Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.
Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.425381Z
Paper Citation Record · LEDGER
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains
As of 16 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 71 of 71 outbound references and 0 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2508.20799.
A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.
Coverage vector
One-hop event checks from named stored sources.
Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00
Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.
Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links
A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.
Source: cited_works
Reference resolution
71 of 71 outbound references displayed
- verified exact47
- verified fuzzy11
- unresolved9
- parse uncertain0
- malformed identifier0
- metadata mismatch4
External citation measurements
No source-named external measurement is stored.
Outbound references
Observation 341d4f32-6bcb-4e8c-be3e-4a4a6d22f745 · outbound
This paper cites 2011 Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2011 Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction
Reference 1
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:31.495478Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 99365366-de63-4efe-ab6c-5c090a1e6c8a · outbound
This paper cites 1992 An Experimental Study of the Cen - tipede Game.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 1992 An Experimental Study of the Cen - tipede Game
Reference 2
- Resolution
- verified exact
- doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:30.123832Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 6849cca8-3dd8-467e-930b-d30fe765d83a · outbound
This paper cites 2014 Social heuristics shape intuitive coop - eration.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2014 Social heuristics shape intuitive coop - eration
Reference 3
- Resolution
- verified exact
- doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:30.109574Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation e2a2d060-526b-4150-9049-9cda6d7a3028 · outbound
This paper cites 2004 Cultural Differences in Ultimatum Game Experiments: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2004 Cultural Differences in Ultimatum Game Experiments: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis
Reference 4
- Resolution
- verified exact
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:31.329841Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation cf1ef61c-9d87-4219-b335-eca90f944be6 · outbound
This paper cites 2008 The two-person beauty contest.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2008 The two-person beauty contest
Reference 5
- Resolution
- verified exact
- doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:30.095226Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation e79f4cd3-f2e8-4430-bc05-82b37bc9f3ce · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains Unresolved cited work
Reference 6
- Resolution
- verified exact
- doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:30.079232Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 39b71676-ddc9-44b7-b3d5-0949bd335506 · outbound
This paper cites 2007 Chimpanzees Are Ratio- nal Maximizers in an Ultimatum Game.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2007 Chimpanzees Are Ratio- nal Maximizers in an Ultimatum Game
Reference 7
- Resolution
- verified exact
- doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:30.061735Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation e312e600-f02d-4c2e-9d6c-5f2287ecd1e8 · outbound
This paper cites 2001 Rationality in medical decision making: a review of the literature on doctors’ decision-making biases.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2001 Rationality in medical decision making: a review of the literature on doctors’ decision-making biases
Reference 8
- Resolution
- verified exact
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:31.245326Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation f3069f2b-1b47-432c-be11-cb5d1f50b623 · outbound
This paper cites 2015 Cognitive and Motivational Biases in Decision and Risk Analysis.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2015 Cognitive and Motivational Biases in Decision and Risk Analysis
Reference 9
- Resolution
- verified exact
- doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:30.045844Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 0dd4c5cf-bf2d-40ad-b30b-6d1f8760c9a9 · outbound
This paper cites 2013 On ev olu- tionary explanations of cognitive biases.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2013 On ev olu- tionary explanations of cognitive biases
Reference 10
- Resolution
- verified exact
- doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:30.030344Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 5215bb6c-75f9-4f1e-a4fc-3222672cabe0 · outbound
This paper cites 2011 Deceit and self-deception: fooling yourself the better to fool others.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2011 Deceit and self-deception: fooling yourself the better to fool others
Reference 11
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:31.481059Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 012b20f7-cfd7-4ebd-a632-dba345cd0e27 · outbound
