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Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Probably Correct Optimal Stable Matching for Two-Sided Markets Under Uncertainty

As of 10 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 0 of 0 outbound references and 2 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2501.03018.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2501.03018 v1

Coverage vector

measured 0 of 0 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links

measured 2 of 2 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00

measured 2 of 2 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-07T11:07:01.454603Z

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: arxiv_reference, observed 2026-07-02T12:36:56.406820Z

Reference resolution

0 of 0 outbound references displayed

  • verified exact0
  • verified fuzzy0
  • unresolved0
  • parse uncertain0
  • malformed identifier0
  • metadata mismatch0

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

No outbound reference observations are available for this paper version.

Pith citing papers

Observation cbad86d3-1cdc-4308-941c-80dc8a179505 · inbound

Learning in Matching Games with Bandit Feedback cites this paper.

Learning in Matching Games with Bandit Feedback Probably Correct Optimal Stable Matching for Two-Sided Markets Under Uncertainty

Reference 3

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T11:07:01.454603Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-07T11:07:01.454603Z digest=sha256:fb09d33662e0b1c1775560fde259dc37ba94d16666b14ac0bc0600660a11716c

Observation 1205ccdc-f1d7-4407-a050-d9f20e96a36d · inbound

Learn to Match: Two-Sided Matching with Temporally Extended Feedback cites this paper.

Learn to Match: Two-Sided Matching with Temporally Extended Feedback Probably Correct Optimal Stable Matching for Two-Sided Markets Under Uncertainty

Reference 5

Resolution
verified exact
arxiv_id, observed 2026-07-02T12:36:56.409339Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-28T02:02:59.456136Z digest=sha256:0dec2da4f76b8ca3ddcf7b9ffac53160ce3e53dd1d88b42a357032675c4516b6