For Bayesian strategic agents, score and utility disparities between cost-differentiated groups remain bounded and can be minimized at intermediate transparency, whereas naive agents produce unbounded utility disparities as noise grows.
The disparate equilibria of algorithmic decision making when individuals invest rationally
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The Disparate Effects of Partial Information in Bayesian Strategic Learning
For Bayesian strategic agents, score and utility disparities between cost-differentiated groups remain bounded and can be minimized at intermediate transparency, whereas naive agents produce unbounded utility disparities as noise grows.