXZMSJKNQFQ57E65DA2TP6FHY.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/6RXZMSJKNQFQ57E65DA2TP6FHY/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/6RXZMSJKNQFQ57E65DA2TP6FHY/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/6RXZMSJK"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/6RXZMSJKNQFQ57E65DA2TP6FHY","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/6RXZMSJKNQFQ57E65DA2TP6FHY.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/6RXZMSJK","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=2604.26076&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/6RXZMSJKNQFQ57E65DA2TP6FHY/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/6RXZMSJKNQFQ57E65DA2TP6FHY/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/6RXZMSJKNQFQ57E65DA2TP6FHY/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/6RXZMSJKNQFQ57E65DA2TP6FHY/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/6RXZMSJKNQFQ57E65DA2TP6FHY/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/6RXZMSJKNQFQ57E65DA2TP6FHY/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/6RXZMSJKNQFQ57E65DA2TP6FHY/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-06-08T01:04:05.849702+00:00","updated_at":"2026-06-08T01:04:05.849702+00:00"}