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Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization

As of 18 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 100 of 136 outbound references and 0 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2506.22911.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2506.22911 v1

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measured 100 of 136 reference resolution

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measured 0 of 0 inbound itemization

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Reference resolution

100 of 136 outbound references displayed

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Outbound references

Observation 57102e47-07a0-4150-8eb0-e73ed813ea3f · outbound

This paper cites Towards data auctions with externalities.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Towards data auctions with externalities

Reference 1

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Observation 9933a6d4-892f-4799-86d6-1176d1d1c0df · outbound

This paper cites Automated design of robust mecha- nisms.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Automated design of robust mecha- nisms

Reference 2

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Observation e04777cb-c2ce-4239-9eb0-fe2f499edff1 · outbound

This paper cites Backpropagation and stochastic gradient descent method.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Backpropagation and stochastic gradient descent method

Reference 3

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Observation 27f2512e-4196-4d47-a2e8-3b638cc35e98 · outbound

This paper cites Input convex neural networks.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Input convex neural networks

Reference 4

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Observation 5031d63b-1d47-4060-ae5c-ccfc2b3b9abd · outbound

This paper cites Near-optimal max-affine estimators for convex regression.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Near-optimal max-affine estimators for convex regression

Reference 5

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Observation 8553bc7d-2a80-4436-a6cf-61a9501db2a9 · outbound

This paper cites Sample complexity of automated mechanism design.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Sample complexity of automated mechanism design

Reference 6

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Observation 109808fa-8a06-40e7-9045-fb8d3d6ba908 · outbound

This paper cites MAC advice for facility loca- tion mechanism design.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization MAC advice for facility loca- tion mechanism design

Reference 7

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Observation 2a448ba1-bc40-4b43-a573-dda93216307d · outbound

This paper cites Universal approximation bounds for superpositions of a sigmoidal func- tion.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Universal approximation bounds for superpositions of a sigmoidal func- tion

Reference 8

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Observation f65c3bde-f4cd-403b-add1-4002e1c19551 · outbound

This paper cites Dynamic programming.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Dynamic programming

Reference 9

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Observation d953f4b1-0dd5-4c79-9876-9989801436de · outbound

This paper cites The curse of highly variable functions for local kernel machines.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization The curse of highly variable functions for local kernel machines

Reference 10

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Observation e1183996-5e50-488f-864d-c615b7cb428c · outbound

This paper cites Methodology for Designing Reasonably Expressive Mechanisms with Application to Ad Auctions.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Methodology for Designing Reasonably Expressive Mechanisms with Application to Ad Auctions

Reference 11

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Observation e4e44873-e310-4d4e-b341-be7af078900c · outbound

This paper cites Welfare and profit maximization with production costs.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Welfare and profit maximization with production costs

Reference 12

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Observation 91a7bd91-eeb2-4b90-bce6-4db9e5840b61 · outbound

This paper cites Large-scale machine learning with stochastic gradient descent.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Large-scale machine learning with stochastic gradient descent

Reference 13

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Observation a268b65a-2737-4803-923b-0480759fab43 · outbound

This paper cites Convex optimization.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Convex optimization

Reference 14

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Observation 77f8dc4a-f05d-4cbc-936d-bedddeb73354 · outbound

This paper cites An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design

Reference 15

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Observation dfed6679-c798-470e-a0fa-d9e12598583c · outbound

This paper cites Optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design: Reducing revenue to welfare maximization.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design: Reducing revenue to welfare maximization

Reference 16

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Observation 2600b9bb-d826-4f35-a4b8-65c1de008c94 · outbound

This paper cites Log-sum-exp neural net- works and posynomial models for convex and log-log-convex data.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Log-sum-exp neural net- works and posynomial models for convex and log-log-convex data

Reference 17

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Observation 83ee5b39-2457-4835-b4bd-7a3e02fa8e76 · outbound

