Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents

As of 17 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 41 of 41 outbound references and 1 inbound Pith citation observation for arXiv:2412.16318.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2412.16318 v2

Coverage vector

measured 41 of 41 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:10.815652Z

measured 42 of 42 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00

measured 1 of 1 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-07T13:03:57.161602Z

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: pith, observed 2026-08-07T13:03:58.532424Z

Reference resolution

41 of 41 outbound references displayed

verified exact1
verified fuzzy19
unresolved21
parse uncertain0
malformed identifier0
metadata mismatch0

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

Observation 9cb9f57f-aa13-4243-a2f1-7dda7878e0ff · outbound

This paper cites write newline.

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents write newline

Reference 1

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:10.676025Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 4deca98b-b851-4643-8e4a-e4ba9e7cbd7f · outbound

This paper cites Toward a theory of discounted repeated games with imperfect monitoring.

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents Toward a theory of discounted repeated games with imperfect monitoring

Reference 2

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:11.229931Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.

Observation efed639b-3301-4267-898c-000eb4156430 · outbound

This paper cites and Erev, I.

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents and Erev, I

Reference 3

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:11.218736Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.

Observation 09aa1a15-8294-4cb2-af91-0d97b1163f0e · outbound

This paper cites Principal-agent reward shaping in mdps.

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents Principal-agent reward shaping in mdps

Reference 4

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:10.688856Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation f7c902c2-77fd-4bdb-8377-e3adc5a21682 · outbound

This paper cites and Dewatripont, M.

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents and Dewatripont, M

Reference 5

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:10.692410Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 75464755-8169-4fcb-827e-e4386aa6c20a · outbound

This paper cites P., and Kakade, S.

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents P., and Kakade, S

Reference 6

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:11.195595Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.

Observation c172d0fa-e3df-4e64-91fa-aa3455c28083 · outbound

This paper cites D., O'doherty, J.

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents D., O'doherty, J

Reference 7

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:11.185652Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.

Observation 3e003763-fcdc-467c-9cab-8a9fca62de84 · outbound

This paper cites Estimating and Incentivizing Imperfect-Knowledge Agents with Hidden Rewards.

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents Estimating and Incentivizing Imperfect-Knowledge Agents with Hidden Rewards

Reference 8

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:10.703651Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 7ded677a-d13d-44ba-baab-4df13c707633 · outbound

This paper cites Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Unobserved Agent Rewards and Perfect-Knowledge Agents.

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Unobserved Agent Rewards and Perfect-Knowledge Agents

Reference 9

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:10.707423Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation ab8da7fd-cc74-4154-b692-b93ba863cd71 · outbound

This paper cites and Szentes, B.

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents and Szentes, B

Reference 10

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:11.175345Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.

Observation 6bb27c9f-7a80-4be8-a6d1-82378caa5a78 · outbound

This paper cites Action elimination and stopping conditions for the multi-armed bandit and reinforcement learning problems.

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents Action elimination and stopping conditions for the multi-armed bandit and reinforcement learning problems

Reference 11

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:11.164531Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.

Observation 008b5109-ee6d-4c25-b46a-da988f20ae7e · outbound

This paper cites Multi-Armed Bandits for Correlated Markovian Environments with Smoothed Reward Feedback.

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents Multi-Armed Bandits for Correlated Markovian Environments with Smoothed Reward Feedback

Reference 12

Resolution: verified exact; local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:10.898079Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.

Observation a87eb957-7692-47bc-8573-95ac2325a162 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents Unresolved cited work

Reference 13

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:11.154078Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.

Observation 7c018f40-b653-4eae-bab7-b7d722622dfd · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents Unresolved cited work

Reference 14

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:11.143474Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.

Observation 5983947f-143f-488d-aae1-2d1e82c66081 · outbound

This paper cites and Moreira, H.

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents and Moreira, H

Reference 15

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:11.133268Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.

Observation f8c86e4b-4b61-4533-9550-56e739ae15ce · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents Unresolved cited work

Reference 16

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:10.731668Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 9c2afcf9-8c5b-4bd1-9993-23131b2ead35 · outbound

This paper cites Optimal contracts for experimentation.

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents Optimal contracts for experimentation

Reference 17

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:11.117271Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.

Observation 8ac7fde2-9008-4747-9a20-2bb56bc4e464 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents Unresolved cited work

Reference 18

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:10.738015Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation f9d6d22a-a26a-4a25-8dfd-004ca432022b · outbound

This paper cites Principal-Agent Reinforcement Learning: Orchestrating AI Agents with Contracts.

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents Principal-Agent Reinforcement Learning: Orchestrating AI Agents with Contracts

Reference 19

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:10.741502Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 33442020-b8e0-42e0-8e8f-a01b1593563a · outbound

This paper cites and Bowman, H.

