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Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information

As of 10 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 100 of 131 outbound references and 0 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2607.08675.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2607.08675 v1

Coverage vector

measured 100 of 131 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z

measured 100 of 100 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00

measured 0 of 0 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: cited_works

Reference resolution

100 of 131 outbound references displayed

  • verified exact10
  • verified fuzzy85
  • unresolved4
  • parse uncertain0
  • malformed identifier0
  • metadata mismatch1

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

Observation 269758ae-2dd1-4b45-a40c-2452cb982e50 · outbound

This paper cites American Economic Review , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information American Economic Review , volume=

Reference 1

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.249416Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:5db5994a11bdf212d9eb3e13ed1641613c873558de2541d205e0144429fceab8

Observation c0416f84-b476-45d6-b9bb-8c3d4f93980c · outbound

This paper cites Annual Review of Economics , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Annual Review of Economics , volume=

Reference 2

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.210186Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:90d6a8aac6e21e49ee43d1f5850232d533ee7bbb7da6275b9f78c88ec698252c

Observation ed501ad4-417a-4a88-9323-5deb9f845935 · outbound

This paper cites Sequential Bayesian persuasion , journal =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Sequential Bayesian persuasion , journal =

Reference 3

Resolution
verified exact
arxiv_id, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.040492Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:32338543c2dbb55a54eb2c32b82310ef6d5a83baa5795b98186d1514a19cafe8

Observation d0ab801b-ceba-4ee8-8ccb-cce4260e1579 · outbound

This paper cites SIGecom Exch.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information SIGecom Exch

Reference 4

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.356976Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:5f7a9fb51581c2539f1c53ce290f433e0b28f554e90ff1d4daa4143ad4d08908

Observation 44a5ec49-4286-41c9-833a-bbdee88631ba · outbound

This paper cites Persuading Voters , urldate =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Persuading Voters , urldate =

Reference 5

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.301670Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:3f8f82378c77319c4c075607ae43e2170e4c368163f46b89386b5645ce7e61f1

Observation b07d4346-73e3-497a-b337-c6f06239d58a · outbound

This paper cites Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver , journal =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver , journal =

Reference 6

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.382561Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:c98584cc7a7cf901487183531caee28f2fc9ca82a6289716cd3cbbb39fc047bf

Observation 5dc1e702-775f-4866-b622-f9c95fcb7f20 · outbound

This paper cites Unpublished manuscript, London School Econ , year=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Unpublished manuscript, London School Econ , year=

Reference 7

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.287671Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:d0fc07c746d0576f92e185616fe5f34e94964e6231e80c38dde08475626cd764

Observation f261443c-5266-4225-a4cf-6d3162c18551 · outbound

This paper cites Private Bayesian persuasion , journal =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Private Bayesian persuasion , journal =

Reference 8

Resolution
verified exact
doi, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.028968Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:04d52306c43c2a03e2afbd7a9d07d58f8dc3f401217d2776d4c0b04ffdd19f08

Observation b6cc78ab-f660-463a-89d7-693129400dba · outbound

This paper cites SIGecom Exch.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information SIGecom Exch

Reference 9

Resolution
verified exact
arxiv_id, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.023864Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:7261abfe06ef6a190f674a4d12add5f6633c5b8169b0199aaaffc910ae52b630

Observation 09273fbc-9231-4052-b605-c71c0827e382 · outbound

This paper cites 2024 , eprint=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information 2024 , eprint=

Reference 10

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.217745Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:1a2faa92bf34ac62f6851c4ac8a2ff78c080a9c1e3643bb5d2ffb523e9142582

Observation 126ee8a0-e1f1-45e3-b2ee-5aca460a40ce · outbound

This paper cites AEA Papers and Proceedings , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information AEA Papers and Proceedings , volume=

Reference 11

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.219451Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:191580eae90c191c52254d78bc32a8db35038352659f16c66842fd8b3bd8a8dd

Observation b0911afd-e16b-4e4a-858f-df038a7c22cd · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Economics & Management Strategy , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Economics & Management Strategy , volume=

Reference 12

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.231947Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:9aa3d7a59f7255bf1ed0cd00d71e840c9c56f68fa452b3a46fb7e18c89046f2b

Observation a2d33a90-4dba-4f5f-99f5-12808a8745f0 · outbound

This paper cites Theoretical Economics , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Theoretical Economics , volume=