This paper cites Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains

Reference 18

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Observation 26e51296-4403-45eb-be76-3b432c48ae5a · outbound

This paper cites Mechanism Design for Facility Location Problem: A Survey.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Mechanism Design for Facility Location Problem: A Survey

Reference 19

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Observation 4cb9130e-c0d3-4f25-8b56-daf5ce4dbf21 · outbound

This paper cites Optimal competitive auctions.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Optimal competitive auctions

Reference 20

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Observation 275b6d4c-3646-4ed6-a04c-d72eee03310a · outbound

This paper cites The complexity of optimal multidimensional pricing.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization The complexity of optimal multidimensional pricing

Reference 21

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Observation 55ce1b74-2f13-484f-afc0-3c207d50aa03 · outbound

This paper cites Strategy-proofness and “median voters.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Strategy-proofness and “median voters

Reference 22

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Observation b1fd6a1c-c126-4930-aa9c-ba6a4d72022c · outbound

This paper cites Multipart pricing of public goods.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Multipart pricing of public goods

Reference 23

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Observation 01c0499f-e87b-4c8b-96d8-aa4199122453 · outbound

This paper cites Incremental mechanism design.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Incremental mechanism design

Reference 24

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Observation b76e8258-4412-4a13-adc5-8924536a4684 · outbound

This paper cites Differentiable economics for ran- domized affine maximizer auctions.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Differentiable economics for ran- domized affine maximizer auctions

Reference 25

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Observation f0e9e74b-79ab-4245-b973-2e161f84e9b3 · outbound

This paper cites Automated design of affine maximizer mechanisms in dynamic set- tings.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Automated design of affine maximizer mechanisms in dynamic set- tings

Reference 26

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Observation 5613cbca-513d-4b88-8b74-d0e13ce3cba1 · outbound

This paper cites Certifying strategyproof auction networks.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Certifying strategyproof auction networks

Reference 27

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Observation 7588f277-fe1b-430a-ad32-3d5119eb6689 · outbound

This paper cites Optimal Automated Market Makers: Differentiable Economics and Strong Duality.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Optimal Automated Market Makers: Differentiable Economics and Strong Duality

Reference 28

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Observation 7a6a0215-c7fb-4f2a-9b89-9d0434edc277 · outbound

This paper cites Learning revenue-maximizing auctions with differentiable matching.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Learning revenue-maximizing auctions with differentiable matching

Reference 29

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Observation 42c4d617-3a1b-463f-8413-df0558621710 · outbound

This paper cites Approximation by superpositions of a sigmoidal function.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Approximation by superpositions of a sigmoidal function

Reference 30

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Observation 76620333-305d-4373-adb3-29141635fb82 · outbound

This paper cites Strong duality for a multiple-good monopolist.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Strong duality for a multiple-good monopolist

Reference 31

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Observation e987b88f-bc1b-4c00-90fd-52b24a4b26fc · outbound

This paper cites Identifying and attacking the saddle point problem in high-dimensional non-convex optimization.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Identifying and attacking the saddle point problem in high-dimensional non-convex optimization

Reference 32

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Observation 5febc184-bc6a-48e4-ac69-01484fdfa0eb · outbound

This paper cites Continuity properties of Paretian utility.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Continuity properties of Paretian utility

Reference 33

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Observation 53a96779-0ea2-4f5e-a62a-5df93b8c06ca · outbound

This paper cites Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization

Reference 34

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Observation c07f3f6d-e474-47af-a2d0-4bfb2607c753 · outbound

This paper cites A context-integrated transformer-based neural network for auction design.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization A context-integrated transformer-based neural network for auction design

Reference 35

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Observation 59b4249d-e197-4cbc-97e2-c298546c9a81 · outbound

This paper cites A scalable neural network for DSIC affine maximizer auction design.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization A scalable neural network for DSIC affine maximizer auction design

Reference 36

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Observation e1831598-7d6a-4973-8bf6-5e3c3d231c81 · outbound

