{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2012:UGY3RO52VDSAEXUJVSNEEDAEQK","short_pith_number":"pith:UGY3RO52","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"a1b1b8bbbaa8e4025e89ac9a420c0482976d25107cd7d8c439920e637c5257a6","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"1209.3418","version":1},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"Mechanisms for Fair Allocation Problems: No-Punishment Payment Rules in Fully Verifiable Settings","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Francesco Scarcello, Gianluigi Greco","submitted_at":"2012-09-15T16:34:54Z","abstract_excerpt":"Mechanism design is addressed in the context of fair allocations of indivisible goods with monetary compensation. Motivated by a real-world social choice problem, mechanisms with verification are considered in a setting where (i) agents' declarations on allocated goods can be fully verified before payments are performed, and where (ii) verification is not used to punish agents whose declarations resulted in incorrect ones. Within this setting, a mechanism is designed that is shown to be truthful, efficient, and budget-balanced, and where agents' utilities are fairly determined by the Shapley v"},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"1209.3418","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.GT","submitted_at":"2012-09-15T16:34:54Z","cross_cats_sorted":[],"title_canon_sha256":"d7bb8e46cc9ecb97b16275c4d1d7fcc79de7a5deaeecfe9b267ec3e8f3b9a7e5","abstract_canon_sha256":"31b91b70512d97aa8a0c0e2ae44fc0dad9b8033c78f1250a31d1efa2699fa387"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-05-18T03:45:31.027242Z","signature_b64":"il6nco71cmTOiDEGya2bN0mzV/VQcAxP715JJLDZtLaKAACRm52hsW85vGlWK4S+ulhjPgkqd2BHuK2lNxKZAg==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"a1b1b8bbbaa8e4025e89ac9a420c0482976d25107cd7d8c439920e637c5257a6","last_reissued_at":"2026-05-18T03:45:31.026793Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-05-18T03:45:31.026793Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"Mechanisms for Fair Allocation Problems: No-Punishment Payment Rules in Fully Verifiable Settings","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Francesco Scarcello, Gianluigi Greco","submitted_at":"2012-09-15T16:34:54Z","abstract_excerpt":"Mechanism design is addressed in the context of fair allocations of indivisible goods with monetary compensation. Motivated by a real-world social choice problem, mechanisms with verification are considered in a setting where (i) agents' declarations on allocated goods can be fully verified before payments are performed, and where (ii) verification is not used to punish agents whose declarations resulted in incorrect ones. Within this setting, a mechanism is designed that is shown to be truthful, efficient, and budget-balanced, and where agents' utilities are fairly determined by the Shapley v"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1209.3418","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"1209.3418","created_at":"2026-05-18T03:45:31.026863+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"1209.3418v1","created_at":"2026-05-18T03:45:31.026863+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.1209.3418","created_at":"2026-05-18T03:45:31.026863+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"UGY3RO52VDSA","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:27:23.164592+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"UGY3RO52VDSAEXUJ","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:27:23.164592+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"UGY3RO52","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:27:23.164592+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":0,"internal_anchor_count":0,"sample":[]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/UGY3RO52VDSAEXUJVSNEEDAEQK","json":"https://pith.science/pith/UGY3RO52VDSAEXUJVSNEEDAEQK.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/UGY3RO52VDSAEXUJVSNEEDAEQK/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/UGY3RO52VDSAEXUJVSNEEDAEQK/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/UGY3RO52"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/UGY3RO52VDSAEXUJVSNEEDAEQK","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/UGY3RO52VDSAEXUJVSNEEDAEQK.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/UGY3RO52","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=1209.3418&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/UGY3RO52VDSAEXUJVSNEEDAEQK/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/UGY3RO52VDSAEXUJVSNEEDAEQK/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/UGY3RO52VDSAEXUJVSNEEDAEQK/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/UGY3RO52VDSAEXUJVSNEEDAEQK/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/UGY3RO52VDSAEXUJVSNEEDAEQK/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/UGY3RO52VDSAEXUJVSNEEDAEQK/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/UGY3RO52VDSAEXUJVSNEEDAEQK/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-05-18T03:45:31.026863+00:00","updated_at":"2026-05-18T03:45:31.026863+00:00"}