Reference 13

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.303631Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:68b62d0af30ae00b488437d5a2a176f3e699be4ffa0d3ca717ed7a4dfdf17a31

Observation 7c87f370-bc5e-43a5-b5ce-3f9940a2cb7a · outbound

This paper cites 2020 , journal=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information 2020 , journal=

Reference 14

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.230254Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:dec5b3b053a06fca04511717339b0c2d6df6dc1c18d3cb54265b5716a5433503

Observation d57e3d0a-a632-4585-b9c5-244e30b02692 · outbound

This paper cites 1926 , publisher=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information 1926 , publisher=

Reference 15

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.372802Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:310705fabc32cbd8c526cd9b163770e671cde2e6ac14edf6f702bb13da8e7634

Observation 37945355-6b15-4584-9578-d5ef3e2f7888 · outbound

This paper cites Theoretical Economics , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Theoretical Economics , volume=

Reference 16

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.315655Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:34057594e2f54161b33e49e21ebbc91ab9461f245d89fd17de87c2b1cc172120

Observation 25298947-3c68-461f-a880-3c0ee3389d27 · outbound

This paper cites International Journal of Game Theory , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information International Journal of Game Theory , volume=

Reference 17

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.292768Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:30a2d038636101dedd0437c5883332e3ee366df44c716051731f945ec3c7daf8

Observation 7b34ddcd-d641-4f76-adc0-f17c2488670c · outbound

This paper cites Available at SSRN 4531654 , year=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Available at SSRN 4531654 , year=

Reference 18

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.317794Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:d48a7dab5a8ff417bb83c75fde57f4f8789a104c3d05eccf24eb564fbfe5ab4c

Observation 1ed10c57-1d64-48e0-99f8-6c36d52c89b2 · outbound

This paper cites Games and Economic Behavior , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Games and Economic Behavior , volume=

Reference 19

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.396836Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:e2c14aed5d7efabcde91cd27c52c2326cb7cc708ac757c5381e5c5f392509c8a

Observation 258ffa6a-0b82-485d-b85f-ba0eba759fae · outbound

This paper cites Mathematische Annalen , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Mathematische Annalen , volume=

Reference 20

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.299908Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:911ec3939e7b93bed751269c7962678137688e497b1cc31d883d68e90ea3f305

Observation 13ecef49-627f-4715-a4fb-c4d2b7fb5d28 · outbound

This paper cites American Economic Review , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information American Economic Review , volume=

Reference 21

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.312445Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:1f92da2fe8c315cd261464083837eaa6a95e75412b1162486700f04ebd27ad73

Observation 56781092-fd66-4ef2-b743-3913fc3669e0 · outbound

This paper cites Econometrica , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Econometrica , volume=

Reference 22

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.356186Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:487ea2b64095813b648c15b9844c5088f8759457fb879957440cf8b6b963f232

Observation 873a386d-5603-4a2e-aac9-8f26a5c83088 · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Economic Theory , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Economic Theory , volume=

Reference 23

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.336374Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:1f2a3010a713fe60495aa9406d5a7b3c866da97f807c864bbd78535ff2ea5cfb

Observation 9e1384f1-92e7-49f3-9ea6-9fc2177d6abb · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Political Economy , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Political Economy , volume=

Reference 24

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.328638Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:fb0f0260d26e0370ee40d28f699af0341dd9b8f7697b89bc346974467aeca414

Observation 4ca43506-26cc-42ec-b630-e8b5b0e16fc7 · outbound

This paper cites Econometrica , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Econometrica , volume=

Reference 25

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.312128Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:69de2effccae8a0cea26977d42d4188ffc79cfef12ad278619b4038a49727008

Observation 162e4fc5-04c4-416e-b60e-f0bf62b1a4b6 · outbound

This paper cites Available at SSRN 3697335 , year=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Available at SSRN 3697335 , year=

Reference 26

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.337168Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:0b4b01dab8849eaf59c6a8f6a8beeab79461afefea7c0d69a32cdf0e9af4bd2e

Observation 6b0bbad8-aa45-47c3-9426-f9bf649272d3 · outbound

This paper cites Bayesian Persuasion Meets Mechanism Design: Going Beyond Intractability with Type Reporting.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Bayesian Persuasion Meets Mechanism Design: Going Beyond Intractability with Type Reporting

Reference 27

Resolution
verified exact
local_arxiv, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.052868Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:2376deb5f1251a4cb164c8b71ceedb46ac741d15b0b567d07cef1a59661ca157

