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Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Beyond Worst-Case Online Allocation via Dynamic Max-min Fairness

As of 18 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 0 of 0 outbound references and 6 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2310.08881.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2310.08881 v4

Coverage vector

measured 0 of 0 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links

measured 6 of 6 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00

measured 6 of 6 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-15T20:19:51.188965Z

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: arxiv_reference, observed 2026-07-01T12:45:44.770320Z

Reference resolution

0 of 0 outbound references displayed

  • verified exact0
  • verified fuzzy0
  • unresolved0
  • parse uncertain0
  • malformed identifier0
  • metadata mismatch0

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

No outbound reference observations are available for this paper version.

Pith citing papers

Observation 64dcae63-82b4-4d58-8822-8ed20b7334b7 · inbound

Allocating Public Goods via Dynamic Max-Min Fairness: Long-Run Behavior and Competitive Equilibria cites this paper.

Allocating Public Goods via Dynamic Max-Min Fairness: Long-Run Behavior and Competitive Equilibria Beyond Worst-Case Online Allocation via Dynamic Max-min Fairness

Reference 13

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-10T14:51:55.161611Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-10T14:51:55.161611Z digest=sha256:0843fffa11ef4c7d392a2b551ead887241d2fd3956972eba1608bb91a705ae8a

Observation fd27d337-be15-40b7-98be-a33a32391e04 · inbound

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits cites this paper.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits Beyond Worst-Case Online Allocation via Dynamic Max-min Fairness

Reference 22

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.148404Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-08-08T05:20:08.148404Z digest=sha256:7a9c60d1ec306a9bfee9c50d0ecb139c07db993fce3bb1927c25955709272396

Observation 443b3490-e2ac-4530-ab61-c2d9286ee554 · inbound

Online Resource Sharing: Better Robust Guarantees via Randomized Strategies cites this paper.

Online Resource Sharing: Better Robust Guarantees via Randomized Strategies Beyond Worst-Case Online Allocation via Dynamic Max-min Fairness

Reference 10

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T20:19:51.188965Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-15T20:19:51.188965Z digest=sha256:6b552de8205df665d57ddcb40a37f58432f06e6785bc0525e2350fa5026087e4

Observation 9b3824d2-33a8-478d-9197-63228184dc04 · inbound

Efficiency, Feasibility, and Incentive-Awareness in Constrained Online Resource Allocation cites this paper.

Efficiency, Feasibility, and Incentive-Awareness in Constrained Online Resource Allocation Beyond Worst-Case Online Allocation via Dynamic Max-min Fairness

Reference 28

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-06T18:10:18.976296Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-08-06T18:10:18.976296Z digest=sha256:63d605d645d958c90b91d8953b2901fc40d3aed2b6011a154bb8165a8bd0939a

Observation 29a9c078-9a91-4026-b3a3-1be88753e8a8 · inbound

Prior-free Collusion-proof Dynamic Mechanisms cites this paper.

Prior-free Collusion-proof Dynamic Mechanisms Beyond Worst-Case Online Allocation via Dynamic Max-min Fairness

Reference 241

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T21:52:32.383398Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-03T21:52:32.383398Z digest=sha256:cc0f366cc4341d373015a1c6b1cbee05beec5195c6a92e2f6f2f13f16e6fccd7

Observation cfcf4387-e73b-4dbc-ba34-dd5c8b9bb677 · inbound

Optimal Auction Design for Constrained Buyers cites this paper.

Optimal Auction Design for Constrained Buyers Beyond Worst-Case Online Allocation via Dynamic Max-min Fairness

Reference 3

Resolution
verified exact
arxiv_id, observed 2026-07-01T12:45:44.771866Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-01T01:45:15.778548Z digest=sha256:ef585b4d004c21551c05a510ee7a30741c5906626768319f027b2308c93f08fa