{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2011:FXM2EZFD3JELYBXXGA2DDW36MZ","short_pith_number":"pith:FXM2EZFD","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"2dd9a264a3da48bc06f7303431db7e6644c99cf603a88a30c99d0b0bbbf8a4bc","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"1111.2893","version":1},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"Optimal Crowdsourcing Contests","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Balasubramanian Sivan, Jason D. Hartline, Shuchi Chawla","submitted_at":"2011-11-12T02:38:16Z","abstract_excerpt":"We study the design and approximation of optimal crowdsourcing contests. Crowdsourcing contests can be modeled as all-pay auctions because entrants must exert effort up-front to enter. Unlike all-pay auctions where a usual design objective would be to maximize revenue, in crowdsourcing contests, the principal only benefits from the submission with the highest quality. We give a theory for optimal crowdsourcing contests that mirrors the theory of optimal auction design: the optimal crowdsourcing contest is a virtual valuation optimizer (the virtual valuation function depends on the distribution"},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"1111.2893","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.GT","submitted_at":"2011-11-12T02:38:16Z","cross_cats_sorted":[],"title_canon_sha256":"2107bfb703dd16b03e8f169c79bf31f348276bc7f27668515b8230b1d42daf28","abstract_canon_sha256":"015e7fa356ec5431e4000d2f265920e1ddb311bc916658d44b56a2fe4739fb13"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-05-18T04:08:23.521287Z","signature_b64":"Sb3BTXHTBlswbTsHbiHoqvYdmO/2YWkPls+xnlHShW2MFzdfNT14PnyUbY3mDUpwcioZfyKTUbsFQBwxmlMcDg==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"2dd9a264a3da48bc06f7303431db7e6644c99cf603a88a30c99d0b0bbbf8a4bc","last_reissued_at":"2026-05-18T04:08:23.520816Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-05-18T04:08:23.520816Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"Optimal Crowdsourcing Contests","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Balasubramanian Sivan, Jason D. Hartline, Shuchi Chawla","submitted_at":"2011-11-12T02:38:16Z","abstract_excerpt":"We study the design and approximation of optimal crowdsourcing contests. Crowdsourcing contests can be modeled as all-pay auctions because entrants must exert effort up-front to enter. Unlike all-pay auctions where a usual design objective would be to maximize revenue, in crowdsourcing contests, the principal only benefits from the submission with the highest quality. We give a theory for optimal crowdsourcing contests that mirrors the theory of optimal auction design: the optimal crowdsourcing contest is a virtual valuation optimizer (the virtual valuation function depends on the distribution"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1111.2893","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"1111.2893","created_at":"2026-05-18T04:08:23.520888+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"1111.2893v1","created_at":"2026-05-18T04:08:23.520888+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.1111.2893","created_at":"2026-05-18T04:08:23.520888+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"FXM2EZFD3JEL","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:26:28.662955+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"FXM2EZFD3JELYBXX","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:26:28.662955+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"FXM2EZFD","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:26:28.662955+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":0,"internal_anchor_count":0,"sample":[]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/FXM2EZFD3JELYBXXGA2DDW36MZ","json":"https://pith.science/pith/FXM2EZFD3JELYBXXGA2DDW36MZ.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/FXM2EZFD3JELYBXXGA2DDW36MZ/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/FXM2EZFD3JELYBXXGA2DDW36MZ/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/FXM2EZFD"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/FXM2EZFD3JELYBXXGA2DDW36MZ","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/FXM2EZFD3JELYBXXGA2DDW36MZ.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/FXM2EZFD","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=1111.2893&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/FXM2EZFD3JELYBXXGA2DDW36MZ/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/FXM2EZFD3JELYBXXGA2DDW36MZ/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/FXM2EZFD3JELYBXXGA2DDW36MZ/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/FXM2EZFD3JELYBXXGA2DDW36MZ/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/FXM2EZFD3JELYBXXGA2DDW36MZ/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/FXM2EZFD3JELYBXXGA2DDW36MZ/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/FXM2EZFD3JELYBXXGA2DDW36MZ/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-05-18T04:08:23.520888+00:00","updated_at":"2026-05-18T04:08:23.520888+00:00"}