This paper cites Mechanism design for large language models.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Mechanism design for large language models

Reference 37

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Observation 5bb7bc22-329b-4af5-9955-cbcbd679854f · outbound

This paper cites Deep Reinforcement Learning in Large Discrete Action Spaces.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Deep Reinforcement Learning in Large Discrete Action Spaces

Reference 38

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Observation d546b0d9-6032-477a-bca6-82cbeb7e0c03 · outbound

This paper cites Optimal auctions through deep learning.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Optimal auctions through deep learning

Reference 39

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Observation 97a7b71f-2bc1-4e33-9d7c-14f1a296e33a · outbound

This paper cites Optimal auctions through deep learning: Advances in differentiable economics.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Optimal auctions through deep learning: Advances in differentiable economics

Reference 40

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:21.549822Z digest=sha256:03502bca9ce50f322718f150d9faa1f1a754cf604febb3d91ee3e2abc547dfaf

Observation a60fa36e-4ebe-4c74-9521-8f9a523d43d3 · outbound

This paper cites Reverse Auction Relinquishing Broadcast Spectrum Rights.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Reverse Auction Relinquishing Broadcast Spectrum Rights

Reference 41

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:21.659417Z digest=sha256:3dd520b9ddfd277cd0a71e278800ce2a3205ad8f6121a137669b6d39da05d266

Observation 314d7992-7345-49b6-8d83-d00c9eaf0c1c · outbound

This paper cites College admissions and the stability of marriage.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization College admissions and the stability of marriage

Reference 42

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:21.693297Z digest=sha256:04d83d9201d0457e74c6401a5165abf849e0871266e2f93bb549bff1d7a3eb64

Observation 13352a68-0fef-48ae-8a52-170c61b4fdb8 · outbound

This paper cites Stochastic relaxation, Gibbs distributions, and the Bayesian restoration of images.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Stochastic relaxation, Gibbs distributions, and the Bayesian restoration of images

Reference 43

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:21.800313Z digest=sha256:cacff81655acd6989ee0916b8b90f80fe828b698d01eba94cdc3d0c1b7000c8f

Observation f4752200-7fb1-4a3b-9de7-49d4f04aba6c · outbound

This paper cites Reverse auctions are different from auctions.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Reverse auctions are different from auctions

Reference 44

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malformed identifier
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:21.873613Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:21.873613Z digest=sha256:ff531398d9a80c8c0368ecd7187e6e51f8fc3413012a042744fbdf6210ed1d1a

Observation b4ef0632-2829-4f5b-a63a-6bb49d99a0f8 · outbound

This paper cites Duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions

Reference 45

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:21.977981Z digest=sha256:7eb661a98b7ae49f4e211c151254c8cc5f5d54e3bfba11818ed67820553f9873

Observation e7414f70-2694-49ea-837c-15fdf3deb8f1 · outbound

This paper cites Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result

Reference 46

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:22.053658Z digest=sha256:41239fa34c691d361d43bb04b1fa75b8eef37788eafb94af32aa7826b40089ed

Observation 4f6ccd96-8f13-46aa-a718-e21bcd3f6e4d · outbound

This paper cites Competitive auctions for multiple digital goods.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Competitive auctions for multiple digital goods

Reference 47

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:22.141193Z digest=sha256:4bc5a1e66f130211809066b631ad13d940f6c9afd24bb62aeca701c2c1419194

Observation d14259cb-9f59-43cb-b941-dd063be670ac · outbound

This paper cites A lower bound on the competitive ratio of truthful auctions.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization A lower bound on the competitive ratio of truthful auctions

Reference 48

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:22.234620Z digest=sha256:896987b61624a7f0aee3490963ef181768c39ef7728100d20b2755c95c1e3106

Observation 3bdab74b-647e-45b8-afdd-e110217df94f · outbound

This paper cites Deep learning for multi- facility location mechanism design.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Deep learning for multi- facility location mechanism design

