Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559

As of 19 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 0 of 0 outbound references and 13 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2012.00854.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2012.00854 v1

Coverage vector

measured 0 of 0 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links

measured 13 of 13 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00

measured 13 of 13 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-12T10:31:51.987215Z

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: arxiv_reference, observed 2026-07-04T13:59:52.276411Z

Reference resolution

0 of 0 outbound references displayed

verified exact0
verified fuzzy0
unresolved0
parse uncertain0
malformed identifier0
metadata mismatch0

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

No outbound reference observations are available for this paper version.

Pith citing papers

Observation 964c5d4a-b3db-4c59-b123-4277189161c9 · inbound

A Game-Theoretic Approach to the Study of Blockchain's Robustness cites this paper.

A Game-Theoretic Approach to the Study of Blockchain's Robustness Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559

Reference 59

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-12T10:31:51.987215Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation fca29466-e4de-4848-8757-bc6885219a63 · inbound

Incentive-Compatible Collusion-Resistance via Posted Prices cites this paper.

Incentive-Compatible Collusion-Resistance via Posted Prices Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559

Reference 13

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-10T23:22:37.500780Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation e5abb44c-edf1-4561-99ed-87e4bdfa54ee · inbound

Mechanism Design for Blockchain Order Books against Selfish Miners cites this paper.

Mechanism Design for Blockchain Order Books against Selfish Miners Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559

Reference 33

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-10T17:09:59.548371Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 39f85b4a-6880-40bd-84e7-f69eff1f80a3 · inbound

NDAI Agreements cites this paper.

NDAI Agreements Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559

Reference 25

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-08T11:31:59.055353Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation b1899ba3-18ac-4a92-a5e1-dfd2c16dfa5e · inbound

Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for Leaderless Blockchain Protocols cites this paper.

Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for Leaderless Blockchain Protocols Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559

Reference 28

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T14:53:07.186526Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 8ddc98fd-d870-4434-8665-28eb898b64fe · inbound

A Framework for Combined Transaction Posting and Pricing for Layer 2 Blockchains cites this paper.

A Framework for Combined Transaction Posting and Pricing for Layer 2 Blockchains Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559

Reference 15

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T14:20:03.398271Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 05845816-3940-4c1f-885b-d7a8b319b008 · inbound

SoK: Preconfirmations cites this paper.

SoK: Preconfirmations Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559

Reference 78

Resolution: verified exact; arxiv_id, observed 2026-05-18T10:51:16.878920Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 1e48cf91-97ad-40fe-b0d1-848e11ec0858 · inbound

Trustless Provenance Trees: A Game-Theoretic Framework for Operator-Gated Blockchain Registries cites this paper.

Trustless Provenance Trees: A Game-Theoretic Framework for Operator-Gated Blockchain Registries Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559

Reference 5

Resolution: verified exact; arxiv_id, observed 2026-05-13T18:13:05.630163Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 50e391e6-c467-4790-aabd-671d183fd3a4 · inbound

Dynamic Transaction Scheduling and Pricing in the Ethereum Mempool cites this paper.

Dynamic Transaction Scheduling and Pricing in the Ethereum Mempool Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559

Reference 14

Resolution: metadata mismatch; arxiv_id, observed 2026-05-14T19:27:52.456921Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 197726f5-60d9-42f4-8937-d4e77f4d95c3 · inbound

Routed Closure: Rethinking Value Capture in Decentralized Ecosystems cites this paper.

Routed Closure: Rethinking Value Capture in Decentralized Ecosystems Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559

Reference 15

Resolution: verified exact; arxiv_id, observed 2026-07-01T16:55:50.631937Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 9832c07f-0611-4c3f-90e6-3cc8f65d7a51 · inbound

Parent-Hash DAG: A Cost Analysis of Constant-Time Append for On-Chain Registries cites this paper.

Parent-Hash DAG: A Cost Analysis of Constant-Time Append for On-Chain Registries Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559

Reference 12

Resolution: verified exact; arxiv_id, observed 2026-07-03T03:47:35.247278Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 2e8a27af-3685-4035-98ca-50876a4c314c · inbound

The Fungible Reserve Standard: A Deterministic Framework for Encoding Carrying Costs in Asset-Backed Tokens cites this paper.

The Fungible Reserve Standard: A Deterministic Framework for Encoding Carrying Costs in Asset-Backed Tokens Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559

Reference 15

Resolution: verified exact; arxiv_id, observed 2026-07-04T13:59:52.278283Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 5d5dc3a4-40d4-4ba0-980f-475a253b34bd · inbound

Optimistic Verifiable Claims: A Blockchain Protocol for Conditionally Confidential Bidding in Decentralized Manufacturing cites this paper.

Optimistic Verifiable Claims: A Blockchain Protocol for Conditionally Confidential Bidding in Decentralized Manufacturing Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559

Reference 46

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-01T02:16:47.374683Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.