{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2011:MQAVXYHZDKEHTTEOTLJC67M34H","short_pith_number":"pith:MQAVXYHZ","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"64015be0f91a8879cc8e9ad22f7d9be1f5e0e6dc0aabb50272aad7b3ab86881f","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"1106.6058","version":1},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"Stability of strategies in payoff-driven evolutionary games on networks","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["nlin.CD"],"primary_cat":"nlin.AO","authors_text":"Francesco Sorrentino, Nicholas Mecholsky","submitted_at":"2011-06-29T20:12:01Z","abstract_excerpt":"We consider a network of coupled agents playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game, in which players are allowed to pick a strategy in the interval [0,1], with 0 corresponding to defection, 1 to cooperation, and intermediate values representing mixed strategies in which each player may act as a cooperator or a defector over a large number of interactions with a certain probability. Our model is payoff-driven, i.e., we assume that the level of accumulated payoff at each node is a relevant parameter in the selection of strategies. Also, we consider that each player chooses his/her strategy in a context"},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"1106.6058","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"nlin.AO","submitted_at":"2011-06-29T20:12:01Z","cross_cats_sorted":["nlin.CD"],"title_canon_sha256":"c35f85e0b319a1959ab8f57c8aa515dbefcae306c9f4ceb34f92c14b36cd68fb","abstract_canon_sha256":"2f60f0ab0c167077813edc997f1b585fccb0d7bb65eac6a9d0adbbcf743c34f3"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-05-18T02:01:26.768505Z","signature_b64":"8DBG5RfQ7Ur0/J5I3AxTWHGDdExOSpPRbvZPz9hGVv78MEFErirl1mSNQEetaEkMZBVKq+yvLRQL1GOl3uTqCQ==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"64015be0f91a8879cc8e9ad22f7d9be1f5e0e6dc0aabb50272aad7b3ab86881f","last_reissued_at":"2026-05-18T02:01:26.767933Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-05-18T02:01:26.767933Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"Stability of strategies in payoff-driven evolutionary games on networks","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["nlin.CD"],"primary_cat":"nlin.AO","authors_text":"Francesco Sorrentino, Nicholas Mecholsky","submitted_at":"2011-06-29T20:12:01Z","abstract_excerpt":"We consider a network of coupled agents playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game, in which players are allowed to pick a strategy in the interval [0,1], with 0 corresponding to defection, 1 to cooperation, and intermediate values representing mixed strategies in which each player may act as a cooperator or a defector over a large number of interactions with a certain probability. Our model is payoff-driven, i.e., we assume that the level of accumulated payoff at each node is a relevant parameter in the selection of strategies. Also, we consider that each player chooses his/her strategy in a context"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1106.6058","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"1106.6058","created_at":"2026-05-18T02:01:26.768033+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"1106.6058v1","created_at":"2026-05-18T02:01:26.768033+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.1106.6058","created_at":"2026-05-18T02:01:26.768033+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"MQAVXYHZDKEH","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:26:34.985390+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"MQAVXYHZDKEHTTEO","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:26:34.985390+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"MQAVXYHZ","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:26:34.985390+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":0,"internal_anchor_count":0,"sample":[]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/MQAVXYHZDKEHTTEOTLJC67M34H","json":"https://pith.science/pith/MQAVXYHZDKEHTTEOTLJC67M34H.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/MQAVXYHZDKEHTTEOTLJC67M34H/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/MQAVXYHZDKEHTTEOTLJC67M34H/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/MQAVXYHZ"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/MQAVXYHZDKEHTTEOTLJC67M34H","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/MQAVXYHZDKEHTTEOTLJC67M34H.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/MQAVXYHZ","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=1106.6058&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/MQAVXYHZDKEHTTEOTLJC67M34H/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/MQAVXYHZDKEHTTEOTLJC67M34H/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/MQAVXYHZDKEHTTEOTLJC67M34H/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/MQAVXYHZDKEHTTEOTLJC67M34H/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/MQAVXYHZDKEHTTEOTLJC67M34H/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/MQAVXYHZDKEHTTEOTLJC67M34H/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/MQAVXYHZDKEHTTEOTLJC67M34H/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-05-18T02:01:26.768033+00:00","updated_at":"2026-05-18T02:01:26.768033+00:00"}