Reference 49

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:22.347124Z digest=sha256:873e510b1475a19265fd762c249d0e552d9b8b48434402b036fd589ef9ffc445

Observation 5258b0e7-45c0-4eae-8435-5a85d04d4104 · outbound

This paper cites Deep Learning.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Deep Learning

Reference 50

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Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:22.436303Z digest=sha256:f0c10781b85989fb8608c047968ecc2f38d5c4bd6bde9dc6274f24422738715c

Observation 430a34aa-c9f5-40f1-aa13-124151e7bb41 · outbound

This paper cites Approximation guarantees of Median Mechanism in Rd.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Approximation guarantees of Median Mechanism in Rd

Reference 51

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:22.507627Z digest=sha256:aa1a0bbe0ce8a054c56a04b4a5bbd47c5a903505421d19b2172ffffd37b121f5

Observation f63f7dfb-eb01-40bf-9a17-dab415e51199 · outbound

This paper cites Incentives in teams.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Incentives in teams

Reference 52

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:22.617858Z digest=sha256:fbc13289aa1c333d5e789927517bf6ebf07e099d0d3d1308efb0a541e93d8a22

Observation 5b914a3f-312f-4460-9a8d-42c26db8f75e · outbound

This paper cites Settling the sample complexity of single- parameter revenue maximization.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Settling the sample complexity of single- parameter revenue maximization

Reference 53

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:22.704343Z digest=sha256:c54f28823bd6f340406c09b151c9be916a833a0bf5105c8ded5543965a64409e

Observation 8fbd5680-4c7b-44cb-a8ed-70b816e838a4 · outbound

This paper cites Computationally feasible automated mechanism design: General approach and case studies.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Computationally feasible automated mechanism design: General approach and case studies

Reference 54

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:22.817309Z digest=sha256:a390c92561762f4e9cf16486b2c7634e0a61e283b486c40e19ea09500b449700

Observation 0586909e-08ae-4f0e-aada-cd315e926e80 · outbound

This paper cites Optimizing affine maximizer auctions via linear programming: an application to revenue maximizing mechanism design for zero-day exploits markets.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Optimizing affine maximizer auctions via linear programming: an application to revenue maximizing mechanism design for zero-day exploits markets

Reference 55

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:22.955541Z digest=sha256:01f375e0e4f0005c9806f91a16e8cbcf1b3d16b471a9a0f9eed0510b19d74404

Observation 53fa4dae-a350-472e-a315-c5362b82f2df · outbound

This paper cites Prior-Independent Auctions for Heterogeneous Bidders.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Prior-Independent Auctions for Heterogeneous Bidders

Reference 56

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:23.091781Z digest=sha256:a99bdfebfbf9552ae018effb6579827d49d72ec8479f35e9496122915dbe32a3

Observation 5df34d58-7e08-49f6-b8d3-172eb45dd3b4 · outbound

This paper cites Automated on- line mechanism design and prophet inequalities.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Automated on- line mechanism design and prophet inequalities

Reference 57

Resolution
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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:23.190298Z digest=sha256:95d1e347b64fec4a7fe33ca378374efd9c90d35e078a79d1d32b8d6c0ae9052c

Observation 8c8728d7-f23c-4dfa-878e-28e301d9d615 · outbound

This paper cites Straightforward individual incentive compatibility in large economies.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Straightforward individual incentive compatibility in large economies

Reference 58

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:23.297814Z digest=sha256:3dfdd948d0786e27c90aa8755e434cb204b9b8cf36dfb565ad417a7d1d6e4caa

Observation 51ebbfde-645c-43b3-b4f2-1fa159cf288b · outbound

This paper cites Universal approximation of symmetric and anti-symmetric functions.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Universal approximation of symmetric and anti-symmetric functions

Reference 59

Resolution
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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:23.404589Z digest=sha256:87f0bdc91247e233ecb7bec0ffe045ad68349f0b1af2b46beca784dc42fac7f4

Observation 6e4510f6-f578-4c5e-8924-2381b24ff546 · outbound

This paper cites Profit maximization in mechanism design.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Profit maximization in mechanism design

Reference 60

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:23.514389Z digest=sha256:5b3d2eef231f89289a04e903d2912950d379eb7dfabf837730f997d1e65b0409

Observation 6bb739bb-d0f9-4d5a-9f8d-febfb358d084 · outbound

This paper cites Gaussian Error Linear Units (GELUs).

