Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

The Theory of Strategic Evolution: Games with Endogenous Players and Strategic Replicators

As of 10 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 36 of 36 outbound references and 0 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2512.07901.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2512.07901 v3

Coverage vector

measured 36 of 36 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-03T18:18:52.227182Z

measured 36 of 36 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00

measured 0 of 0 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: cited_works

Reference resolution

36 of 36 outbound references displayed

verified exact0
verified fuzzy0
unresolved36
parse uncertain0
malformed identifier0
metadata mismatch0

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

Observation 07358484-2de1-4f2d-a1c4-f368ac341707 · outbound

This paper cites Concrete Problems in AI Safety.

The Theory of Strategic Evolution: Games with Endogenous Players and Strategic Replicators Concrete Problems in AI Safety

Reference 1

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T18:18:47.753005Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

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Observation 560eb127-7968-4ed1-9c9a-c00c18a8649d · outbound

This paper cites Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies.

The Theory of Strategic Evolution: Games with Endogenous Players and Strategic Replicators Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies

Reference 2

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T18:18:47.875673Z

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Observation 4f130c9e-30db-4e0c-886d-8c370d947885 · outbound

This paper cites Buchanan.

The Theory of Strategic Evolution: Games with Endogenous Players and Strategic Replicators Buchanan

Reference 3

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T18:18:47.996562Z

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Observation 15b5fd67-a7e2-46c8-b00e-d8e4a3364442 · outbound

This paper cites Buchanan.

The Theory of Strategic Evolution: Games with Endogenous Players and Strategic Replicators Buchanan

Reference 4

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T18:18:48.152618Z

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Observation ff3749b1-fc86-48bb-88f2-cd9ebc0d5a45 · outbound

This paper cites Buchanan and Gordon Tullock.

The Theory of Strategic Evolution: Games with Endogenous Players and Strategic Replicators Buchanan and Gordon Tullock

Reference 5

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T18:18:48.281028Z

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Observation 0205547f-abf6-4f1e-89f1-732ad566d1c8 · outbound

This paper cites Clarifying ai alignment.

The Theory of Strategic Evolution: Games with Endogenous Players and Strategic Replicators Clarifying ai alignment

Reference 6

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T18:18:48.383881Z

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Observation 26541388-f818-48fa-a734-2842fdb22844 · outbound

This paper cites Deep reinforcement learning from human preferences.

The Theory of Strategic Evolution: Games with Endogenous Players and Strategic Replicators Deep reinforcement learning from human preferences

Reference 7

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T18:18:48.554119Z

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Observation d68a377f-0e78-4f48-98a8-4e9b4480f8db · outbound

This paper cites AI Research Considerations for Human Existential Safety (ARCHES).

The Theory of Strategic Evolution: Games with Endogenous Players and Strategic Replicators AI Research Considerations for Human Existential Safety (ARCHES)

Reference 8

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T18:18:48.640078Z

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Observation 57ce0172-dd2b-4e2f-ac56-678455a258e1 · outbound

This paper cites Open Problems in Cooperative AI.

The Theory of Strategic Evolution: Games with Endogenous Players and Strategic Replicators Open Problems in Cooperative AI

Reference 9

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T18:18:48.784270Z

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Observation cb765597-6396-43c6-882b-1665f1a364db · outbound

This paper cites The dynamical theory of coevolution: A derivation from stochastic ecological processes.

The Theory of Strategic Evolution: Games with Endogenous Players and Strategic Replicators The dynamical theory of coevolution: A derivation from stochastic ecological processes

Reference 10

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T18:18:48.930823Z

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Observation 63c7555c-c843-4812-940f-0e923e064d10 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

The Theory of Strategic Evolution: Games with Endogenous Players and Strategic Replicators Unresolved cited work

Reference 11

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T18:18:49.063286Z

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Observation a390a1e1-ac3e-4d7e-aa6e-491a4ca4e1a4 · outbound

This paper cites Nonlinear Oscillations, Dynamical Systems, and Bifurcations of Vector Fields.

The Theory of Strategic Evolution: Games with Endogenous Players and Strategic Replicators Nonlinear Oscillations, Dynamical Systems, and Bifurcations of Vector Fields

Reference 12

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T18:18:49.187444Z

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Observation 805f804f-05f7-4017-b5be-5aad409a4bf3 · outbound

This paper cites Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics.

The Theory of Strategic Evolution: Games with Endogenous Players and Strategic Replicators Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics

Reference 13

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T18:18:49.298465Z

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Observation b0f42a32-bbfd-494c-8ba7-25f52f587c65 · outbound

This paper cites Horn and Charles R.

The Theory of Strategic Evolution: Games with Endogenous Players and Strategic Replicators Horn and Charles R

Reference 14

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T18:18:49.433223Z

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Observation e4adb9d1-850e-409e-a306-417d63a3eb32 · outbound

This paper cites Malham \'e , and Peter E.

The Theory of Strategic Evolution: Games with Endogenous Players and Strategic Replicators Malham \'e , and Peter E

Reference 15

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T18:18:49.597553Z

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Observation 35983441-d3ea-4dfd-a469-ad14ecbba70e · outbound

This paper cites Risks from Learned Optimization in Advanced Machine Learning Systems.

The Theory of Strategic Evolution: Games with Endogenous Players and Strategic Replicators Risks from Learned Optimization in Advanced Machine Learning Systems

Reference 16

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T18:18:49.710538Z

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Observation ee75b30e-dbb6-45d4-a9f3-8ba6645a90fa · outbound

This paper cites Optimality and informational efficiency in resource allocation processes.

