{"bundle_type":"pith_open_graph_bundle","bundle_version":"1.0","pith_number":"pith:2014:7BXXXMKNRSF7VA7RX3H26A5JZP","short_pith_number":"pith:7BXXXMKN","canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"1409.2597","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.GT","submitted_at":"2014-09-09T05:10:46Z","cross_cats_sorted":[],"title_canon_sha256":"b75f1bdc9ae6178fe1fc971cae0221384c569b53e0fb9e7c539978d18f21718b","abstract_canon_sha256":"69542f194ca32d5829d4e6e17eb5dc33b9b823bc3190502f7183b840266dd8d8"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"canonical_sha256":"f86f7bb14d8c8bfa83f1becfaf03a9cbea7619f04d2b81f7cb3eefaa1430502c","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"1409.2597","version":1},"source_aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"1409.2597","created_at":"2026-05-18T02:43:10Z"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"1409.2597v1","created_at":"2026-05-18T02:43:10Z"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.1409.2597","created_at":"2026-05-18T02:43:10Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"7BXXXMKNRSF7","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:28:16Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"7BXXXMKNRSF7VA7R","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:28:16Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"7BXXXMKN","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:28:16Z"}],"events":[{"event_type":"record_created","subject_pith_number":"pith:2014:7BXXXMKNRSF7VA7RX3H26A5JZP","target":"record","payload":{"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"1409.2597","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.GT","submitted_at":"2014-09-09T05:10:46Z","cross_cats_sorted":[],"title_canon_sha256":"b75f1bdc9ae6178fe1fc971cae0221384c569b53e0fb9e7c539978d18f21718b","abstract_canon_sha256":"69542f194ca32d5829d4e6e17eb5dc33b9b823bc3190502f7183b840266dd8d8"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"canonical_sha256":"f86f7bb14d8c8bfa83f1becfaf03a9cbea7619f04d2b81f7cb3eefaa1430502c","receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-05-18T02:43:10.183861Z","signature_b64":"Tb7uDC3W+Lj4n8GAKWhKpc/cl0QldaVW9xNERxr4K3nJ0PWx+b5X2R2ulRHB21CcgybIoD+iSJRH0rHYlPVCBw==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"f86f7bb14d8c8bfa83f1becfaf03a9cbea7619f04d2b81f7cb3eefaa1430502c","last_reissued_at":"2026-05-18T02:43:10.183361Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-05-18T02:43:10.183361Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"source_kind":"arxiv","source_id":"1409.2597","source_version":1,"attestation_state":"computed"},"signer":{"signer_id":"pith.science","signer_type":"pith_registry","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"created_at":"2026-05-18T02:43:10Z","supersedes":[],"prev_event":null,"signature":{"signature_status":"signed_v1","algorithm":"ed25519","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signature_b64":"a/eudUJxm8zQ1hiekGA6WC4CG5kJqPSKrb/WRmhZNIZGJ0oMcWj8P44LYv+zl9RDWCCNThxpO3I8fKba2EoSCw==","signed_message":"open_graph_event_sha256_bytes","signed_at":"2026-06-26T00:04:30.031458Z"},"content_sha256":"6797fb74f854a481e19f931a95a1e58d4df4866e0b0516a9a38fd41bfb5cb8aa","schema_version":"1.0","event_id":"sha256:6797fb74f854a481e19f931a95a1e58d4df4866e0b0516a9a38fd41bfb5cb8aa"},{"event_type":"graph_snapshot","subject_pith_number":"pith:2014:7BXXXMKNRSF7VA7RX3H26A5JZP","target":"graph","payload":{"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"Simple and Near-Optimal Mechanisms For Market Intermediation","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Rad Niazadeh, Robert D. Kleinberg, Yang Yuan","submitted_at":"2014-09-09T05:10:46Z","abstract_excerpt":"A prevalent market structure in the Internet economy consists of buyers and sellers connected by a platform (such as Amazon or eBay) that acts as an intermediary and keeps a share of the revenue of each transaction. While the optimal mechanism that maximizes the intermediary's profit in such a setting