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Gaussian Error Linear Units (GELUs)

Reference 61

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:23.631653Z digest=sha256:7f396ae9b9a31548621cec91c6efd46a0499b9c8ba2af5dc7324cb7e5983088e

Observation b25b6e4d-f007-4bda-a621-4500af4b4706 · outbound

This paper cites Welfare maximization with production costs: A primal dual approach.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Welfare maximization with production costs: A primal dual approach

Reference 62

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:49.863067Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:23.734138Z digest=sha256:e3a75cb9266cca883c0b3bfac6ca736ad8c3b8f280c4fd69c3508f7d7477fbed

Observation c6721c6f-079b-4441-a05c-4af4b738fa13 · outbound

This paper cites Optimal-er auctions through attention.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Optimal-er auctions through attention

Reference 63

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:49.636386Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:23.804975Z digest=sha256:a7d84efd355fa47d86f519ef4dda8bbdaad3612d711306a2c4a9cb79b20d0216

Observation ef2e18dc-215a-47bb-8d47-37c859266f96 · outbound

This paper cites Posted Price Mechanisms for Online Allocation with Disec- onomies of Scale.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Posted Price Mechanisms for Online Allocation with Disec- onomies of Scale

Reference 64

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:49.379759Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:23.913680Z digest=sha256:fe38012f311542833847d7f2b452ebe6da2f0af099578890a01635d03bb75068

Observation e34f5530-84c6-4701-8182-bb20ba1223dc · outbound

This paper cites An Online Intelligent Task Pricing Mechanism Based on Reverse Auction in Mobile Crowdsensing Networks for the Internet of Things.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization An Online Intelligent Task Pricing Mechanism Based on Reverse Auction in Mobile Crowdsensing Networks for the Internet of Things

Reference 65

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:49.112564Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:23.992501Z digest=sha256:5eea1726e8499f267fcb94bde8101990930ed81487d56f7c5e354dadc274c783

Observation e17d3687-e1d4-423b-bfe6-549cc9bf8502 · outbound

This paper cites Estimation of particle transmission by random sampling.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Estimation of particle transmission by random sampling

Reference 66

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:48.880579Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:24.073807Z digest=sha256:891af3e85f565b089d11afec1a42a9bf03fd1b340b78490aa87749b438bab1d7

Observation c93494be-dc5e-429e-973b-0ed2e68c4b29 · outbound

This paper cites Parameterized convex universal approximators for decision- making problems.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Parameterized convex universal approximators for decision- making problems

Reference 67

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:48.590802Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:24.140249Z digest=sha256:f386569e22f847235b4e392b336dfe3843901926fd6499358cbc59aa55cf293b

Observation b8ed81b5-07d6-4219-8ef8-0d51daa396ec · outbound

This paper cites Adam: A Method for Stochastic Optimization.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Adam: A Method for Stochastic Optimization

Reference 68

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Source-reported events for the cited work

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:24.218228Z digest=sha256:4257c9282145a8a57ff38348f310a32b46f8f37df94061a04c87c0703ed22816

Observation 4cb63ce5-d980-4203-b61a-bf9aea8f1d68 · outbound

This paper cites Bayesian estimates of equation system parameters: an application of integration by Monte Carlo.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Bayesian estimates of equation system parameters: an application of integration by Monte Carlo

