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Security of quantum key distribution with bit and basis dependent detector flaws
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We consider the security of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol for Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), in the presence of bit and basis dependent detector flaws. We suggest a powerful attack that can be used in systems with detector efficiency mismatch, even if the detector assignments are chosen randomly by Bob. A security proof is provided, valid for any basis dependent, possibly lossy, linear optical imperfections in the channel/receiver/detectors. The proof does not assume the so-called squashing detector model.
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Security of quantum key distribution with source and detector imperfections through phase-error estimation
A modular proof technique extends phase-error-estimation security bounds from basis-independent to mismatched detector efficiencies, enabling finite-key QKD security with simultaneous source and detector imperfections.
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