{"bundle_type":"pith_open_graph_bundle","bundle_version":"1.0","pith_number":"pith:2015:ZSCJKSWKOIXYV7GO7MZ5TB2LAM","short_pith_number":"pith:ZSCJKSWK","canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"1508.01130","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.GT","submitted_at":"2015-08-05T17:03:05Z","cross_cats_sorted":[],"title_canon_sha256":"5cb607914b57639d05cdf216109e9c1729cb9096bf906e5f72a9d94ca5b1e5d7","abstract_canon_sha256":"f0b9c4c9754d844b38a47a04d5a4f04de94d03187a2680415481066f6a00c243"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"canonical_sha256":"cc84954aca722f8afccefb33d9874b033ae699df4dad9b2d5a7e1c6182365c7a","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"1508.01130","version":1},"source_aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"1508.01130","created_at":"2026-05-18T01:35:43Z"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"1508.01130v1","created_at":"2026-05-18T01:35:43Z"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.1508.01130","created_at":"2026-05-18T01:35:43Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"ZSCJKSWKOIXY","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:29:52Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"ZSCJKSWKOIXYV7GO","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:29:52Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"ZSCJKSWK","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:29:52Z"}],"events":[{"event_type":"record_created","subject_pith_number":"pith:2015:ZSCJKSWKOIXYV7GO7MZ5TB2LAM","target":"record","payload":{"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"1508.01130","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.GT","submitted_at":"2015-08-05T17:03:05Z","cross_cats_sorted":[],"title_canon_sha256":"5cb607914b57639d05cdf216109e9c1729cb9096bf906e5f72a9d94ca5b1e5d7","abstract_canon_sha256":"f0b9c4c9754d844b38a47a04d5a4f04de94d03187a2680415481066f6a00c243"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"canonical_sha256":"cc84954aca722f8afccefb33d9874b033ae699df4dad9b2d5a7e1c6182365c7a","receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-05-18T01:35:43.987757Z","signature_b64":"fQwz2rkB720KW/WrySBW8FR1eNkXRFSHom2A71IeS9coln/qriqGs5YG4K+AMSMHT15363C2p4T1Eb1nI/+ZDw==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"cc84954aca722f8afccefb33d9874b033ae699df4dad9b2d5a7e1c6182365c7a","last_reissued_at":"2026-05-18T01:35:43.987362Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-05-18T01:35:43.987362Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"source_kind":"arxiv","source_id":"1508.01130","source_version":1,"attestation_state":"computed"},"signer":{"signer_id":"pith.science","signer_type":"pith_registry","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"created_at":"2026-05-18T01:35:43Z","supersedes":[],"prev_event":null,"signature":{"signature_status":"signed_v1","algorithm":"ed25519","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signature_b64":"ShGGLgmhElNQJj09h5HCnEajgdcokPsmce90vN4d2CCNlrAx/EEuiJtQodXqMf7mlmWiI8POeEgBe3d6i1Q4DA==","signed_message":"open_graph_event_sha256_bytes","signed_at":"2026-05-30T15:42:42.638032Z"},"content_sha256":"e4e698b7a828b38f2dc9ce10fcff3d3c4480a36ca1a7b727f6bbf11c7edd7f5c","schema_version":"1.0","event_id":"sha256:e4e698b7a828b38f2dc9ce10fcff3d3c4480a36ca1a7b727f6bbf11c7edd7f5c"},{"event_type":"graph_snapshot","subject_pith_number":"pith:2015:ZSCJKSWKOIXYV7GO7MZ5TB2LAM","target":"graph","payload":{"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"On the Efficiency of All-Pay Mechanisms","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Alkmini Sgouritsa, Bo Tang, George Christodoulou","submitted_at":"2015-08-05T17:03:05Z","abstract_excerpt":"We study the inefficiency of mixed equilibria, expressed as the price of anarchy, of all-pay auctions in three different environments: combinatorial, multi-unit and single-item auctions. First, we consider item-bidding combinatorial auctions where m all-pay auctions run in parallel, one for each good. For