Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.
Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links
Paper Citation Record · LEDGER
Estimating and Incentivizing Imperfect-Knowledge Agents with Hidden Rewards
As of 14 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 0 of 0 outbound references and 3 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2308.06717.
A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.
Coverage vector
One-hop event checks from named stored sources.
Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00
Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.
Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:10.703651Z
A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.
Source: arxiv_reference, observed 2026-05-11T15:21:06.800294Z
Reference resolution
0 of 0 outbound references displayed
- verified exact0
- verified fuzzy0
- unresolved0
- parse uncertain0
- malformed identifier0
- metadata mismatch0
External citation measurements
No source-named external measurement is stored.
Outbound references
No outbound reference observations are available for this paper version.
Pith citing papers
Observation 3e003763-fcdc-467c-9cab-8a9fca62de84 · inbound
Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents cites this paper.
Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents Estimating and Incentivizing Imperfect-Knowledge Agents with Hidden Rewards
Reference 8
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:10.703651Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation e6bfac6a-ee86-4ec2-b333-2015fa4f6c22 · inbound
Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals cites this paper.
Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals Estimating and Incentivizing Imperfect-Knowledge Agents with Hidden Rewards
Reference 8
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T13:03:55.914058Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation ea12b6f2-fde3-43e4-a852-5815ee0e8dd9 · inbound
Moral Hazard in LTI Dynamics: A Hypothesis Testing Approach cites this paper.
Moral Hazard in LTI Dynamics: A Hypothesis Testing Approach Estimating and Incentivizing Imperfect-Knowledge Agents with Hidden Rewards
Reference 12
- Resolution
- verified exact
- arxiv_id, observed 2026-05-11T15:21:06.807552Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.