This paper cites 2011 The evolution and psychol- ogy of self-deception.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2011 The evolution and psychol- ogy of self-deception
Reference 12
- Resolution
- verified exact
- doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:30.014056Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 57a8c497-707d-44a3-8049-bad3da7620d4 · outbound
This paper cites 20 20 Theory of mind and decision science: Towards a typology of tasks and computational models.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 20 20 Theory of mind and decision science: Towards a typology of tasks and computational models
Reference 13
- Resolution
- metadata mismatch
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:31.154984Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation edccc18d-221f-40cb-8b7f-9f7f85b8f9b3 · outbound
This paper cites 2009 The evolution of misbelief.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2009 The evolution of misbelief
Reference 14
- Resolution
- verified exact
- doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.997664Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation d24827e1-5920-4743-ab3c-b709d6a645a3 · outbound
This paper cites 2024 Evolut ion of a theory of mind.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2024 Evolut ion of a theory of mind
Reference 15
- Resolution
- metadata mismatch
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:31.064457Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 8d59fcf4-4114-44c0-889a-5b9afc6da3ff · outbound
This paper cites 2004 A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2004 A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
Reference 16
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.172502Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation ef87996f-56c0-4bb9-a475-55ef9a22a008 · outbound
This paper cites 1973 The Logic of Animal Conflict.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 1973 The Logic of Animal Conflict
Reference 17
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.177082Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation 9cce0d91-0e28-4a28-b0ba-7f8198eecabd · outbound
This paper cites 1982 Evolution and the Theory of Games.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 1982 Evolution and the Theory of Games
Reference 18
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:31.466232Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation af1b39ba-7e70-4d85-a940-5bc186ccb3dc · outbound
This paper cites 2010 The calculus of selfishness.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2010 The calculus of selfishness
Reference 19
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:31.451715Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation ba0a80c6-418a-4bca-a3b3-ec4b2daf15e8 · outbound
This paper cites 2023 EGTtoo ls: Evolutionary game dynamics in Python.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2023 EGTtoo ls: Evolutionary game dynamics in Python
Reference 20
- Resolution
- metadata mismatch
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:30.977211Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 0aa2be75-8fed-428b-9661-510af2b7ad3a · outbound
This paper cites 1993 Evolution of Smartn Players.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 1993 Evolution of Smartn Players
Reference 21
- Resolution
- verified exact
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:30.875050Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 69879928-9371-41bd-8e53-e4949ab45ba1 · outbound
This paper cites 2012 Level-k analysis of experimental c en- tipede games.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2012 Level-k analysis of experimental c en- tipede games
Reference 22
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:31.435878Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation ebfca467-5736-454f-bc5f-f8eb57311d5e · outbound
This paper cites 2022 Deep and shallow thinking in the long run.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2022 Deep and shallow thinking in the long run
Reference 23
- Resolution
- verified exact
- doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.947863Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 0e01c60d-b825-40ce-8ec0-ae6590fef682 · outbound
This paper cites 1997 Rationality and Bounded Rationality.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 1997 Rationality and Bounded Rationality
Reference 24
- Resolution
- verified exact
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:30.798569Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 0e76b383-2504-40c1-adab-5ff49fa68a62 · outbound
This paper cites 1981 Games of perfect information, predator y pricing and the chain-store paradox.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 1981 Games of perfect information, predator y pricing and the chain-store paradox
Reference 25
- Resolution
- verified exact
- doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.933029Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 27f055c5-2725-46b5-8f43-1c06c3fb094c · outbound
This paper cites 2003 Equilibrium play and adaptive learning in a three-person centipede game.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2003 Equilibrium play and adaptive learning in a three-person centipede game
Reference 26
- Resolution
- verified exact
- doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.916836Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 0120f6f4-4d9c-41a0-abe2-204eb7a6c933 · outbound
This paper cites 2004 Population Learning of Co- operative Behavior in a Three-Person Centipede Game.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2004 Population Learning of Co- operative Behavior in a Three-Person Centipede Game
Reference 27
- Resolution
- verified exact
- doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.901738Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 03901f81-0e5b-4ef1-a3a5-0dd866a374be · outbound
This paper cites 1996 An experimental study of constant-sum centipede games.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 1996 An experimental study of constant-sum centipede games
Reference 28
- Resolution
- verified exact
- doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.887130Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 052d5876-f4b9-43e0-9950-2eec44b8c6b8 · outbound
This paper cites 2009 Field Centipedes.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2009 Field Centipedes
Reference 29
- Resolution
- verified exact
- doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.871568Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 9d8d87e0-d5ac-49d0-873f-68c181abfc1d · outbound
This paper cites 2012 Evolutionary dynamics in finite popu- lations can explain the full range of cooperative behaviors observe d in the centipede game.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2012 Evolutionary dynamics in finite popu- lations can explain the full range of cooperative behaviors observe d in the centipede game
Reference 30
- Resolution
- verified exact
- doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.855961Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation d0242942-63dd-4f95-a7dc-b18943c26448 · outbound
This paper cites 1995 Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 1995 Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games
Reference 31
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.247071Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation d7267058-832f-4b1f-adc1-b01dae771ae6 · outbound
This paper cites 1998 Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 1998 Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games
Reference 32
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.251516Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation 75886377-5b82-4486-b4a8-8795de6af334 · outbound
This paper cites 2022 Altruism and Ambiguity in the Centipede game.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2022 Altruism and Ambiguity in the Centipede game
Reference 33
- Resolution
- verified exact
- doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.829747Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 93e1339c-a89f-40a6-a66b-28bbeaf40def · outbound
This paper cites 2016 Exploring cooperation and competition in the Centipede game through verbal protocol an alysis.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2016 Exploring cooperation and competition in the Centipede game through verbal protocol an alysis
Reference 34
- Resolution
- verified exact
- doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.815213Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 512e2e3a-7f9b-480b-860f-bd581440c4ad · outbound
This paper cites 2019 Preferences-dependent learning in t he cen- tipede game: The persistence of mistrust.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2019 Preferences-dependent learning in t he cen- tipede game: The persistence of mistrust
Reference 35
- Resolution
- metadata mismatch
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:30.644088Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation ad2b7da4-24dc-4e3f-b315-64532777cf62 · outbound
This paper cites 2014 The evolution of decision rules in complex environments.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2014 The evolution of decision rules in complex environments
Reference 36
- Resolution
- verified exact
- doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.800026Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation fcf7e33d-1125-4f42-9c17-1010868f8977 · outbound
This paper cites 1974 Judgment under Uncertainty: H euristics and Biases: Biases in judgments reveal some heuristics of thinking u nder uncertainty.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 1974 Judgment under Uncertainty: H euristics and Biases: Biases in judgments reveal some heuristics of thinking u nder uncertainty
Reference 37
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.275296Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation 772202a5-9743-4aa6-84f0-621b354140b9 · outbound
This paper cites 2013 How much does it help t o know what she knows you know? An agent-based simulation study.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2013 How much does it help t o know what she knows you know? An agent-based simulation study
Reference 38
- Resolution
- verified exact
- doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.784286Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation b0253379-dfc4-40f0-87a6-6838d9651ec8 · outbound
This paper cites 2014 Theory of Mind: Did Evolu- tion Fool Us?.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2014 Theory of Mind: Did Evolu- tion Fool Us?