Reference 69

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:48.340250Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:24.303036Z digest=sha256:685097a1a52f6cdf5fb8421ddbae9da0ec8d8883a85bbd894094dea7762f9856

Observation 1b0f7ec0-904c-4c77-9e65-1ad33ea11f51 · outbound

This paper cites Total-cost procurement auctions: Impact of suppliers’ cost adjustments on auction format choice.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Total-cost procurement auctions: Impact of suppliers’ cost adjustments on auction format choice

Reference 70

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:48.012487Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:24.371591Z digest=sha256:d5db43bdfc9482664fe046a5a7b50ebf7ca3f2c8269d8e7effe47a30c6d01bac

Observation 6cc72ebd-f118-4784-b233-1d7c8b37a6a4 · outbound

This paper cites Faster first-order methods for extensive-form game solving.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Faster first-order methods for extensive-form game solving

Reference 71

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:47.710679Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:24.473727Z digest=sha256:4883cd9c7078eadc33b90dced7a1e6ec23f81537e54780599cb0ed56018dc99d

Observation cfbfe6c9-4b61-4b4a-831f-16d4759af485 · outbound

This paper cites Towards a characterization of truthful combi- natorial auctions.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Towards a characterization of truthful combi- natorial auctions

Reference 72

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:47.388967Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:24.565841Z digest=sha256:7e84a8643f5d5c3442d73509b92b11f9113235c1b1353ad1c2b0706ce455bd08

Observation f949a3ae-ef4f-41e1-a9d3-6d93edba9319 · outbound

This paper cites Two simplified proofs for Roberts’ theorem.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Two simplified proofs for Roberts’ theorem

Reference 73

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:46.824269Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:24.741994Z digest=sha256:fa2d14bf97e83bd6b946d7a4d9adc8bbc8064f2d85feee491c0b3728151fae10

Observation 4e8a7139-734b-4a8f-9c46-c232d294cfff · outbound

This paper cites Truthful and near-optimal mechanism design via linear programming.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Truthful and near-optimal mechanism design via linear programming

Reference 74

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:46.502859Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:24.834317Z digest=sha256:d7b5f574503fbf6dc73611d482d32b79646b6159c2fd0b72fa6f19864b4f9bfa

Observation 6676b129-9c08-4de0-b955-0c7148d22cef · outbound

This paper cites Deep learning.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Deep learning

Reference 75

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:46.175708Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:24.917310Z digest=sha256:4de55ab10c24727cbbe9cac0131b07c45eff538951db8bbe91d320147df00b0a

Observation def9fba6-91ba-4c11-acbb-bdb14e4c8d72 · outbound

This paper cites Set transformer: A framework for attention-based permutation-invariant neural networks.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Set transformer: A framework for attention-based permutation-invariant neural networks

Reference 76

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:45.916232Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:25.028023Z digest=sha256:4dbac4bfa24d46ecdcf7a2b3c453fed38ecf1a448d202b110b11a30e577f706f

Observation 189d8397-9c54-440c-80d6-452f0a2f6dcf · outbound

This paper cites Approximating revenue-maximizing combi- natorial auctions.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Approximating revenue-maximizing combi- natorial auctions

Reference 77

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:45.606448Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:25.081299Z digest=sha256:feaf1aa611eec90d9ff40018205c1546f4f06d36df1abc7210ac3a8d12fee714

Observation 9c840a5e-5613-4f26-adda-3703ae0cf455 · outbound

This paper cites Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist

Reference 78

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:45.356308Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:25.157008Z digest=sha256:9715e87e9d8421e22cc8d97c9b3ec402c6f06523d2d7a9fb370ac416fa1046a7

Observation 3bac1c1f-ec92-4795-b0fe-9f625261225a · outbound

This paper cites Microeconomic theory.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Microeconomic theory

Reference 79

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:45.061301Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:25.236568Z digest=sha256:6fb54909925046a771fc84fb8029ae231cccbab482db6f53caf4b6b6ecc20a5b

