Pith. sign in

Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Equilibria and incentives for illiquid auction markets

As of 17 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 0 of 0 outbound references and 2 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2307.15805.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2307.15805 v1

Coverage vector

measured 0 of 0 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links

measured 2 of 2 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00

measured 2 of 2 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:03.438732Z

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: pith, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:03.795405Z

Reference resolution

0 of 0 outbound references displayed

  • verified exact0
  • verified fuzzy0
  • unresolved0
  • parse uncertain0
  • malformed identifier0
  • metadata mismatch0

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

No outbound reference observations are available for this paper version.

Pith citing papers

Observation 14b9a6ff-0e8f-4948-ab92-5c763ee6369c · inbound

Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets cites this paper.

Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets Equilibria and incentives for illiquid auction markets

Reference 18

Resolution
verified exact
local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:03.800921Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-08-10T17:08:03.438732Z digest=sha256:62fce52535488dd8408cafac5748978eeccdc2febeb5e6c766a67c7e87ae2d24

Observation b99598f1-9062-4090-a154-204723b1ee04 · inbound

Learning Market Making with Closing Auctions cites this paper.

Learning Market Making with Closing Auctions Equilibria and incentives for illiquid auction markets

Reference 20

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T08:26:55.331258Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-03T08:26:55.331258Z digest=sha256:4fc41157e002961e3dbf0d7066a82acbc9f710a653215a9b597bb7b1f3ce47f8