may be quite complicated, the mechanisms observed in reality are generally much simpler, e.g., applying an affine function to the price of the transaction as the intermediary's fee. Loertscher and Niedermayer [2007] initiated the study of such fee-setting mechanisms in two-sided markets, and we c"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1409.2597","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"verdict_id":null},"signer":{"signer_id":"pith.science","signer_type":"pith_registry","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"created_at":"2026-05-18T02:43:10Z","supersedes":[],"prev_event":null,"signature":{"signature_status":"signed_v1","algorithm":"ed25519","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signature_b64":"tTAuFOH899HCT9jEcBUmnoNG2MJ1ZkKopTVJFF60f+zw/jgfrgZi0LWlIB6urdctRTyHlKJOzG7MJwIF2qaQAQ==","signed_message":"open_graph_event_sha256_bytes","signed_at":"2026-06-26T00:04:30.031807Z"},"content_sha256":"4b422a7bc5d90ed0306fa317f6b9c35ba7bce1d354eedcea984b5a032d930e7e","schema_version":"1.0","event_id":"sha256:4b422a7bc5d90ed0306fa317f6b9c35ba7bce1d354eedcea984b5a032d930e7e"}],"timestamp_proofs":[],"mirror_hints":[{"mirror_type":"https","name":"Pith Resolver","base_url":"https://pith.science","bundle_url":"https://pith.science/pith/7BXXXMKNRSF7VA7RX3H26A5JZP/bundle.json","state_url":"https://pith.science/pith/7BXXXMKNRSF7VA7RX3H26A5JZP/state.json","well_known_bundle_url":"https://pith.science/.well-known/pith/7BXXXMKNRSF7VA7RX3H26A5JZP/bundle.json","status":"primary"}],"public_keys":[{"key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","format":"raw","public_key_b64":"stVStoiQhXFxp4s2pdzPNoqVNBMojDU/fJ2db5S3CbM=","public_key_hex":"b2d552b68890857171a78b36a5dccf368a953413288c353f7c9d9d6f94b709b3","fingerprint_sha256_b32_first128bits":"RVFV5Z2OI2J3ZUO7ERDEBCYNKS","fingerprint_sha256_hex":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","rotates_at":null,"url":"https://pith.science/pith-signing-key.json","notes":"Pith uses this Ed25519 key to sign canonical record SHA-256 digests. Verify with: ed25519_verify(public_key, message=canonical_sha256_bytes, signature=base64decode(signature_b64))."}],"merge_version":"pith-open-graph-merge-v1","built_at":"2026-06-26T00:04:30Z","links":{"resolver":"https://pith.science/pith/7BXXXMKNRSF7VA7RX3H26A5JZP","bundle":"https://pith.science/pith/7BXXXMKNRSF7VA7RX3H26A5JZP/bundle.json","state":"https://pith.science/pith/7BXXXMKNRSF7VA7RX3H26A5JZP/state.json","well_known_bundle":"https://pith.science/.well-known/pith/7BXXXMKNRSF7VA7RX3H26A5JZP/bundle.json"},"state":{"state_type":"pith_open_graph_state","state_version":"1.0","pith_number":"pith:2014:7BXXXMKNRSF7VA7RX3H26A5JZP","merge_version":"pith-open-graph-merge-v1","event_count":2,"valid_event_count":2,"invalid_event_count":0,"equivocation_count":0,"current":{"canonical_record":{"metadata":{"abstract_canon_sha256":"69542f194ca32d5829d4e6e17eb5dc33b9b823bc3190502f7183b840266dd8d8","cross_cats_sorted":[],"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.GT","submitted_at":"2014-09-09T05:10:46Z","title_canon_sha256":"b75f1bdc9ae6178fe1fc971cae0221384c569b53e0fb9e7c539978d18f21718b"},"schema_version":"1.0","source":{"id":"1409.2597","kind":"arxiv","version":1}},"source_aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"1409.2597","created_at":"2026-05-18T02:43:10Z"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"1409.2597v1","created_at":"2026-05-18T02:43:10Z"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.1409.2597","created_at":"2026-05-18T02:43:10Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"7BXXXMKNRSF7","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:28:16Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"7BXXXMKNRSF7VA7R","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:28:16Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"7BXXXMKN","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:28:16Z"}],"graph_snapshots":[{"event_id":"sha256:4b422a7bc5d90ed0306fa317f6b9c35ba7bce1d354eedcea984b5a032d930e7e","target":"graph","created_at":"2026-05-18T02:43:10Z","signer":{"key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signer_id":"pith.science","signer_type":"pith_registry"},"payload":{"graph_snapshot":{"author_claims":{"count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","strong_count":0},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"paper":{"abstract_excerpt":"A