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents and Bowman, H

Reference 20

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:11.100149Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.

Observation bf418276-3728-4607-8785-bd2c63ad3d45 · outbound

This paper cites and Wolfowitz, J.

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents and Wolfowitz, J

Reference 21

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:10.749256Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 64a5e0e7-bcc1-4569-90fb-138b42bd9df8 · outbound

This paper cites and Martimort, D.

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents and Martimort, D

Reference 22

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:11.083233Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.

Observation cff73efe-c5d2-48ea-83ec-4fb6c8cb916c · outbound

This paper cites and Szepesv \'a ri, C.

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents and Szepesv \'a ri, C

Reference 23

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:10.755773Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 4bc9284e-30fa-4f86-ae59-f0a2bd6590de · outbound

This paper cites Linear multi-resource allocation with semi-bandit feedback.

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents Linear multi-resource allocation with semi-bandit feedback

Reference 24

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:11.066429Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.

Observation 87fdec8c-6001-45a7-b76c-5a7007c53629 · outbound

This paper cites Learning with good feature representations in bandits and in rl with a generative model.

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents Learning with good feature representations in bandits and in rl with a generative model

Reference 25

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:11.056022Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.

Observation b72f5621-2e0c-414d-a4a5-a848d01c380b · outbound

This paper cites D., Zhang, S., Munro, M., and Steyvers, M.

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents D., Zhang, S., Munro, M., and Steyvers, M

Reference 26

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:11.045348Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.

Observation bbf787ed-48bd-479f-afef-5a05739bd540 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents Unresolved cited work

Reference 27

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:11.034383Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.

Observation 95cac984-2cc3-444c-a07a-273169eeecf5 · outbound

This paper cites and Chen, Y.

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents and Chen, Y

Reference 28

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:11.023908Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.

Observation 737e0a4c-e431-4156-97fb-018d3302f866 · outbound

This paper cites P., and Schneider, J.

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents P., and Schneider, J

Reference 29

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:11.013708Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.

Observation d385d668-bc48-4b72-bce0-5ad418f54d1b · outbound

This paper cites and Lattimore, T.

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents and Lattimore, T

Reference 30

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:11.002445Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.

Observation f144d51e-d2be-4159-9c03-ee896725b7b0 · outbound

This paper cites Monitoring cooperative agreements in a repeated principal-agent relationship.

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents Monitoring cooperative agreements in a repeated principal-agent relationship

Reference 31

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:10.992406Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.

Observation 27f66512-ac4c-438a-96eb-02a9e72f6b66 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents Unresolved cited work

Reference 32

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:10.980954Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.

Observation 4d6203dd-f99a-48c1-9bff-640d342022d8 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents Unresolved cited work

Reference 33

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:10.970132Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.

Observation 671e2c90-4437-40f4-8495-149620ae4924 · outbound

This paper cites Contracts: the theory of dynamic principal--agent relationships and the continuous-time approach.

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents Contracts: the theory of dynamic principal--agent relationships and the continuous-time approach

Reference 34

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:10.960139Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.

Observation 697705b9-fe7d-4ca2-a804-daa42b50778c · outbound

This paper cites Learning to Mitigate Externalities: the Coase Theorem with Hindsight Rationality.

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents Learning to Mitigate Externalities: the Coase Theorem with Hindsight Rationality

Reference 35

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:10.794350Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 1aed3558-faf0-4a00-84c5-24a6f07f4c42 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents Unresolved cited work

Reference 36

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:10.950107Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.

Observation ba47e262-0d43-48d7-9f87-a023853a77ff · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents Unresolved cited work

Reference 37

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:10.939330Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.

Observation 15392dd3-50ff-4aa3-adb1-410bdc41bb93 · outbound

This paper cites S., Bowden, J., and Wason, J.

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents S., Bowden, J., and Wason, J

Reference 38

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:10.928750Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.

Observation e4590607-40c1-406b-8804-84ec0ad94f9b · outbound

This paper cites Contractual Reinforcement Learning: Pulling Arms with Invisible Hands.

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents Contractual Reinforcement Learning: Pulling Arms with Invisible Hands

Reference 39

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:10.808207Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 5e0e1328-219a-48b5-a024-74aeac7dd9e2 · outbound

This paper cites The Sample Complexity of Online Contract Design.

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents The Sample Complexity of Online Contract Design

Reference 40

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:10.811900Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation abcac524-75f0-441a-bbeb-b4a056186cc8 · outbound

This paper cites Online Learning in a Creator Economy.

Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents Online Learning in a Creator Economy

Reference 41

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-11T10:53:10.815652Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Pith citing papers

Observation af64217d-881b-43b3-a166-02718cfa7c29 · inbound

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals cites this paper.

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents

Reference 23

Resolution: verified exact; local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-07T13:03:58.582546Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.