Reference 39
- Resolution
- verified exact
- doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.769431Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 3f9b625e-869a-41ac-bddf-0d8dfa7ecc59 · outbound
This paper cites 1994 The Traveler’s Dilemma: Paradoxes of Rationality in Game Theory.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 1994 The Traveler’s Dilemma: Paradoxes of Rationality in Game Theory
Reference 40
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:31.421174Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 9add62ec-73b5-407b-beb7-5fdce2e01b45 · outbound
This paper cites 1999 Stochastic game theory: For playing g ames, not just for doing theory.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 1999 Stochastic game theory: For playing g ames, not just for doing theory
Reference 41
- Resolution
- verified exact
- doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.754680Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 855c90de-0435-4820-990a-09df860a8764 · outbound
This paper cites 2004 A model of noisy introspection.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2004 A model of noisy introspection
Reference 42
- Resolution
- verified exact
- doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.740391Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 6cc61462-5924-4ddd-b135-2774941dc298 · outbound
This paper cites 2013 From extortion to generosity, ev olution in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2013 From extortion to generosity, ev olution in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
Reference 43
- Resolution
- verified exact
- doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.726168Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 3e0ebd11-d98f-43a6-9e8f-c78e527d8b24 · outbound
This paper cites 1998 Hawk-dove game and com- petition dynamics.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 1998 Hawk-dove game and com- petition dynamics
Reference 44
- Resolution
- verified exact
- doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.711468Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation ba27d153-9814-4a18-9be9-fded11867645 · outbound
This paper cites 1983 Replicator dynamics.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 1983 Replicator dynamics
Reference 45
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:31.405531Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 63a66457-7b70-41b8-aaa2-4684eb09a795 · outbound
This paper cites 2014 The replicator equation and other gam e dy- namics.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2014 The replicator equation and other gam e dy- namics
Reference 46
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:31.390888Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation e1a487c9-e9ce-45f9-9bf6-43fbdd7452dd · outbound
This paper cites 2006 Five rules for the evolution of cooperation.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2006 Five rules for the evolution of cooperation
Reference 47
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:31.375387Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation eee75559-26a1-4964-9e43-5545fc4325a2 · outbound
This paper cites 2007 Transforming the dilemma.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2007 Transforming the dilemma
Reference 48
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:31.360639Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 59782cf6-b1d2-4348-9327-8b6731e73bf3 · outbound
This paper cites 2015 Three steps ahead: Three steps ahead.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2015 Three steps ahead: Three steps ahead
Reference 49
- Resolution
- verified exact
- doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.695516Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 7ff7ce64-60cb-46b6-a9f6-16c6240dfbbe · outbound
This paper cites 2003 Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational a nd Bound- edly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2003 Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational a nd Bound- edly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions
Reference 50
- Resolution
- verified exact
- doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.681112Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 18770c3e-ce49-412e-b398-31ad65879492 · outbound
This paper cites 2012 Neural correlates of wis h- ful thinking.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2012 Neural correlates of wis h- ful thinking
Reference 51
- Resolution
- verified exact
- doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.666164Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation b7424f42-bd8b-416d-81de-e6d8d0511956 · outbound
This paper cites 2014 A bounded rationality acc ount of wishful thinking.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2014 A bounded rationality acc ount of wishful thinking
Reference 52
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:31.345267Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation e4e6f903-3211-4f6f-88ee-157b5f9a8753 · outbound
This paper cites Gravitational quadrupole deformation and the tidal deformability for stellar systems: (The number of) Love for undergraduates.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains Gravitational quadrupole deformation and the tidal deformability for stellar systems: (The number of) Love for undergraduates
Reference 53
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.347247Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation d50af370-bca1-4efa-aaec-4153673e1c4e · outbound
This paper cites 2010 How prevalent is wishful thinking? Misattribu- tion of arousal causes optimism and pessimism in subjective prob- abilities.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2010 How prevalent is wishful thinking? Misattribu- tion of arousal causes optimism and pessimism in subjective prob- abilities
Reference 54
- Resolution
- verified exact
- doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.650858Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 68639391-03ba-44da-99be-9ce7a1c0a469 · outbound
This paper cites 1998 Defensive Pessimism and Optimism: The Bitter- Sweet Influence of Mood on Performance and Prefactual and Counterfactual Thinking.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 1998 Defensive Pessimism and Optimism: The Bitter- Sweet Influence of Mood on Performance and Prefactual and Counterfactual Thinking
Reference 55
- Resolution
- verified exact
- doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.633731Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 445704c0-1584-435e-987d-382c811b111c · outbound
This paper cites 2011 Agitated Honey bees Exhibit Pessimistic Cognitive Biases.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2011 Agitated Honey bees Exhibit Pessimistic Cognitive Biases
Reference 56
- Resolution
- verified exact
- doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.618015Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 9bc9203a-ba18-44f7-83de-f71ca5ba57fa · outbound
This paper cites 2009 Wishful Thinking about the Future : Does Desire Impact Optimism?.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2009 Wishful Thinking about the Future : Does Desire Impact Optimism?
