Pith. sign in

Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization

As of 20 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 84 of 84 outbound references and 2 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2411.13513.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2411.13513 v1

Coverage vector

measured 84 of 84 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.105728Z

measured 86 of 86 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00

measured 2 of 2 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:20.716950Z

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: arxiv_reference, observed 2026-05-11T04:55:56.198677Z

Reference resolution

84 of 84 outbound references displayed

  • verified exact3
  • verified fuzzy71
  • unresolved10
  • parse uncertain0
  • malformed identifier0
  • metadata mismatch0

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

Observation cfda2087-c529-4e9c-9b9b-09c481c9cf58 · outbound

This paper cites Budget-feasible mechanism design for non- monotone submodular objectives: Offline and online.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Budget-feasible mechanism design for non- monotone submodular objectives: Offline and online

Reference 1

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:19.739735Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.739735Z digest=sha256:e744e3c03e784561d7adcc3fc371ec54b0f312b93d19dafd5da7f23394be6707

Observation dc3a5b86-1aa9-4f07-bd46-5f165e763b14 · outbound

This paper cites Mechanism design for crowdsourcing: An optimal 1- 1/e competitive budget-feasible mechanism for large markets.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Mechanism design for crowdsourcing: An optimal 1- 1/e competitive budget-feasible mechanism for large markets

Reference 2

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:19.744791Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.744791Z digest=sha256:bb9dabf4137621fac1c99dd1cd417df12658fce1035c800b576bb833ea17220c

Observation fc447c2d-5d4f-47d7-95ad-f7d99ca70d4f · outbound

This paper cites Frugal path mechanisms.ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG), 3(1):1–22, 2007.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Frugal path mechanisms.ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG), 3(1):1–22, 2007

Reference 3

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:19.749376Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.749376Z digest=sha256:d9890adceebfeb886f5b6be5a895eb5418116b4dda856e1c84fbf13bc61ebf4b

Observation 20995da9-42e0-42aa-ba2f-5df2e2b3f259 · outbound

This paper cites Deterministic budget-feasible clock auctions.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Deterministic budget-feasible clock auctions

Reference 4

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:19.754027Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.754027Z digest=sha256:ba90180a384f663216f2a5b397d6ff78b542d5abc08d3cb458619602fd850223

Observation bddea676-1df9-44c5-8092-91dad0d4c627 · outbound

This paper cites Bayesian Incentive Compatibility via Fractional Assignments.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Bayesian Incentive Compatibility via Fractional Assignments

Reference 5

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:21.272719Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.758602Z digest=sha256:0780ce98f784e4ca4f7b7ea685f0102c04ba40fc37c2a1f7a7e4e4b8b0bcae8b

Observation af5d73f3-ca36-4461-b502-27dd51a4edd8 · outbound

This paper cites Budget feasible mechanism design: from prior-free to bayesian.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Budget feasible mechanism design: from prior-free to bayesian

Reference 6

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:21.258584Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.762998Z digest=sha256:fee57072393319b56bf5eba1ae63310496b5d442853e1b55b8d5ff96ebe7036f

Observation 912a3663-3049-418f-ae07-e98bbb1e4d31 · outbound

This paper cites Worst-case mechanism design via bayesian analysis.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Worst-case mechanism design via bayesian analysis

Reference 7

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:21.244290Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.767947Z digest=sha256:c2f187303e09515a513ee7ea89f1b445debb2600c7f41cb7b5183020eab0210c

Observation a9f2a05b-3934-47fb-86aa-d3d27dbdb11f · outbound

This paper cites Industrial procurement auctions.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Industrial procurement auctions

Reference 8

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:21.229980Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.772277Z digest=sha256:a951f3943a58b0fdc65ff2460e18201b71db104d7b116cfcd180cfbe1e9d9eee

Observation 1b72bc9f-7b22-4642-8e7a-c1ce7df93fd8 · outbound

This paper cites (almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading.Games and Economic Behavior, 130:369–383, 2021.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization (almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading.Games and Economic Behavior, 130:369–383, 2021

Reference 9

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:21.216519Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.776816Z digest=sha256:36c1f48b1e64d9bfa5a2bfe551e74962fe0bff0f140c852903df6e072304ed38

Observation 16963dc4-fc71-4800-9ef9-c2bf9a0ac0c2 · outbound

This paper cites Approximating gains-from-trade in bilateral trading.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Approximating gains-from-trade in bilateral trading

Reference 10

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:21.202631Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.781152Z digest=sha256:737e2c495f534a209abf3c8e7a8cc51e811c8657bea83e6886ff40fcae6200ec

