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Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Generalized Principal-Agency: Contracts, Information, Games and Beyond

As of 9 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 0 of 0 outbound references and 3 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2209.01146.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2209.01146 v2

Coverage vector

measured 0 of 0 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links

measured 3 of 3 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00

measured 3 of 3 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-08T19:42:45.363582Z

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: pith, observed 2026-08-07T04:54:08.658488Z

Reference resolution

0 of 0 outbound references displayed

  • verified exact0
  • verified fuzzy0
  • unresolved0
  • parse uncertain0
  • malformed identifier0
  • metadata mismatch0

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

No outbound reference observations are available for this paper version.

Pith citing papers

Observation e87ba1e4-72af-4e05-92d0-08a330b705ac · inbound

The Sample Complexity of Online Strategic Decision Making with Information Asymmetry and Knowledge Transportability cites this paper.

The Sample Complexity of Online Strategic Decision Making with Information Asymmetry and Knowledge Transportability Generalized Principal-Agency: Contracts, Information, Games and Beyond

Reference 14

Resolution
verified exact
local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-07T04:54:08.765995Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-07T04:54:03.437949Z digest=sha256:74d316915be676a940796ae976438f503f3a5f460723e12107001d0b7fae52cf

Observation 9373548f-8576-45e4-9c5e-184dc00c4ff0 · inbound

Compensation Design cites this paper.

Compensation Design Generalized Principal-Agency: Contracts, Information, Games and Beyond

Reference 2026

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-02T02:19:05.542667Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-02T02:19:05.542667Z digest=sha256:3c326c56c11ab5a472c8b737d65b3816e77ec87f62e0e5b3e15cf313329a60c4

Observation 03180e89-08ba-48ec-a597-59c7fd6af251 · inbound

From Compensation Design to Budget-Feasible Mechanisms: A Constant Approximation for Subadditive Valuations cites this paper.

From Compensation Design to Budget-Feasible Mechanisms: A Constant Approximation for Subadditive Valuations Generalized Principal-Agency: Contracts, Information, Games and Beyond

Reference 149

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-08T19:42:45.363582Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-08-08T19:42:45.363582Z digest=sha256:5eff663d244eac85a7a691e58871a8f4b288707df1bc28cbf389612c9551da03