Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.
Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:30.669150Z
Paper Citation Record · LEDGER
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion
As of 18 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 53 of 53 outbound references and 0 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2506.05876.
A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.
Coverage vector
One-hop event checks from named stored sources.
Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00
Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.
Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links
A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.
Source: cited_works
Reference resolution
53 of 53 outbound references displayed
- verified exact1
- verified fuzzy37
- unresolved15
- parse uncertain0
- malformed identifier0
- metadata mismatch0
External citation measurements
No source-named external measurement is stored.
Outbound references
Observation a4e33801-7082-4d17-843e-be8bb94639d8 · outbound
This paper cites Cooperation, competition, and maliciousness: Llm-stakeholders interactive negotiation.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion Cooperation, competition, and maliciousness: Llm-stakeholders interactive negotiation
Reference 1
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:40.696126Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation d732301b-c7e1-4950-982a-03a11de89701 · outbound
This paper cites GPT-4 Technical Report.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion GPT-4 Technical Report
Reference 2
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:24.399561Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation 43614536-2a61-498a-a579-ff9b6fa22e41 · outbound
This paper cites On the value of persuasion by experts.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion On the value of persuasion by experts
Reference 3
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:40.531287Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation 28bb705c-edcc-4702-b197-c5e8ce40a3c0 · outbound
This paper cites Persuasion is now 30 per cent of us gdp: Revisiting mccloskey and klamer after a quarter of a century.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion Persuasion is now 30 per cent of us gdp: Revisiting mccloskey and klamer after a quarter of a century
Reference 4
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:40.384592Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation 9a639ebf-f688-4e4f-85ef-89fdef1eb7ac · outbound
This paper cites The evolution of cooperation.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion The evolution of cooperation
Reference 5
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:24.792723Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation a58a4279-9cea-4ad5-9bbe-1827436d762e · outbound
This paper cites Robust predictions in games with incomplete information.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion Robust predictions in games with incomplete information
Reference 6
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:40.237566Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation a4e160dd-0dee-4e80-a28c-c673ce195f36 · outbound
This paper cites Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
Reference 7
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:39.976546Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation 555b93d7-920e-4a19-a658-17f84e365f43 · outbound
This paper cites Information design: A unified perspective.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion Information design: A unified perspective
Reference 8
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:25.098896Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation d0d3bd71-481f-479d-ae05-85b5230bcac8 · outbound
This paper cites Persuading farsighted receivers in mdps: the power of honesty.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion Persuading farsighted receivers in mdps: the power of honesty
Reference 9
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:39.797818Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation efa69676-0ada-4d16-8861-871f2e020ef2 · outbound
This paper cites How Well Can LLMs Negotiate? NegotiationArena Platform and Analysis.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion How Well Can LLMs Negotiate? NegotiationArena Platform and Analysis
Reference 10
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:25.331186Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation 28ae5536-3af7-4678-9e03-00de9f899038 · outbound
This paper cites Cooperation under the shadow of the future: experimental evidence from infinitely repeated games.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion Cooperation under the shadow of the future: experimental evidence from infinitely repeated games
Reference 11
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:39.575594Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation 971a72f5-160e-4f69-a87e-f12e9ba835e6 · outbound
This paper cites Grading standards and education quality.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion Grading standards and education quality
Reference 12
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:39.342443Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation 71a8c173-a200-4c2f-a818-104b41b17be6 · outbound
This paper cites Private bayesian persuasion with sequential games.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion Private bayesian persuasion with sequential games
Reference 13
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:39.096289Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation d1647320-bccb-41b7-9ca7-32a40b8de2bf · outbound
This paper cites A survey of experiments on communication via cheap talk.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion A survey of experiments on communication via cheap talk
Reference 14
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:38.754541Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation 2add568c-22bd-4781-8953-019faa816dab · outbound
This paper cites Strategic information transmission.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion Strategic information transmission
Reference 15
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:38.473117Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation d0a084ce-6835-4f45-9b84-1d8326e606fe · outbound
This paper cites Reducing congestion through information design.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion Reducing congestion through information design
