{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2015:KYNYTFF3HDIMOR6M4K745BYMGC","short_pith_number":"pith:KYNYTFF3","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"561b8994bb38d0c747cce2bfce870c309ee8edd459451520b3b29dc1aa0da25c","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"1503.01288","version":1},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"Game-theoretic Approach for Non-Cooperative Planning","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.GT"],"primary_cat":"cs.AI","authors_text":"Eva Onaindia, Jaume Jord\\'an","submitted_at":"2015-03-04T11:46:33Z","abstract_excerpt":"When two or more self-interested agents put their plans to execution in the same environment, conflicts may arise as a consequence, for instance, of a common utilization of resources. In this case, an agent can postpone the execution of a particular action, if this punctually solves the conflict, or it can resort to execute a different plan if the agent's payoff significantly diminishes due to the action deferral. In this paper, we present a game-theoretic approach to non-cooperative planning that helps predict before execution what plan schedules agents will adopt so that the set of strategie"},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"1503.01288","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.AI","submitted_at":"2015-03-04T11:46:33Z","cross_cats_sorted":["cs.GT"],"title_canon_sha256":"9bbabc74f768d8cb7f6ccb73b584da8607d7c85c1b62ca57e533a1d79b07705e","abstract_canon_sha256":"c5403948cda64c9141e2579d5fb8fb3d94066f4b0d9708c5f7d84aadd2583855"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-05-18T02:25:39.480858Z","signature_b64":"dfaGMTmgqrXanHzsxMqO2dmMXsBQQ2zZL8tl3bDtbiYin7GweLEBw3mX9NGzVi/UF01vPXxETdyY89Q5qy47Aw==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"561b8994bb38d0c747cce2bfce870c309ee8edd459451520b3b29dc1aa0da25c","last_reissued_at":"2026-05-18T02:25:39.480419Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-05-18T02:25:39.480419Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"Game-theoretic Approach for Non-Cooperative Planning","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.GT"],"primary_cat":"cs.AI","authors_text":"Eva Onaindia, Jaume Jord\\'an","submitted_at":"2015-03-04T11:46:33Z","abstract_excerpt":"When two or more self-interested agents put their plans to execution in the same environment, conflicts may arise as a consequence, for instance, of a common utilization of resources. In this case, an agent can postpone the execution of a particular action, if this punctually solves the conflict, or it can resort to execute a different plan if the agent's payoff significantly diminishes due to the action deferral. In this paper, we present a game-theoretic approach to non-cooperative planning that helps predict before execution what plan schedules agents will adopt so that the set of strategie"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1503.01288","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"1503.01288","created_at":"2026-05-18T02:25:39.480497+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"1503.01288v1","created_at":"2026-05-18T02:25:39.480497+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.1503.01288","created_at":"2026-05-18T02:25:39.480497+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"KYNYTFF3HDIM","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:29:29.992203+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"KYNYTFF3HDIMOR6M","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:29:29.992203+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"KYNYTFF3","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:29:29.992203+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":0,"internal_anchor_count":0,"sample":[]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/KYNYTFF3HDIMOR6M4K745BYMGC","json":"https://pith.science/pith/KYNYTFF3HDIMOR6M4K745BYMGC.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/KYNYTFF3HDIMOR6M4K745BYMGC/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/KYNYTFF3HDIMOR6M4K745BYMGC/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/KYNYTFF3"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/KYNYTFF3HDIMOR6M4K745BYMGC","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/KYNYTFF3HDIMOR6M4K745BYMGC.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/KYNYTFF3","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=1503.01288&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/KYNYTFF3HDIMOR6M4K745BYMGC/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/KYNYTFF3HDIMOR6M4K745BYMGC/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/KYNYTFF3HDIMOR6M4K745BYMGC/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/KYNYTFF3HDIMOR6M4K745BYMGC/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/KYNYTFF3HDIMOR6M4K745BYMGC/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/KYNYTFF3HDIMOR6M4K745BYMGC/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/KYNYTFF3HDIMOR6M4K745BYMGC/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-05-18T02:25:39.480497+00:00","updated_at":"2026-05-18T02:25:39.480497+00:00"}