{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2018:YTMO5JVVJB7I3F45ZUH4SGKZSZ","short_pith_number":"pith:YTMO5JVV","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"c4d8eea6b5487e8d979dcd0fc919599664fe3ebfe6f99274723f5211e66cef3c","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"1806.01072","version":1},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"A rational decentralized generalized Nash equilibrium seeking for energy markets","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.GT","econ.TH"],"primary_cat":"cs.CE","authors_text":"Lorenzo Nespoli, Matteo Salani, Vasco Medici","submitted_at":"2018-06-04T12:33:13Z","abstract_excerpt":"We propose a method to design a decentralized energy market which guarantees individual rationality (IR) in expectation, in the presence of system-level grid constraints. We formulate the market as a welfare maximization problem subject to IR constraints, and we make use of Lagrangian duality to model the problem as a n-person non-cooperative game with a unique generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE). We provide a distributed algorithm which converges to the GNE. The convergence and properties of the algorithm are investigated by means of numerical simulations."},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"1806.01072","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.CE","submitted_at":"2018-06-04T12:33:13Z","cross_cats_sorted":["cs.GT","econ.TH"],"title_canon_sha256":"7ca590be98de39f6bde562acd400bf6919f6a420ed6a9e56588aacd424b05476","abstract_canon_sha256":"f82797536df1d737a1ada920600b5541c5711eae7c1fc5a4de533f7834e2d817"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-05-18T00:10:16.591759Z","signature_b64":"VAI2sCa+NqglrVT93UBwpgpF14nfAo9VEll7OBGgoYSewizdCDUbcXX6oAA3FBfzgv3qcf6h+rcXbNobKgl0DA==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"c4d8eea6b5487e8d979dcd0fc919599664fe3ebfe6f99274723f5211e66cef3c","last_reissued_at":"2026-05-18T00:10:16.591162Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-05-18T00:10:16.591162Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"A rational decentralized generalized Nash equilibrium seeking for energy markets","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.GT","econ.TH"],"primary_cat":"cs.CE","authors_text":"Lorenzo Nespoli, Matteo Salani, Vasco Medici","submitted_at":"2018-06-04T12:33:13Z","abstract_excerpt":"We propose a method to design a decentralized energy market which guarantees individual rationality (IR) in expectation, in the presence of system-level grid constraints. We formulate the market as a welfare maximization problem subject to IR constraints, and we make use of Lagrangian duality to model the problem as a n-person non-cooperative game with a unique generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE). We provide a distributed algorithm which converges to the GNE. The convergence and properties of the algorithm are investigated by means of numerical simulations."},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1806.01072","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"1806.01072","created_at":"2026-05-18T00:10:16.591235+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"1806.01072v1","created_at":"2026-05-18T00:10:16.591235+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.1806.01072","created_at":"2026-05-18T00:10:16.591235+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"YTMO5JVVJB7I","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:33:04.347982+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"YTMO5JVVJB7I3F45","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:33:04.347982+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"YTMO5JVV","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:33:04.347982+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":0,"internal_anchor_count":0,"sample":[]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/YTMO5JVVJB7I3F45ZUH4SGKZSZ","json":"https://pith.science/pith/YTMO5JVVJB7I3F45ZUH4SGKZSZ.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/YTMO5JVVJB7I3F45ZUH4SGKZSZ/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/YTMO5JVVJB7I3F45ZUH4SGKZSZ/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/YTMO5JVV"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/YTMO5JVVJB7I3F45ZUH4SGKZSZ","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/YTMO5JVVJB7I3F45ZUH4SGKZSZ.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/YTMO5JVV","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=1806.01072&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/YTMO5JVVJB7I3F45ZUH4SGKZSZ/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/YTMO5JVVJB7I3F45ZUH4SGKZSZ/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/YTMO5JVVJB7I3F45ZUH4SGKZSZ/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/YTMO5JVVJB7I3F45ZUH4SGKZSZ/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/YTMO5JVVJB7I3F45ZUH4SGKZSZ/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/YTMO5JVVJB7I3F45ZUH4SGKZSZ/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/YTMO5JVVJB7I3F45ZUH4SGKZSZ/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-05-18T00:10:16.591235+00:00","updated_at":"2026-05-18T00:10:16.591235+00:00"}