Reference 16
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:38.186368Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation adaedeaa-6b31-4141-89ea-b32385d0bb2d · outbound
This paper cites Evaluating language model agency through negotiations.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion Evaluating language model agency through negotiations
Reference 17
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:26.190972Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation 255d94c7-407c-4ed5-8ea0-edd2c6d34ed6 · outbound
This paper cites Llms at the bargaining table.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion Llms at the bargaining table
Reference 18
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:37.829488Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation 174f3761-1ec4-448a-84fd-2ccc75c36a54 · outbound
This paper cites Algorithmic information structure design: a survey.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion Algorithmic information structure design: a survey
Reference 19
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:37.461128Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation f08f8a68-cb88-4c03-8807-5e8c51eef6d3 · outbound
This paper cites Algorithmic bayesian persuasion.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion Algorithmic bayesian persuasion
Reference 20
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:37.184787Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation a8cfdf86-ecda-4791-8132-6df41cb3c556 · outbound
This paper cites Cheap talk.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion Cheap talk
Reference 21
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:26.876846Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation 31c056d6-7ba5-41be-b5b6-d350d0c19d64 · outbound
This paper cites A non-cooperative equilibrium for supergames.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion A non-cooperative equilibrium for supergames
Reference 22
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:36.977011Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation 0b90f0ca-c541-43d2-b393-0c93f94fe94a · outbound
This paper cites Bayesian persuasion in sequential decision-making.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion Bayesian persuasion in sequential decision-making
Reference 23
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:36.726922Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation e4be19db-a4e9-469e-a86b-f8bda78a24fa · outbound
This paper cites DeepSeek-R1: Incentivizing Reasoning Capability in LLMs via Reinforcement Learning.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion DeepSeek-R1: Incentivizing Reasoning Capability in LLMs via Reinforcement Learning
Reference 24
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:27.344644Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation e367d67e-0dc0-40e8-98d2-d318074dbb9a · outbound
This paper cites Ultimatum bargaining behavior: A survey and comparison of experimental results.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion Ultimatum bargaining behavior: A survey and comparison of experimental results
Reference 25
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:36.413423Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation d28164d0-fe6c-4d8a-9976-6741c95408e8 · outbound
This paper cites An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining
Reference 26
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:36.122761Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation c510ca88-9ccf-4e08-b4bc-449f2d955d08 · outbound
This paper cites Decoupling Strategy and Generation in Negotiation Dialogues.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion Decoupling Strategy and Generation in Negotiation Dialogues
Reference 27
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:27.655191Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation bfa007b0-2dd4-48a1-9f90-515c55d62c38 · outbound
This paper cites How bayesian persuasion can help reduce illegal parking and other socially undesirable behavior.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion How bayesian persuasion can help reduce illegal parking and other socially undesirable behavior
Reference 28
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:35.822673Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation b68d830c-8ee4-44bb-9ac6-aeed85eb5f45 · outbound
This paper cites Proportional solutions to bargaining situations: interpersonal utility comparisons.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion Proportional solutions to bargaining situations: interpersonal utility comparisons
Reference 29
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:35.526017Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation a796400d-15d1-439c-acc3-e3e2490d0837 · outbound
This paper cites Other solutions to nash's bargaining problem.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion Other solutions to nash's bargaining problem
Reference 30
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:35.279077Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation 69e1ef46-2c60-494e-80f6-aa117bffef9d · outbound
This paper cites Bayesian persuasion and information design.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion Bayesian persuasion and information design
Reference 31
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:35.019194Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation 63427800-cdea-458e-9e40-8091c1451774 · outbound
This paper cites Bayesian persuasion.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion Bayesian persuasion
Reference 32
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:28.283706Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation 53b7435d-1187-4845-a777-4cfafb4eb6d1 · outbound
This paper cites Debating with More Persuasive LLMs Leads to More Truthful Answers.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion Debating with More Persuasive LLMs Leads to More Truthful Answers
Reference 33
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:28.368238Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation 763e8451-8867-4ac4-8862-23e894a896b6 · outbound
This paper cites wisdom of the crowd.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion wisdom of the crowd
Reference 34
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:34.743796Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation c9cbc9e7-1ee0-4330-9a4d-e119ce80038b · outbound
This paper cites Speeding, terrorism, and teaching to the test.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion Speeding, terrorism, and teaching to the test