Observation be573ae8-bb82-4af8-abce-9b266156de59 · outbound

This paper cites Approximating gains from trade in two-sided markets via simple mechanisms.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Approximating gains from trade in two-sided markets via simple mechanisms

Reference 11

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:21.188348Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.785545Z digest=sha256:3bc7cb6631b08d3108dda94afbadb1eb12b7a1203e559e51ffde503a9cd997b4

Observation 9f7a13cd-b318-4865-85b5-e1a9de5fca2b · outbound

This paper cites Government procurement solutions, 2024.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Government procurement solutions, 2024

Reference 12

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:21.174354Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.789943Z digest=sha256:88717d064b3f172d3ae2fe73b2e850db0fa0c36c4499acd11736a37690b986b3

Observation c90c46c4-5666-4cb5-9081-66f5b8d5beb2 · outbound

This paper cites An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms

Reference 13

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:21.160709Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.794112Z digest=sha256:432141d1eca34099e78c7da3438ec67bea846a11be70c217f3c74a2bd68621bc

Observation 33b9e0e5-217a-4dad-ab16-ec691154cbd9 · outbound

This paper cites Optimalmulti-dimensionalmechanism design: Reducing revenue to welfare maximization.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Optimalmulti-dimensionalmechanism design: Reducing revenue to welfare maximization

Reference 14

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:21.146635Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.798512Z digest=sha256:a375885d1d80721fc4b1cfc2e756bbf23e2f2441220441e11644dc9b681dbfd7

Observation a39ddc35-96b3-44b7-9cd5-44d7f670d322 · outbound

This paper cites Reducing revenue to welfare maximization: Approximation algorithms and other generalizations.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Reducing revenue to welfare maximization: Approximation algorithms and other generalizations

Reference 15

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:21.132490Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.803104Z digest=sha256:e95a850d6708d8d1d6c96c11d970f071d6955b7d633e97020752bb9fe4ed49ef

Observation b28c4389-087c-47f1-9c5a-808b33a8e0e0 · outbound

This paper cites Understanding incentives: Mechanism designbecomesalgorithmdesign.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Understanding incentives: Mechanism designbecomesalgorithmdesign

Reference 16

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:21.118192Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.807442Z digest=sha256:be400fd8ade66c59c32b495338d518a96cea3494c949cb5f15b2fe1d75c31878

Observation 503086f9-0035-4ce8-90b8-5fc5ee96b173 · outbound

This paper cites On multi-dimensional gains from trade maximization.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization On multi-dimensional gains from trade maximization

Reference 17

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:21.104546Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.811759Z digest=sha256:b8eec837806b6cb619f166c29e9d9987e6284c0ad6089747388cec79fdf5cff2

Observation 192a17d2-edcf-41f2-b3d7-43dfe6d08349 · outbound

This paper cites Auctions for structured procurement.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Auctions for structured procurement

Reference 18

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:21.090899Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.816220Z digest=sha256:b790b49f7652ea6ce20597c47870bfd8201b9494b7c21723ba00e66c02d4fdcc

Observation 28ef63da-e2e5-4aa7-938b-16f2625b4ad2 · outbound

This paper cites On the limits of black-box reductions in mechanism design.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization On the limits of black-box reductions in mechanism design

Reference 19

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:21.076433Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.820692Z digest=sha256:60962513ef04c730ca31db75123eadade4349803a1e4fa8d7c21d9dfa99e92d5

Observation 49de3d76-06d8-4f08-8d4d-d4b38d6518d0 · outbound

This paper cites On the approximability of budget feasible mechanisms.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization On the approximability of budget feasible mechanisms

Reference 20

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:21.062441Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.824803Z digest=sha256:828b0f3efb20ee14c2f925952d5ac00cb029d13b4a035ce44404403eccf975f7

Observation 072346fb-f94b-47f0-80a7-5fda85e90486 · outbound

This paper cites Multipart pricing of public goods.Public choice, 11(1):17–33, 1971.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Multipart pricing of public goods.Public choice, 11(1):17–33, 1971

Reference 21

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:21.048498Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.829160Z digest=sha256:dd175ec0d20e0269fb0ca16744ced5d53ab844b6ce5588a66d5f332ba96299c8

Observation ff63dab7-48ce-4726-a88e-a692a0a06940 · outbound

This paper cites Approximately efficient double auctions with strong budget balance.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Approximately efficient double auctions with strong budget balance

Reference 22

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:21.034085Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.833536Z digest=sha256:8500a69e4548a4ab3ace8c9775c7cd0727c4b45e57830f8d61419b6c895aa9b2

Observation e965251b-a068-49dd-a869-5f13788f47e5 · outbound

This paper cites Approximately efficient two-sided combinatorial auctions.ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC), 8(1):1–29, 2020.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Approximately efficient two-sided combinatorial auctions.ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC), 8(1):1–29, 2020