Observation dabb16a4-eaf4-4589-b730-b4d29409548a · outbound

This paper cites The maximum numbers of faces of a convex polytope.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization The maximum numbers of faces of a convex polytope

Reference 80

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:44.643715Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:25.327173Z digest=sha256:978efa5a06f67e549ec60883c5528322a3626c9b0f6fd8f3a6e6279dfacf1ae8

Observation 0cd149c2-179c-4d44-9637-867c465d9bf9 · outbound

This paper cites Equation of state calculations by fast computing machines.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Equation of state calculations by fast computing machines

Reference 81

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:44.336076Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:25.414799Z digest=sha256:68d214a4265dba1991f20353ea943a851bcdcd661869d182486c3e3e9d139406

Observation e8c13b39-5543-46f1-b6b7-529825804047 · outbound

This paper cites Envelope theorems for arbitrary choice sets.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Envelope theorems for arbitrary choice sets

Reference 82

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:43.988280Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:25.512515Z digest=sha256:afc5087128ecba1c7b67fcbcefa95044e092a094949fdc023bd37f3a6ad0d700

Observation b17486ce-7d8f-4ce7-bc77-89b29dbb995b · outbound

This paper cites A theory of auctions and competitive bidding.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization A theory of auctions and competitive bidding

Reference 83

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:43.707633Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:25.598799Z digest=sha256:403c675cc868e686340db4c635e2066eda4ec96dc042214b9e53fc2fff7ee69c

Observation 148936be-4ad2-4267-9c81-c8221ea77ed9 · outbound

This paper cites On strategy-proofness and single peakedness.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization On strategy-proofness and single peakedness

Reference 84

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:43.365450Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:25.732090Z digest=sha256:86c43f6ce439363bfced62f46c5469c9295de1ba25b0476bfe2aed52517fe40b

Observation 58fa8d15-8c99-4df3-87d2-03f4913cc44b · outbound

This paper cites Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem

Reference 85

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:42.996823Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:25.832642Z digest=sha256:6fae15cdb0d9c36928c638419fffdf5c70b4b68fd43cce6b7d5d91fb86381408

Observation 57ca2496-7631-4420-b933-b92d5a39b709 · outbound

This paper cites Optimal auction design.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Optimal auction design

Reference 86

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:42.688261Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:25.916118Z digest=sha256:f8b7bbd2c242ff1d0c5056acf1164d1e07d218d94fa12dcb9774178183ccbc2e

Observation f2b62b12-b57e-47c7-830a-277b7ff65739 · outbound

This paper cites Automated mech- anism design without money via machine learning.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Automated mech- anism design without money via machine learning

Reference 87

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:42.454373Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:25.996076Z digest=sha256:c6538baafb023c567b5a674c6123bae1657669a6e9559a2618207e6a2e81633b

Observation 9674d893-5d9d-43dd-8d93-c6757ff486d7 · outbound

This paper cites Affine maximizers in domains with selfish valuations.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Affine maximizers in domains with selfish valuations

Reference 88

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:42.091491Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:26.076449Z digest=sha256:22eaa2190c26bb2aaca50bcc9a8ede71d597603d5fdea68e371ba26bec73156e

Observation dc29035f-6744-45f0-9f23-49ba1daf3d17 · outbound

This paper cites Sur une g´ en´ eralisation des int´ egrales de MJ Radon.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Sur une g´ en´ eralisation des int´ egrales de MJ Radon

Reference 89

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:41.773789Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:26.185405Z digest=sha256:286903b70efd044d5e580e509f17bb38ee5c3d97fdb19a7d5667349e05874d36

Observation 886d0fed-c6d9-41f4-8abf-cbd2ed2e02e6 · outbound

This paper cites Algorithmic Game Theory.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Algorithmic Game Theory

Reference 90

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:41.505796Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:26.267657Z digest=sha256:55aedaf7448e0ca56adcce0fb0f76efc094ca13a20a26c159b3f51ee7079f7a6