Reference 57
- Resolution
- verified exact
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:30.473977Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 1e879b27-b097-4e2d-a446-f9cf70da8fd4 · outbound
This paper cites 2007 The influence of outcome de- sirability on optimism.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2007 The influence of outcome de- sirability on optimism
Reference 58
- Resolution
- verified exact
- doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.603628Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 616f094a-2fd3-48f5-ba23-fecd67ee97eb · outbound
This paper cites 1999 On the Evolution of Attitudes towa rds Risk in Winner-Take-All Games.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 1999 On the Evolution of Attitudes towa rds Risk in Winner-Take-All Games
Reference 59
- Resolution
- verified exact
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:30.398831Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 03485551-9318-4ea4-8858-6bb4450171ad · outbound
This paper cites 2025 Why do children pass in the centipede g ame? Cognitive limitations v.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2025 Why do children pass in the centipede g ame? Cognitive limitations v
Reference 60
- Resolution
- verified exact
- doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.588520Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 79b0a1db-72f7-49de-8707-0018a50ac630 · outbound
This paper cites 2011 The evolution of overconfidence.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2011 The evolution of overconfidence
Reference 61
- Resolution
- verified exact
- doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.573550Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation f0952ca1-1952-4e2e-b674-0da7f381e70a · outbound
This paper cites 2024 Learning to Resolve So cial Dilemmas: A Survey.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2024 Learning to Resolve So cial Dilemmas: A Survey
Reference 62
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.389688Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation c0016ad3-7f1b-4ecf-b3e7-e79ecc1ae699 · outbound
This paper cites 2006 Imitation processes with small mu tations.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2006 Imitation processes with small mu tations
Reference 63
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.394008Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation 25ce1c48-9900-414e-b760-c4145ba590aa · outbound
This paper cites 2006 Stochastic dynam- ics of invasion and fixation.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2006 Stochastic dynam- ics of invasion and fixation
Reference 64
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.398417Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation a833cc7d-69a5-4ba4-8313-6e35aec4d82b · outbound
This paper cites 2019 Computation and S imu- lation of Evolutionary Game Dynamics in Finite Populations.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2019 Computation and S imu- lation of Evolutionary Game Dynamics in Finite Populations
Reference 65
- Resolution
- verified exact
- doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.528376Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation b45a68d0-2a8e-4523-8164-c09ce4d845e7 · outbound
This paper cites 2025 MarcoSaponara/centipede-bias: First pub lic release.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2025 MarcoSaponara/centipede-bias: First pub lic release
Reference 66
- Resolution
- verified exact
- doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.512516Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation dc499575-4511-4629-9b04-43c145284530 · outbound
This paper cites 1994 Trust and commitment in the United States and Japan.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 1994 Trust and commitment in the United States and Japan
Reference 67
- Resolution
- verified exact
- doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.496674Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 903f27a8-1c55-40e2-88de-4f3a764f437c · outbound
This paper cites 2018 Commitment-enhancing tools in Centipede games: Evidencing European–Japanese differences in trust and cooperation.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2018 Commitment-enhancing tools in Centipede games: Evidencing European–Japanese differences in trust and cooperation
Reference 68
- Resolution
- verified exact
- doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.480743Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 3b16d17b-bc47-4000-822e-abc91f619285 · outbound
This paper cites 2016 Cooperation in re- peated interactions: A systematic review of Centipede game exper i- ments, 1992–2016.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2016 Cooperation in re- peated interactions: A systematic review of Centipede game exper i- ments, 1992–2016
Reference 69
- Resolution
- verified exact
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:30.290345Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation c7f5b1ef-9c7b-4f97-aba0-ca26c2c60a1f · outbound
This paper cites 2017 Co - operation and Trust in Japanese and British Samples: Evidence From Incomplete Information Games.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2017 Co - operation and Trust in Japanese and British Samples: Evidence From Incomplete Information Games
Reference 70
- Resolution
- verified exact
- doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.465204Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 76155786-cbb9-4c40-a66f-63b2ad9d20ce · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains Unresolved cited work
Reference 566
- Resolution
- verified exact
- doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.962655Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Pith citing papers
No inbound Pith citation observations are available.