Reference 23

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:21.020513Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.837760Z digest=sha256:9414514df16a9705101927a88465912416c2c42313e34dc2251863651ef852b9

Observation 6d442f33-fda2-45d0-9cf4-a28d8a4c18f1 · outbound

This paper cites Approximately efficient bilateral trade.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Approximately efficient bilateral trade

Reference 24

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:21.006904Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.842070Z digest=sha256:57ee73ff54a92aaa35bf2276839dbb7aa9b251c7e53942a7483a673ce06be726

Observation 60ab939d-7a7d-4d42-bf6e-a5c7bcb0e93c · outbound

This paper cites Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Cambridge University Press, 2006

Reference 25

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.992982Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.846449Z digest=sha256:a00acc434dabc9f7f1fa1f458e20ba0cc5e64b6b4da8b4839a6e31c82ab39feb

Observation aadedcd7-eb28-4f6e-99ff-00cbfeba9305 · outbound

This paper cites Mechanisms for complement-free procurement.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Mechanisms for complement-free procurement

Reference 26

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.979170Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.850639Z digest=sha256:1de57f848e00bebe57edb39c8d9636da3c34c65e426f0a68072d5766ff3577a3

Observation bc758076-26b3-4010-80b9-99bb0746f91c · outbound

This paper cites Bernoulli factories and black-box reductions in mechanism design.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Bernoulli factories and black-box reductions in mechanism design

Reference 27

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.965287Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.854937Z digest=sha256:8caefb2261277fa49aba8b1d3e79b3085555d7ded68d28decf82c7c8b6b1f13c

Observation fcab7727-5a9a-4d15-982d-61da7c6700d7 · outbound

This paper cites Optimal and differen- tially private data acquisition: Central and local mechanisms.Operations Research, 2023.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Optimal and differen- tially private data acquisition: Central and local mechanisms.Operations Research, 2023

Reference 28

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.951416Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.859344Z digest=sha256:b735cd1230585cf62879e91524c30389431ba0a9fc74b116e50cac1a5a0e5760

Observation 0e57861f-de54-4106-a9a7-7352c5814fea · outbound

This paper cites Improved approximation to first-best gains-from-trade.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Improved approximation to first-best gains-from-trade

Reference 29

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.936117Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.863566Z digest=sha256:8014ab3f4bde4e8b0e02cd6874e035a4b00264f5e1368cf04c24660bff1f716f

Observation 89f834d3-921f-47eb-b11d-e8181fa08182 · outbound

This paper cites A combinatorial allocation mechanism with penalties for banner advertising.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization A combinatorial allocation mechanism with penalties for banner advertising

Reference 30

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.921697Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.867621Z digest=sha256:9ed479f93d8056f547c68b4210de1c4eca88a765e000a5dbe0c3285b07b7940c

Observation 1e4d7888-79a0-44b2-8a12-54fb28b31c0b · outbound

This paper cites A threshold of ln n for approximating set cover.Journal of the ACM (JACM), 45(4): 634–652, 1998.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization A threshold of ln n for approximating set cover.Journal of the ACM (JACM), 45(4): 634–652, 1998

Reference 31

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.907667Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.871936Z digest=sha256:265086c287e07153280fae627d62680dd100754405d98a64ac60819844c4b1f8

Observation 07d5fc9a-5542-431e-bf62-0528ee810e30 · outbound

This paper cites Maximizing non-monotone submodular functions.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Maximizing non-monotone submodular functions

Reference 32

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.893002Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.876244Z digest=sha256:9006448c994fab19a9fa46a9f4c5a48d6bbbe4f617e7f1032650ab4547731598

Observation eb676fdb-fe1d-4e70-a8fe-fca7df346577 · outbound

This paper cites Pass approximation: A framework for analyzing and designing heuristics.Algorithmica, 66:450–478, 2013.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Pass approximation: A framework for analyzing and designing heuristics.Algorithmica, 66:450–478, 2013

Reference 33

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.878034Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.880585Z digest=sha256:0d4e50775071e48c8ace27d9ff86ff0395e1520f104b63a6b8633f5222e15c88

Observation 85656f6c-5a3e-48b4-9715-09d08cda6029 · outbound

This paper cites Guess free maximization of submodular and linear sums.Algorithmica, 83(3): 853–878, 2021.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Guess free maximization of submodular and linear sums.Algorithmica, 83(3): 853–878, 2021

Reference 34

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.862055Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.884947Z digest=sha256:d6d08660499e189a36e519a530ac0663ef84f22b2de3ea35502570ce5f7fe7bc