The Theory of Strategic Evolution: Games with Endogenous Players and Strategic Replicators Optimality and informational efficiency in resource allocation processes

Reference 17

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T18:18:49.818665Z

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Observation 85bfe122-215d-4845-960c-8a6b648ba772 · outbound

This paper cites AI safety via debate.

The Theory of Strategic Evolution: Games with Endogenous Players and Strategic Replicators AI safety via debate

Reference 18

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T18:18:49.983397Z

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Observation fd54872c-3462-4117-950c-e3df82369150 · outbound

This paper cites Mean field games.

The Theory of Strategic Evolution: Games with Endogenous Players and Strategic Replicators Mean field games

Reference 19

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T18:18:50.092414Z

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Observation 7fe012e5-ea30-4236-acae-c0ff3304ac5e · outbound

This paper cites Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality.

The Theory of Strategic Evolution: Games with Endogenous Players and Strategic Replicators Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality

Reference 20

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T18:18:50.204452Z

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Observation 34903154-58e3-427b-834b-a51ae6686b3b · outbound

This paper cites Evolution and the Theory of Games.

The Theory of Strategic Evolution: Games with Endogenous Players and Strategic Replicators Evolution and the Theory of Games

Reference 21

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T18:18:50.382804Z

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Observation bee733eb-1d55-4e7e-9ce2-2ae2d9f88ca5 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

The Theory of Strategic Evolution: Games with Endogenous Players and Strategic Replicators Unresolved cited work

Reference 22

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T18:18:50.556869Z

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Observation fec42717-4cf2-418c-b2dd-ce7077ed91d1 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

The Theory of Strategic Evolution: Games with Endogenous Players and Strategic Replicators Unresolved cited work

Reference 23

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T18:18:50.690768Z

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Observation eb362c0c-9af8-4fc6-8dcf-cd6c41fd7db1 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

The Theory of Strategic Evolution: Games with Endogenous Players and Strategic Replicators Unresolved cited work

Reference 24

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T18:18:50.830980Z

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Observation c9b0e71a-b68a-4861-b31d-12eba1d6d2fe · outbound

This paper cites Ng and Stuart J.

The Theory of Strategic Evolution: Games with Endogenous Players and Strategic Replicators Ng and Stuart J

Reference 25

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T18:18:50.972088Z

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Observation 00ebf0a9-0d8e-45a0-93fd-1203ca9dcf01 · outbound

This paper cites Omohundro.

The Theory of Strategic Evolution: Games with Endogenous Players and Strategic Replicators Omohundro

Reference 26

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T18:18:51.117802Z

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Observation fc3d4988-7d54-4009-8177-b63fade5d625 · outbound

This paper cites Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action.

The Theory of Strategic Evolution: Games with Endogenous Players and Strategic Replicators Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action

Reference 27

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T18:18:51.197702Z

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Observation d8764a12-2554-4580-a1f5-cf81bce28092 · outbound

This paper cites A Theory of Justice.

The Theory of Strategic Evolution: Games with Endogenous Players and Strategic Replicators A Theory of Justice

Reference 28

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T18:18:51.352670Z

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Observation fc2b09c1-f173-46fd-a68f-c4703a8e5b30 · outbound

This paper cites Human Compatible: Artificial Intelligence and the Problem of Control.

The Theory of Strategic Evolution: Games with Endogenous Players and Strategic Replicators Human Compatible: Artificial Intelligence and the Problem of Control

Reference 29

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T18:18:51.491344Z

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Observation 46ca76c8-c8b2-4b8a-b547-9c0b4691790c · outbound

This paper cites Sandholm.

The Theory of Strategic Evolution: Games with Endogenous Players and Strategic Replicators Sandholm

Reference 30

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T18:18:51.601192Z

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Observation c6600657-4d8f-44e8-9142-f048ae56871b · outbound

This paper cites Agent foundations for aligning machine intelligence with human interests: A technical research agenda.

The Theory of Strategic Evolution: Games with Endogenous Players and Strategic Replicators Agent foundations for aligning machine intelligence with human interests: A technical research agenda

Reference 31

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T18:18:51.731242Z

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Observation 1227499f-de58-45ce-ab10-68964d18db13 · outbound

This paper cites Theory of Self-Reproducing Automata.

The Theory of Strategic Evolution: Games with Endogenous Players and Strategic Replicators Theory of Self-Reproducing Automata

Reference 32

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T18:18:51.831361Z

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Observation 4f324d99-7826-45f7-b837-155f573f2cd1 · outbound

This paper cites Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.

The Theory of Strategic Evolution: Games with Endogenous Players and Strategic Replicators Theory of Games and Economic Behavior

Reference 33

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T18:18:51.902170Z

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Observation d126a4f7-cc4d-4a31-878a-9b9ed81a3e84 · outbound

This paper cites Emergent Complexity via Multi-Agent Competition.

The Theory of Strategic Evolution: Games with Endogenous Players and Strategic Replicators Emergent Complexity via Multi-Agent Competition

Reference 34

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T18:18:52.027325Z

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Observation 6757e2c5-e6a1-48b9-9481-f86504315401 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

The Theory of Strategic Evolution: Games with Endogenous Players and Strategic Replicators Unresolved cited work

Reference 35

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T18:18:52.128342Z

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Observation 06a153f4-1aa4-46a5-b06f-2d147f90b1cb · outbound

This paper cites Mean Field Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning.

The Theory of Strategic Evolution: Games with Endogenous Players and Strategic Replicators Mean Field Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning

Reference 36

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T18:18:52.227182Z

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Pith citing papers

No inbound Pith citation observations are available.