Observation 14c71ff2-a48c-419b-bd29-dea5c0d4ee82 · outbound

This paper cites Preprint , title =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Preprint , title =

Reference 28

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.393444Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:b4c0177021f83b001a262309e4e5f06b3353c73fd5dbf68dec1d3bbc5ee9fb98

Observation cca4cb63-348b-4f1e-9b17-8d74ecd808d7 · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Economic Literature , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Economic Literature , volume=

Reference 29

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.351879Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:3ca3c3cb7bdc5ae46ae334aa214d636beb34be5138c8399bd196dd95e96f5959

Observation 2d7ead62-6662-48e7-8cbf-1a1a27b1ea97 · outbound

This paper cites 2022 , publisher=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information 2022 , publisher=

Reference 30

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.366575Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:99426839bd692c5f2d2671cd6e53fa10e3d6bec1d23621db7ae3895cb24784e8

Observation 27c1d003-4a7a-4cb3-9da6-4afcce8b41ab · outbound

This paper cites Econometrica , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Econometrica , volume=

Reference 31

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.378623Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:7848b835c1cd0e48d7d8b8f666d461690a3d93a41ceff4a0aabbd686173821b0

Observation 78cbde6a-0cfa-45ad-9727-5fb7cd554eea · outbound

This paper cites Available at SSRN 3281132 , year=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Available at SSRN 3281132 , year=

Reference 32

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.291341Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:0e72e4e63f392142896c9858d39957549a52ba3f3ffa63c1b2f7c505ab952911

Observation 0fdaf95b-10de-4878-bfe3-ecf25e6b4b74 · outbound

This paper cites Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality , urldate =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality , urldate =

Reference 33

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.269190Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:26e750798885f471185dca801e843f009e174418c85f4b92662178f0da1cbbf6

Observation 3c726076-83b7-4672-a424-40c94aeb73d4 · outbound

This paper cites Competing Persuaders in Zero-Sum Games.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Competing Persuaders in Zero-Sum Games

Reference 34

Resolution
metadata mismatch
local_arxiv, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.056350Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:5d91f79bd98049c196913f8023656a068f8a74b2359bf3e654a8fa6893064483

Observation 40c635a9-6705-4422-8a58-00eef07d4e50 · outbound

This paper cites Games and Economic Behavior , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Games and Economic Behavior , volume=

Reference 35

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.301499Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:cb216ce8fb9e557aa68c4d26ee0994d223dc33fb85b45abf05b52104f03216ba

Observation 58ccb820-7528-477c-acc2-78f4aa649ad9 · outbound

This paper cites The Review of Economic Studies , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information The Review of Economic Studies , volume=

Reference 36

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.339643Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:d5d9f507725c5a02438467b2f6069c9d895eefaf00cc5eeff13f4aced41501dd

Observation 680022ac-1e7a-4403-bc4e-8be9ad140016 · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Political Economy , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Political Economy , volume=

Reference 37

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.357957Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:43375084e69077bdd319761826b0b6269085cd4d40d99e27a72894573be6285f

Observation f78f2098-d1cf-4a53-908f-c5b6c1a0fdb5 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Unresolved cited work

Reference 38

Resolution
unresolved
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.298295Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:bc73d927f9a4525a167368629d2b4e9f1dad912176dc74043dfd3c88bcb95a8d

Observation d0f4fbf6-8580-4066-9077-5dbbf222257a · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Mathematical Economics , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Mathematical Economics , volume=

Reference 39

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.246913Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:99e06120662a310a456bf54f7037b49e2f042884b87a0627750ee194c7b7fe80

Observation c593f02b-c09a-4e10-bf44-e1ff23322ae1 · outbound

This paper cites American Economic Journal: Microeconomics , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information American Economic Journal: Microeconomics , volume=

Reference 40

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.279734Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:e33c860ce69e63338ccb934268f0e8c39bfc1d9164db72e118fbc8c7296d6dca

Observation 0b5c7719-00ef-4617-8ca0-b2d1b725ff9f · outbound

This paper cites 1970 , publisher=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information 1970 , publisher=

Reference 41

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.224904Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:ad76ef7deb64c8576b6471272e0dcd6ce4a566237c28f583a30a05d3ce226f66

Observation efbd5394-9fd6-44be-8133-1f2cc14c0ee3 · outbound

This paper cites Annals of Economics and Statistics , number=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Annals of Economics and Statistics , number=