Reference 35
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:34.517062Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation 341d243b-4052-45ce-adb4-9d4aef594c82 · outbound
This paper cites Bargaining and repeated games.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion Bargaining and repeated games
Reference 36
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:34.285046Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation b6ad1d5d-dc8d-4691-bd22-be966caed1d5 · outbound
This paper cites Sequential persuasion.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion Sequential persuasion
Reference 37
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:28.830538Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation 66be118e-c813-4dff-80ec-615a7f839420 · outbound
This paper cites Evidence of general economic principles of bargaining and trade from 2,000 classroom experiments.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion Evidence of general economic principles of bargaining and trade from 2,000 classroom experiments
Reference 38
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:34.033201Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation 79bf2656-aa82-4516-9cdc-339e492e320c · outbound
This paper cites Information design in multi-agent reinforcement learning.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion Information design in multi-agent reinforcement learning
Reference 39
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:33.695900Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation 728fe16a-68cc-4311-ad28-379a348ab847 · outbound
This paper cites Bargaining games, pp.\ 622–658.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion Bargaining games, pp.\ 622–658
Reference 40
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:33.420327Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation 8a010896-8749-4a82-8866-039b6f5f1788 · outbound
This paper cites One quarter of gdp is persuasion.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion One quarter of gdp is persuasion
Reference 41
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:33.140083Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation 8c73f5e3-e7bb-4385-9af7-b79a7c54d617 · outbound
This paper cites Modelling Political Coalition Negotiations Using LLM-based Agents.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion Modelling Political Coalition Negotiations Using LLM-based Agents
Reference 42
- Resolution
- verified exact
- local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:30.939085Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation de063b2b-e1f3-4e38-ac7a-f218b2dd3ccf · outbound
This paper cites Welfare Diplomacy: Benchmarking Language Model Cooperation.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion Welfare Diplomacy: Benchmarking Language Model Cooperation
Reference 43
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:29.257549Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation ad510137-3e0f-4d25-8b51-4351fdbd8e4a · outbound
This paper cites Two-person cooperative games.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion Two-person cooperative games
Reference 44
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:32.908640Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation 13f657bc-9084-40aa-988c-d7471cbf9b6f · outbound
This paper cites The bargaining problem.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion The bargaining problem
Reference 45
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:32.563728Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation 62a1ba1d-278f-478f-86fb-dd9ff0663426 · outbound
This paper cites Fairness versus reason in the ultimatum game.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion Fairness versus reason in the ultimatum game
Reference 46
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:32.297641Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation 9d7c97ba-dc72-43d9-a292-ea97acd618af · outbound
This paper cites Introducing openai o3 and o4-mini, 2025.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion Introducing openai o3 and o4-mini, 2025
Reference 47
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:32.041972Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation 3c4ebb59-78a1-4922-ad6f-d07860c09acf · outbound
This paper cites Information disclosure and unraveling in matching markets.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion Information disclosure and unraveling in matching markets
Reference 48
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:31.798185Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation 23929f11-b37d-4ed9-a308-43389652de38 · outbound
This paper cites Chatgpt and open-ai models: A preliminary review.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion Chatgpt and open-ai models: A preliminary review
Reference 49
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:31.517791Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation 731a2e6a-934f-4ae6-9e95-83dd1b5ca7f4 · outbound
This paper cites Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model
Reference 50
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:31.282015Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation 13b269f9-89ff-4e5a-aff0-b7188f35b415 · outbound
This paper cites Sequential Information Design: Markov Persuasion Process and Its Efficient Reinforcement Learning.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion Sequential Information Design: Markov Persuasion Process and Its Efficient Reinforcement Learning
Reference 51
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:30.371131Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation ac3da89a-dee4-4079-af33-b54681c25942 · outbound
This paper cites Sequential bayesian persuasion.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion Sequential bayesian persuasion
Reference 52
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:30.545626Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation df894e3a-c2f0-4d70-bf75-bca9fe04c5c0 · outbound
This paper cites Measuring Bargaining Abilities of LLMs: A Benchmark and A Buyer-Enhancement Method.
Information Bargaining: Bilateral Commitment in Bayesian Persuasion Measuring Bargaining Abilities of LLMs: A Benchmark and A Buyer-Enhancement Method
Reference 53
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T10:18:30.669150Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Pith citing papers
No inbound Pith citation observations are available.