fractionally subadditive valuations, we strengthen the upper bound from 2 [Syrgkanis and Tardos STOC'13] to 1.82 by proving some structural properties that characterize the mixed Nash equilibria of the game. Next, we design an all-pay mechanism with a randomized allocation rule for the multi-"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1508.01130","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"verdict_id":null},"signer":{"signer_id":"pith.science","signer_type":"pith_registry","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"created_at":"2026-05-18T01:35:43Z","supersedes":[],"prev_event":null,"signature":{"signature_status":"signed_v1","algorithm":"ed25519","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signature_b64":"unNo7UNKTkzRPF0iIMdIBV7qgIgAPXu6K5pXifa/9oEMXjuZEL5DTWBX92KRDSrqNPTH0xZA/asA8CJq/QMbCQ==","signed_message":"open_graph_event_sha256_bytes","signed_at":"2026-05-30T15:42:42.638388Z"},"content_sha256":"9f11ef5bbfe4adac860d9cae3b8151842407116d6d614d4cb57ae71a159dfd78","schema_version":"1.0","event_id":"sha256:9f11ef5bbfe4adac860d9cae3b8151842407116d6d614d4cb57ae71a159dfd78"}],"timestamp_proofs":[],"mirror_hints":[{"mirror_type":"https","name":"Pith Resolver","base_url":"https://pith.science","bundle_url":"https://pith.science/pith/ZSCJKSWKOIXYV7GO7MZ5TB2LAM/bundle.json","state_url":"https://pith.science/pith/ZSCJKSWKOIXYV7GO7MZ5TB2LAM/state.json","well_known_bundle_url":"https://pith.science/.well-known/pith/ZSCJKSWKOIXYV7GO7MZ5TB2LAM/bundle.json","status":"primary"}],"public_keys":[{"key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","format":"raw","public_key_b64":"stVStoiQhXFxp4s2pdzPNoqVNBMojDU/fJ2db5S3CbM=","public_key_hex":"b2d552b68890857171a78b36a5dccf368a953413288c353f7c9d9d6f94b709b3","fingerprint_sha256_b32_first128bits":"RVFV5Z2OI2J3ZUO7ERDEBCYNKS","fingerprint_sha256_hex":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","rotates_at":null,"url":"https://pith.science/pith-signing-key.json","notes":"Pith uses this Ed25519 key to sign canonical record SHA-256 digests. Verify with: ed25519_verify(public_key, message=canonical_sha256_bytes, signature=base64decode(signature_b64))."}],"merge_version":"pith-open-graph-merge-v1","built_at":"2026-05-30T15:42:42Z","links":{"resolver":"https://pith.science/pith/ZSCJKSWKOIXYV7GO7MZ5TB2LAM","bundle":"https://pith.science/pith/ZSCJKSWKOIXYV7GO7MZ5TB2LAM/bundle.json","state":"https://pith.science/pith/ZSCJKSWKOIXYV7GO7MZ5TB2LAM/state.json","well_known_bundle":"https://pith.science/.well-known/pith/ZSCJKSWKOIXYV7GO7MZ5TB2LAM/bundle.json"},"state":{"state_type":"pith_open_graph_state","state_version":"1.0","pith_number":"pith:2015:ZSCJKSWKOIXYV7GO7MZ5TB2LAM","merge_version":"pith-open-graph-merge-v1","event_count":2,"valid_event_count":2,"invalid_event_count":0,"equivocation_count":0,"current":{"canonical_record":{"metadata":{"abstract_canon_sha256":"f0b9c4c9754d844b38a47a04d5a4f04de94d03187a2680415481066f6a00c243","cross_cats_sorted":[],"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.GT","submitted_at":"2015-08-05T17:03:05Z","title_canon_sha256":"5cb607914b57639d05cdf216109e9c1729cb9096bf906e5f72a9d94ca5b1e5d7"},"schema_version":"1.0","source":{"id":"1508.01130","kind":"arxiv","version":1}},"source_aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"1508.01130","created_at":"2026-05-18T01:35:43Z"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"1508.01130v1","created_at":"2026-05-18T01:35:43Z"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.1508.01130","created_at":"2026-05-18T01:35:43Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"ZSCJKSWKOIXY","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:29:52Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"ZSCJKSWKOIXYV7GO","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:29:52Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"ZSCJKSWK","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:29:52Z"}],"graph_snapshots":[{"event_id":"sha256:9f11ef5bbfe4adac860d9cae3b8151842407116d6d614d4cb57ae71a159dfd78","target":"graph","created_at":"2026-05-18T01:35:43Z","signer":{"key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signer_id":"pith.science","signer_type":"pith_registry"},"payload":{"graph_snapshot":{"author_claims":{"count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","strong_count":0},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"paper":{"abstract_excerpt":"We