Reference 42

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.264404Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:bbd252be5303fef2c91dac1cbba794c939086c04c984155b644a9055b0da25c8

Observation 782fa419-8c45-4bf7-853b-7bebbfdcec75 · outbound

This paper cites The Review of Economic Studies , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information The Review of Economic Studies , volume=

Reference 43

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.305490Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:0576aa3c6f155bc3d796db46ad5baee429680a8c72d0afe61c4284dd2e56595a

Observation 3f1c5cb1-4d15-4af8-a74c-7df7890fd419 · outbound

This paper cites Working paper , year=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Working paper , year=

Reference 44

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.330219Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:bb6511cbd289c5468d0e693f1474207db36af0ddb111b094910e3501e80e1e8f

Observation 8d66fc80-6cb8-4bbe-98ae-92956d7ebd64 · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Political Economy , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Political Economy , volume=

Reference 45

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.326897Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:49ae8da047840257728c2ccc9dc391b86f5738b3d7014ed947c00168d7feb954

Observation 6c91dd42-5690-4b14-a56d-1e3306b74469 · outbound

This paper cites Theoretical Economics , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Theoretical Economics , volume=

Reference 46

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.298050Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:9e73c9a4fce656cade86ac56f9454e699b0cc7d06e4324546a77c362c3e70526

Observation e918fa9d-e4e2-44a1-94a1-35e7c36672f9 · outbound

This paper cites Econometrica , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Econometrica , volume=

Reference 47

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.319605Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:cd2eaada8b2e49f1e167ea21c0ea510c9e71986e5fda4ea52541c64bedf9a576

Observation 1a9dcfc0-447f-4854-9d0a-b7b18291d426 · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Economic Theory , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Economic Theory , volume=

Reference 48

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.367574Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:8b02da516d59bfd192801664321c861e10e2350ee355d3f6e6ed155f61f374ea

Observation 081f2e4f-dac9-4753-935d-4bbff08e5ebe · outbound

This paper cites Theoretical Economics , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Theoretical Economics , volume=

Reference 49

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.368257Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:5a88d1ec232ace6b2c279b03d5b754a5ce942c18a8384e44a2c3ac1d0f0d5a01

Observation ec6c288e-8f29-4719-ac75-2eef532795dc · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Unresolved cited work

Reference 50

Resolution
unresolved
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.376928Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:8cc49e87edd23556772df7d4bebc2ae3b9e2fc1c6fdc0bc16f289a4390c6ba31

Observation 4e043450-34b9-425c-8ddb-d8afbfefcb96 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Unresolved cited work

Reference 51

Resolution
unresolved
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.353446Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:edd31192320012a71fa9081ab485e6e92ea6f2402b77e8b2b4c9ab7cc8f68528

Observation af33ed4c-db2d-4c83-bf68-0e291f55d16d · outbound

This paper cites The American Economic Review , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information The American Economic Review , year =

Reference 52

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.331860Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:c590226bd3b9e06035116593601afbf8ad08597ce682d9aea5b62ecccde78350

Observation d3ad39bf-b0a1-42c1-ade9-69720645bcd0 · outbound

This paper cites The Journal of Law & Economics , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information The Journal of Law & Economics , year =

Reference 53

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.345963Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:43f655deae7ae65d59825bc6442963ff4fae5d0b1b3507b8f19eac6f9c7d733a

Observation 64f009c7-9969-463a-95f4-d3f772c31975 · outbound

This paper cites and Dubra, Juan , title =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information and Dubra, Juan , title =

Reference 54

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.310849Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:847b4a3dee04a5b8568e9ff987fe3653271078051a4ad163598520ecb9870ded

Observation 117c3760-6e67-45d6-97d0-f8793bcbb550 · outbound

This paper cites Accounting Horizons , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Accounting Horizons , year =

Reference 55

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.292966Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:587dbb50ae7775a2105f04ba33d885ade1476a8b04a429e3928febaef3474531

Observation 3c270756-d79f-4cba-bd2a-40026a87d9f7 · outbound

This paper cites The Accounting Review , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information The Accounting Review , year =

Reference 56

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.273276Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:042a2ce7c3aa1b692190bcb1d69f430eb18bdc8c59d075e3986b42119bd2e441

Observation 3b42f996-6056-4a04-8ece-cd9462d60328 · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Economic Theory , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Economic Theory , volume=

