{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2018:CNASV4ERGCYLV25DWSGMZ57UYP","short_pith_number":"pith:CNASV4ER","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"13412af09130b0baeba3b48cccf7f4c3f0e5c12fb851531e4a01421031157823","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"1804.01977","version":2},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"An End-to-end Argument in Mechanism Design (Prior-independent Auctions for Budgeted Agents)","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Jason D. Hartline, Yiding Feng","submitted_at":"2018-04-05T17:57:26Z","abstract_excerpt":"This paper considers prior-independent mechanism design, namely identifying a single mechanism that has near optimal performance on every prior distribution. We show that mechanisms with truthtelling equilibria, a.k.a., revelation mechanisms, do not always give optimal prior-independent mechanisms and we define the revelation gap to quantify the non-optimality of revelation mechanisms. This study suggests that it is important to develop a theory for the design of non-revelation mechanisms. Our analysis focuses on welfare maximization in single-item auctions for agents with budgets and a natura"},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"1804.01977","kind":"arxiv","version":2},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.GT","submitted_at":"2018-04-05T17:57:26Z","cross_cats_sorted":[],"title_canon_sha256":"e12d476b550723c136e8bc323eabbdc09ff6b87049bf0ca53a7e3fd8786b4e0f","abstract_canon_sha256":"199d5d80f6674c8e2bc6154ba1ebb30a8847473d0bcd565b32b4885b9a76e122"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-05-18T00:09:25.326589Z","signature_b64":"+iCIgazO9ryqIlpioWwo/amNZot7f6WAL/S05h7Nk/DYgs59HH6b6i6CykwMGiCEZu3mDB88EWni8xXRsLGfBg==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"13412af09130b0baeba3b48cccf7f4c3f0e5c12fb851531e4a01421031157823","last_reissued_at":"2026-05-18T00:09:25.326006Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-05-18T00:09:25.326006Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"An End-to-end Argument in Mechanism Design (Prior-independent Auctions for Budgeted Agents)","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Jason D. Hartline, Yiding Feng","submitted_at":"2018-04-05T17:57:26Z","abstract_excerpt":"This paper considers prior-independent mechanism design, namely identifying a single mechanism that has near optimal performance on every prior distribution. We show that mechanisms with truthtelling equilibria, a.k.a., revelation mechanisms, do not always give optimal prior-independent mechanisms and we define the revelation gap to quantify the non-optimality of revelation mechanisms. This study suggests that it is important to develop a theory for the design of non-revelation mechanisms. Our analysis focuses on welfare maximization in single-item auctions for agents with budgets and a natura"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1804.01977","kind":"arxiv","version":2},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"1804.01977","created_at":"2026-05-18T00:09:25.326093+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"1804.01977v2","created_at":"2026-05-18T00:09:25.326093+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.1804.01977","created_at":"2026-05-18T00:09:25.326093+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"CNASV4ERGCYL","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:32:16.446611+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"CNASV4ERGCYLV25D","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:32:16.446611+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"CNASV4ER","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:32:16.446611+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":0,"internal_anchor_count":0,"sample":[]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/CNASV4ERGCYLV25DWSGMZ57UYP","json":"https://pith.science/pith/CNASV4ERGCYLV25DWSGMZ57UYP.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/CNASV4ERGCYLV25DWSGMZ57UYP/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/CNASV4ERGCYLV25DWSGMZ57UYP/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/CNASV4ER"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/CNASV4ERGCYLV25DWSGMZ57UYP","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/CNASV4ERGCYLV25DWSGMZ57UYP.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/CNASV4ER","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=1804.01977&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/CNASV4ERGCYLV25DWSGMZ57UYP/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/CNASV4ERGCYLV25DWSGMZ57UYP/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/CNASV4ERGCYLV25DWSGMZ57UYP/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/CNASV4ERGCYLV25DWSGMZ57UYP/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/CNASV4ERGCYLV25DWSGMZ57UYP/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/CNASV4ERGCYLV25DWSGMZ57UYP/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/CNASV4ERGCYLV25DWSGMZ57UYP/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-05-18T00:09:25.326093+00:00","updated_at":"2026-05-18T00:09:25.326093+00:00"}