Observation 584dfe81-c43c-4761-9d89-371c69d6dab0 · outbound

This paper cites Optimal mechanism for selling two goods.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Optimal mechanism for selling two goods

Reference 91

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:41.250654Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:26.353455Z digest=sha256:73ac23f28c99ea506d052aca3bb6c5decc3aa145c8cfc6560a5e8e19f1929c5e

Observation 4ade873e-8565-4a46-8267-555bbb49dee5 · outbound

This paper cites Preferencenet: Encoding human preferences in auction design with deep learning.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Preferencenet: Encoding human preferences in auction design with deep learning

Reference 92

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:40.960148Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:26.426354Z digest=sha256:273159b89abb6a4948c429ba2c2554cca8ebc0d646125efc00999273a2f3f389

Observation 8f190efa-73b7-485b-9f5a-9aee51abc9f1 · outbound

This paper cites Why and when can deep-but not shallow-networks avoid the curse of dimensionality: a review.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Why and when can deep-but not shallow-networks avoid the curse of dimensionality: a review

Reference 93

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:40.680453Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:26.541082Z digest=sha256:35da8c925ce575f126888beca5fa013c9423972294e80e035aede9cacce720ed

Observation 250766bd-ad59-429f-a75a-a76cbf2c58ef · outbound

This paper cites Benefits of permutation-equivariance in auction mechanisms.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Benefits of permutation-equivariance in auction mechanisms

Reference 94

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:40.393667Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:26.623014Z digest=sha256:0d54ca6fb9789ea3d03c7ab593a68273b29215c7f472ee748eb87616bcdb7ca0

Observation e6e161fe-97aa-4d86-93a2-98695f067020 · outbound

This paper cites Auction learning as a two-player game.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Auction learning as a two-player game

Reference 95

Resolution
verified exact
local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:31.531506Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:26.709583Z digest=sha256:0a6f5006bb0cda45719896494c6a2ac0b30915d4c77f834f70cee14492aec1d9

Observation a0ce2fd4-f2b8-4ae2-a153-8258c0f7feb3 · outbound

This paper cites Auction Learning as a Two-Player Game.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Auction Learning as a Two-Player Game

Reference 96

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:40.116497Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:26.805352Z digest=sha256:9f53caf0d58c91bacc9ad52511864c05a5db69b6b51a6d020a237c6c3164dd3b

Observation facaccac-745d-49ea-8e6b-e1271ad372ca · outbound

This paper cites A permutation-equivariant neural network architecture for auction de- sign.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization A permutation-equivariant neural network architecture for auction de- sign

Reference 97

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:39.764959Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:26.922879Z digest=sha256:a5b155e7457fb0b5eedc4eded2360287b76d171693e2c68d442f26c4df4300dc

Observation 65e9af19-9bff-4393-8d4d-8560418118eb · outbound

This paper cites Deep Learning for Two-Sided Matching.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Deep Learning for Two-Sided Matching

Reference 98

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:27.031927Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:27.031927Z digest=sha256:bb38e21f82c12c3e5678d4b3c85bb323918f5bd88857cbcf4e68757e2348e524

Observation 599a11f6-2c2b-4caa-a647-cb7e23cee919 · outbound

This paper cites url: https : / / www.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization url: https : / / www

Reference 99

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:39.412386Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:27.126296Z digest=sha256:e6c22276b433b54039a8a81176eebef75400a005b880576f690ac33fe6ed7c89

Observation 54e00091-90d5-43f5-ae17-08c186330608 · outbound

This paper cites Exponential convergence of Langevin distribu- tions and their discrete approximations.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Exponential convergence of Langevin distribu- tions and their discrete approximations

Reference 100

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:39.156536Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:27.213453Z digest=sha256:f03055e1a40ae91bc829a4b874495d7ed2eb4257156b104b307b30dfd0f0a360

Pith citing papers

No inbound Pith citation observations are available.