Reference 57

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.355237Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:e9768a9b630ce414f62905a723abb7bce5c2ae3c9a2f60a866412e47afca9216

Observation 8b75932a-f497-4ccd-8e0d-483c6f46042a · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Conflict Resolution , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Conflict Resolution , year =

Reference 58

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.358874Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:12368b6505a0af5b0c58403fa4ed8141b26382a3b711e46587a0dfb3d467c571

Observation d1a01b5c-4bf9-4372-87cb-aa2527f21420 · outbound

This paper cites American Journal of Political Science , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information American Journal of Political Science , year =

Reference 59

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.310524Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:6f43d4f5e26ec3579224a5632dddfbf3f564afcc077450cb495f8ab5d2c3b073

Observation a15811cc-38dc-47d7-8bf7-07bbc2dbacd6 · outbound

This paper cites Political Behavior , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Political Behavior , year =

Reference 60

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.332696Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:f1dab1eae87df0c4cbb8e65aa8af4062b5af33ed057a9fb3b6a54d61ec29d731

Observation 95c1706d-1ca3-4e57-a77d-3dce64dc9d7c · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Marketing Communications , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Marketing Communications , year =

Reference 61

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.247339Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:a9a980ee9018b38e72a133e980f85525dec196c4822165316cc17d931cc2ea52

Observation 21697ab0-362c-4e52-b801-16a019a81d0b · outbound

This paper cites American Political Science Review , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information American Political Science Review , year =

Reference 62

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.364908Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:298ce82d0fd4e09dea14420eb4ad70994f10c5f104bd2fa12524abdc2a8a5656

Observation 77395c00-3ff9-447f-ba6a-fb41ae246d26 · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Applied Social Psychology , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Applied Social Psychology , year =

Reference 63

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.268149Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:7565ead926b2c84af8ff2fd407d5595b33ee3d862fad0461e14eb4342b1bb639

Observation 35058a2f-93cb-43bd-8c91-7f50d61a27d5 · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Empirical Generalizations in Marketing , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Empirical Generalizations in Marketing , year =

Reference 64

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.208445Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:0c7539285133e20e9feacd673930526a84144836d3ac8dee0053f8d43c73f56b

Observation ec793bd8-675f-4310-a65a-e1347b98f6b2 · outbound

This paper cites 2010 , author =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information 2010 , author =

Reference 65

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.352628Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:02ee5903be7e57116b8177f6ef26262fe14b153e7332a955d52f40effdbf6ea1

Observation 223a69e0-d77c-4e67-a7b1-e44b90223b00 · outbound

This paper cites The Quarterly Journal of Economics , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information The Quarterly Journal of Economics , year =

Reference 66

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.385994Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:2a700f5d7b228b12f3acc8299393eed5edda7344f74bb7de29c2757bbb74508d

Observation e74b285d-4979-48f3-b219-4dd4b40a1670 · outbound

This paper cites The Bell Journal of Economics , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information The Bell Journal of Economics , year =

Reference 67

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.395184Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:81286f49f6e3ff97acc41abdd6917fe5a29b92bac264dec55c837f0f5428ba86

Observation bf2992be-a64b-4c4a-860a-966d58280ac4 · outbound

This paper cites The Accounting Review , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information The Accounting Review , year =

Reference 68

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.231785Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:e73a764957201f2234f1b10e35ad9898e2b536eca4735afa4f701d4989da871d

Observation a0bbac86-a786-4437-9622-9a587e1db0ea · outbound

This paper cites 1995 , author =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information 1995 , author =

Reference 69

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.258870Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:eb164da42525f8201af712b9fff6de57cf3037977255ea08f2810763f1980f1b

Observation f9681a54-9ccf-4976-ad78-2f9bee3a51e8 · outbound

This paper cites American Economic Review , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information American Economic Review , year =

Reference 70

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.308928Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:6be846a5c52640785c4a362525e8634db2e1352abb39753d56bc0d99a132acef

Observation a3adc8e2-2f9f-4b19-beca-66ac5a42af10 · outbound

This paper cites Econometric Society 10th World Congress , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Econometric Society 10th World Congress , year =

Reference 71

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.267385Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:a61ee01598e3e165717470ebf9fdb6bb492f43752a0f304fd6c9a3e32a37ace1

Observation ce0c683c-1eba-49ac-9d98-175c51e9d1d8 · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Political Economy , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Political Economy , year =