study the inefficiency of mixed equilibria, expressed as the price of anarchy, of all-pay auctions in three different environments: combinatorial, multi-unit and single-item auctions. First, we consider item-bidding combinatorial auctions where m all-pay auctions run in parallel, one for each good. For fractionally subadditive valuations, we strengthen the upper bound from 2 [Syrgkanis and Tardos STOC'13] to 1.82 by proving some structural properties that characterize the mixed Nash equilibria of the game. Next, we design an all-pay mechanism with a randomized allocation rule for the multi-","authors_text":"Alkmini Sgouritsa, Bo Tang, George Christodoulou","cross_cats":[],"headline":"","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.GT","submitted_at":"2015-08-05T17:03:05Z","title":"On the Efficiency of All-Pay Mechanisms"},"references":{"count":0,"internal_anchors":0,"resolved_work":0,"sample":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1508.01130","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"created_at":null,"id":null,"model_set":{},"one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"pith_extraction_headline":"","strongest_claim":"","weakest_assumption":""}},"verdict_id":null}}],"author_attestations":[],"timestamp_anchors":[],"storage_attestations":[],"citation_signatures":[],"replication_records":[],"corrections":[],"mirror_hints":[],"record_created":{"event_id":"sha256:e4e698b7a828b38f2dc9ce10fcff3d3c4480a36ca1a7b727f6bbf11c7edd7f5c","target":"record","created_at":"2026-05-18T01:35:43Z","signer":{"key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signer_id":"pith.science","signer_type":"pith_registry"},"payload":{"attestation_state":"computed","canonical_record":{"metadata":{"abstract_canon_sha256":"f0b9c4c9754d844b38a47a04d5a4f04de94d03187a2680415481066f6a00c243","cross_cats_sorted":[],"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.GT","submitted_at":"2015-08-05T17:03:05Z","title_canon_sha256":"5cb607914b57639d05cdf216109e9c1729cb9096bf906e5f72a9d94ca5b1e5d7"},"schema_version":"1.0","source":{"id":"1508.01130","kind":"arxiv","version":1}},"canonical_sha256":"cc84954aca722f8afccefb33d9874b033ae699df4dad9b2d5a7e1c6182365c7a","receipt":{"algorithm":"ed25519","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","canonical_sha256":"cc84954aca722f8afccefb33d9874b033ae699df4dad9b2d5a7e1c6182365c7a","first_computed_at":"2026-05-18T01:35:43.987362Z","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","kind":"pith_receipt","last_reissued_at":"2026-05-18T01:35:43.987362Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","receipt_version":"0.3","signature_b64":"fQwz2rkB720KW/WrySBW8FR1eNkXRFSHom2A71IeS9coln/qriqGs5YG4K+AMSMHT15363C2p4T1Eb1nI/+ZDw==","signature_status":"signed_v1","signed_at":"2026-05-18T01:35:43.987757Z","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes"},"source_id":"1508.01130","source_kind":"arxiv","source_version":1}}},"equivocations":[],"invalid_events":[],"applied_event_ids":["sha256:e4e698b7a828b38f2dc9ce10fcff3d3c4480a36ca1a7b727f6bbf11c7edd7f5c","sha256:9f11ef5bbfe4adac860d9cae3b8151842407116d6d614d4cb57ae71a159dfd78"],"state_sha256":"0a662718618ff7118cc3c7ddb6269b4928c10d0232abb944f054061ec0ab7e35"},"bundle_signature":{"signature_status":"signed_v1","algorithm":"ed25519","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signature_b64":"NfNdILwpT9VzzILC0pzss79n4KzhcE9r5oqtdKY4Tm5c/S61SyPH0/6Md3SYI3G9bbUGlXdBjDsv5x4NnPb3BQ==","signed_message":"bundle_sha256_bytes","signed_at":"2026-05-30T15:42:42.640726Z","bundle_sha256":"cab4706d4c4fde93b1391118a79c57f5db08e1cd48f92b51229e2d845f9559cb"}}