prevalent market structure in the Internet economy consists of buyers and sellers connected by a platform (such as Amazon or eBay) that acts as an intermediary and keeps a share of the revenue of each transaction. While the optimal mechanism that maximizes the intermediary's profit in such a setting may be quite complicated, the mechanisms observed in reality are generally much simpler, e.g., applying an affine function to the price of the transaction as the intermediary's fee. Loertscher and Niedermayer [2007] initiated the study of such fee-setting mechanisms in two-sided markets, and we c","authors_text":"Rad Niazadeh, Robert D. Kleinberg, Yang Yuan","cross_cats":[],"headline":"","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.GT","submitted_at":"2014-09-09T05:10:46Z","title":"Simple and Near-Optimal Mechanisms For Market Intermediation"},"references":{"count":0,"internal_anchors":0,"resolved_work":0,"sample":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1409.2597","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"created_at":null,"id":null,"model_set":{},"one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"pith_extraction_headline":"","strongest_claim":"","weakest_assumption":""}},"verdict_id":null}}],"author_attestations":[],"timestamp_anchors":[],"storage_attestations":[],"citation_signatures":[],"replication_records":[],"corrections":[],"mirror_hints":[],"record_created":{"event_id":"sha256:6797fb74f854a481e19f931a95a1e58d4df4866e0b0516a9a38fd41bfb5cb8aa","target":"record","created_at":"2026-05-18T02:43:10Z","signer":{"key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signer_id":"pith.science","signer_type":"pith_registry"},"payload":{"attestation_state":"computed","canonical_record":{"metadata":{"abstract_canon_sha256":"69542f194ca32d5829d4e6e17eb5dc33b9b823bc3190502f7183b840266dd8d8","cross_cats_sorted":[],"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.GT","submitted_at":"2014-09-09T05:10:46Z","title_canon_sha256":"b75f1bdc9ae6178fe1fc971cae0221384c569b53e0fb9e7c539978d18f21718b"},"schema_version":"1.0","source":{"id":"1409.2597","kind":"arxiv","version":1}},"canonical_sha256":"f86f7bb14d8c8bfa83f1becfaf03a9cbea7619f04d2b81f7cb3eefaa1430502c","receipt":{"algorithm":"ed25519","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","canonical_sha256":"f86f7bb14d8c8bfa83f1becfaf03a9cbea7619f04d2b81f7cb3eefaa1430502c","first_computed_at":"2026-05-18T02:43:10.183361Z","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","kind":"pith_receipt","last_reissued_at":"2026-05-18T02:43:10.183361Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","receipt_version":"0.3","signature_b64":"Tb7uDC3W+Lj4n8GAKWhKpc/cl0QldaVW9xNERxr4K3nJ0PWx+b5X2R2ulRHB21CcgybIoD+iSJRH0rHYlPVCBw==","signature_status":"signed_v1","signed_at":"2026-05-18T02:43:10.183861Z","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes"},"source_id":"1409.2597","source_kind":"arxiv","source_version":1}}},"equivocations":[],"invalid_events":[],"applied_event_ids":["sha256:6797fb74f854a481e19f931a95a1e58d4df4866e0b0516a9a38fd41bfb5cb8aa","sha256:4b422a7bc5d90ed0306fa317f6b9c35ba7bce1d354eedcea984b5a032d930e7e"],"state_sha256":"f01ad5ccbc0661b3aa56fbfd96e4ab9050f7e886a96dbce7f4e0134f0d978273"},"bundle_signature":{"signature_status":"signed_v1","algorithm":"ed25519","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signature_b64":"Gx+9a/01pl/NIQYboBpdFf2+dL+rRs+XkhVM+pvcj1Kytg6V+gXRHTKaHoTtCCPDtQFW+mZKpepFZASZ9XHlBQ==","signed_message":"bundle_sha256_bytes","signed_at":"2026-06-26T00:04:30.033740Z","bundle_sha256":"c1262c2ad41b31855340907ba326c6496d12b0791ee8c0e4712daa3b57bdee61"}}