Reference 72

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.314045Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:6704441f8720e0b85e3ab80d6da7474e5e93af1149fb799e2056eb397e2e6378

Observation 6ebd1ccd-71e6-45c5-9da2-38c76480eb70 · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Economic Theory , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Economic Theory , year =

Reference 73

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.323043Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:50b2c46e47b49fa28e4280e3c2c4cdaa3eab461511e3f6eeae34c7b328807d0f

Observation aca94e58-346f-41cb-b353-abc7494117b1 · outbound

This paper cites Persuading voters , journal =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Persuading voters , journal =

Reference 74

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.321322Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:ae46905b634d67a565d6efb3ce1e9d2ee49f265d501e07896d3666555eed23e6

Observation 67b670c7-752a-484a-af23-041a866f707b · outbound

This paper cites Econometrica , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Econometrica , year =

Reference 75

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.307181Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:962f072ad8b7b51a7cc8cc702af4798f1baf2daa551e93d04c26ec66bf3068d6

Observation 20f0a01b-c34a-4aa1-8c9b-ba1a233a811f · outbound

This paper cites American Economic Journal: Microeconomics , Volume =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information American Economic Journal: Microeconomics , Volume =

Reference 76

Resolution
verified exact
doi, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.035741Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:60445eef4eb849f5809b88d67fc23c11e1b80ffe2ad298ce74a56b01158aa117

Observation 18f0338c-cf17-4387-895c-7d89b5e7d33a · outbound

This paper cites Robust implementation in general mechanisms , journal =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Robust implementation in general mechanisms , journal =

Reference 77

Resolution
verified exact
doi, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.041774Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:318bbf7446dd40cd14f734a0bc5f49604490a4ba10e031cfd57b188849af0321

Observation 95fdfed8-0cd2-470d-9bb2-5feee525e803 · outbound

This paper cites Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk , urldate =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk , urldate =

Reference 78

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.324768Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:72d202338404d17f735725a1dc46f1e3fdb6cbfe1a8743a41a8c72d1c7f7a3f9

Observation f475c5d1-a93a-43ea-8ce0-6bb657874564 · outbound

This paper cites American Economic Journal: Microeconomics , year=2019, volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information American Economic Journal: Microeconomics , year=2019, volume=

Reference 79

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.347705Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:c7766eea450bfbd8bda99025432d80091c01f84364ad4144430e2721b9e537d4

Observation 5813d252-e7ea-49ff-bebe-6045944b8b2b · outbound

This paper cites Theoretical Economics , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Theoretical Economics , year =

Reference 80

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.389789Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:2a9b24cafb22e669c9958e3faeefff71c4787c692f924366bc9b6b3a20180072

Observation a801d055-4c5d-4802-800a-6bed9b4188e2 · outbound

This paper cites Available at SSRN 1868066 , year=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Available at SSRN 1868066 , year=

Reference 81

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.281516Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:af53644c653dcfaefecefd29220b5862a69fab0543f8fba2bb9896efed639b47

Observation e4406323-d537-4523-95c4-ce8b79b15117 · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Economic Literature , Volume =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Economic Literature , Volume =

Reference 82

Resolution
verified exact
doi, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.034525Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:1667a682a3f141482c0dfdfda875ced86372997dd02d9eb694b208d3c3e7110d

Observation e718b9de-32f7-4382-a868-4ddd4c82d367 · outbound

This paper cites American Economic Review , Volume =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information American Economic Review , Volume =

Reference 83

Resolution
verified exact
doi, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.033419Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:f5eb8e427b941f2cabc34d1c4dbea2d6583953d7ce2773057cdc0325ed63537f

Observation 6eed5cab-4c84-4b1f-ac14-5e499b226f87 · outbound

This paper cites American Economic Review , Volume =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information American Economic Review , Volume =

Reference 84

Resolution
verified exact
doi, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.028126Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:251b5aad1d553e47baf4658ed7670daa373247107f9bbb569ed2523ce5d63a25

Observation a79e64bf-166d-4ac1-bfdc-9c3b3cd87c26 · outbound

This paper cites Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure , journal =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure , journal =

Reference 85

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.371852Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:dfb965f4176a2b7ec087b2b0a2bc99dff2d3652c93ed90dd235a8f432870ce56

