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Matthew Weinberg","submitted_at":"2018-12-05T03:05:01Z","abstract_excerpt":"The Competition Complexity of an auction setting refers to the number of additional bidders necessary in order for the (deterministic, prior-independent, dominant strategy truthful) Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism to achieve greater revenue than the (randomized, prior-dependent, Bayesian-truthful) optimal mechanism without the additional bidders.\n  We prove that the competition complexity of $n$ bidders with additive valuations over $m$ independent items is at most $n(\\ln(1+m/n)+2)$, and also at most $9\\sqrt{nm}$. 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