Observation 075c4bf2-f25a-40e9-a40d-893f17376380 · outbound

This paper cites Full revelation of information in Sender--Receiver games of persuasion , journal =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Full revelation of information in Sender--Receiver games of persuasion , journal =

Reference 86

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.345003Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:1993d0633cd2943430835ee056ea5fd4e7dd472717716aab086fd884947687b0

Observation 36fb106a-0035-4c07-855d-45286d437ea5 · outbound

This paper cites A definition , author=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information A definition , author=

Reference 87

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.331037Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:e8f8035571b3fda6155fecb3c0cd7bff39dd86d7f363efe85c98ac9aad773d14

Observation d26d9b9e-a2a3-4363-9d04-4c89ab34a026 · outbound

This paper cites American Economic Review , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information American Economic Review , volume=

Reference 88

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.263516Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:e4b74f6367f1108126a1bffe662e8fed65c98a8455979feb4522ba64f9978277

Observation b657126e-6e9c-49ed-93eb-26d2a1fd5146 · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Economic Theory , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Economic Theory , year =

Reference 89

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.380486Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:3756ff6ae55d63bb12699e371d572cca326287aa5f5b27fc54de98ced8f3bbfc

Observation b3e07c51-0d02-4623-b8ab-61f14286b49c · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Unresolved cited work

Reference 90

Resolution
unresolved
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.294755Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:5723ba882e38ba0aad7076bbce2ef11fd402f98e8e3b7ed94d7417e12f13f657

Observation 846a6176-e581-4e8e-a75a-8872dfe28686 · outbound

This paper cites Dynamic sender--receiver games , journal =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Dynamic sender--receiver games , journal =

Reference 91

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.245543Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:ea93a221fa0fb72104d05861fe5ee08c5204c4fb053418d1454256f231089f05

Observation bc808483-8794-4fc4-8a9a-302fc93c7cda · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Economic Theory , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Economic Theory , year =

Reference 92

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.269891Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:5a6845b3c11b7d233cea0aafe99658d810d026c412ad2f09c806d814b34f7cc6

Observation 227ee572-b140-4d76-a2a7-e730b109ae0b · outbound

This paper cites 2001 , author =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information 2001 , author =

Reference 93

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.360510Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:927e0280c100f2beb76206ccc3748085edd62494f82b0aec534963929044d939

Observation 0b454938-bf2d-4a5f-b4da-53e3bb5fa5d9 · outbound

This paper cites Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society , pages=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society , pages=

Reference 94

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.350946Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:3a188b90ce79f4e121d7e7f3239a31b3c2e18680a313f53aed4f9addaee93d3c

Observation 96549173-c88e-4de7-b8ca-4f9e16ecebe9 · outbound

This paper cites Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society , pages=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society , pages=

Reference 95

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.187716Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:97d17d79581b63dbb67b4ab7f61321033efe7c0a789a0aa4391ad45831b53a24

Observation 1628233d-0f8e-4899-a004-b6c2a085da2b · outbound

This paper cites 2019 , MONTH = Jul, KEYWORDS =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information 2019 , MONTH = Jul, KEYWORDS =

Reference 96

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.364199Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:fc49be7b0b126df356b220898b483d3140024c4c3d9b4518db22dbff54abc642

Observation f11a028f-0d35-4271-944e-84c87e6124fe · outbound

This paper cites Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society , pages=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society , pages=

Reference 97

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.361389Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:39600a3d234c3c38cfaa2d3a66cae5ea7090e5917d0d1a3afce1aef82e4b73b7

Observation 5b5b3949-2221-4d43-b0ab-9d5103559dac · outbound

This paper cites American Economic Review , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information American Economic Review , volume=

Reference 98

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.333502Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:c9c3220770221e1a1d12009833116d06e203fce55c05a9f2edcfda79a7bbe1a8

Observation 22cd9e92-8ffd-4295-af18-f2ca78dcc221 · outbound

This paper cites 2006 , author =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information 2006 , author =

Reference 99

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.285282Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:2d45d1ec87d3ce7ce2ac30d30bf48bf5866e73f75bb04a95e63d06cc09f68fc0

Observation b581b95e-a23a-4d3a-a899-d1ad2a5ca0d1 · outbound

This paper cites Econometrica , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Econometrica , year =

Reference 100

Resolution
verified exact
arxiv_id, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.044999Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:d1281112a75ca68c2efff99dc72c48ff1d909a9f1c09afa68386c36995def1f0

Pith citing papers

No inbound Pith citation observations are available.