Observation 635b7c44-4929-4ef2-b0ad-b30e6e177a51 · outbound

This paper cites Conditional equilibrium outcomes via ascending price processes with applications to combinatorial auctions with item bidding.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Conditional equilibrium outcomes via ascending price processes with applications to combinatorial auctions with item bidding

Reference 35

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.847102Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.889411Z digest=sha256:b12f3144b7694b705f6446f2a4ca5fcdfc607c56aa082fba7648b8eb6e1fd166

Observation 382bb432-8760-45dc-ad39-56a828b52ac0 · outbound

This paper cites Bicriteria algorithms for maximizing the difference between submodular function and linear function under noise.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Bicriteria algorithms for maximizing the difference between submodular function and linear function under noise

Reference 36

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.832461Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.893926Z digest=sha256:1c97dfc2ac7532f16cf874f6ab9cc268456b71f6daa89d7bc32cc81b729546cc

Observation 4757f3fb-8a55-446e-9907-39a68f36aa51 · outbound

This paper cites A multi-pass streaming algorithm for regularized submodular maximization.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization A multi-pass streaming algorithm for regularized submodular maximization

Reference 37

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.817594Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.898899Z digest=sha256:ce96014ea3b20cb6376d75c1b7c69870634c99d97e7209d458f1b946d4de58c5

Observation a918a21c-2693-4e68-88db-07fef858f648 · outbound

This paper cites Algorithms for maximizing monotone submodular function minus modular function under noise.Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, 45(4):96, 2023.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Algorithms for maximizing monotone submodular function minus modular function under noise.Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, 45(4):96, 2023

Reference 38

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.802233Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.903174Z digest=sha256:bcfcd37c8b93c9ee113c74907e0486e97ac8629dfcd3b36fb364881246930c29

Observation 7e51d944-f1c2-4ed4-8031-9dfc01d43584 · outbound

This paper cites Incentives in teams.Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 617–631, 1973.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Incentives in teams.Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 617–631, 1973

Reference 39

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:19.907293Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.907293Z digest=sha256:3179f784f0624bd714399ab666376223dedebba6f2f8b9c8b32d3f45f8424b9e

Observation 3cf1f211-475e-4583-b149-173362955c97 · outbound

This paper cites Triple eagle: Simple, fast and practical budget-feasible mechanisms.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Triple eagle: Simple, fast and practical budget-feasible mechanisms

Reference 40

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.777645Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.911425Z digest=sha256:4c7d64f5f18ef090ecfcef1ef9918c9cb86d157bead1c57880e7924b795f4932

Observation 111cf3b5-3921-43ac-9dfa-794107025838 · outbound

This paper cites Submodular maximization beyond non-negativity: Guarantees, fast algorithms, and applications.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Submodular maximization beyond non-negativity: Guarantees, fast algorithms, and applications

Reference 41

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.763564Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.915559Z digest=sha256:a616bc6481125b68396785353114a0600f5b22b791cb1715f26b3a68a8bd8211

Observation d05878e1-6e25-4282-bbb3-7ebf2dbd0905 · outbound

This paper cites Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings

Reference 42

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.749449Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.919744Z digest=sha256:a1fcaf27c90e228526b2b01826b84fb1f86852695aa71852b02787edeb341fcd

Observation 76bb0db7-7272-477b-9ac8-526ba8e814c8 · outbound

This paper cites Hartline and Brendan Lucier.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Hartline and Brendan Lucier

Reference 43

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.734913Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.923883Z digest=sha256:06a52b81f355f152aa472a5ad3e4da33bf997c9d1d986df7dfa2d1576374a7c1

Observation a74b1ae4-7330-4ab1-956c-1f2824a0493f · outbound

This paper cites Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings

Reference 44

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.720925Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.928279Z digest=sha256:a84be7b75a4b4340d3c882e7667d4bf3dcdd624d8335dcf40fbc9ca10a7c87da

Observation 29bf4968-c41b-4736-aae9-aa190cada6c0 · outbound

This paper cites Maximization of approximately submodular functions.Advances in neural information processing systems, 29, 2016.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Maximization of approximately submodular functions.Advances in neural information processing systems, 29, 2016

Reference 45

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.706515Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.932579Z digest=sha256:8d60dc027b300565191a1839ff6f7c6b881ca940208bc2bc2266da429cfc0939

Observation 6071620c-6c1c-4e80-abc8-d1e03fc822f0 · outbound

This paper cites Simple and efficient budget feasible mechanisms for monotone submodular valuations.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Simple and efficient budget feasible mechanisms for monotone submodular valuations

Reference 46

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.691948Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.936821Z digest=sha256:5f768d411d7d9c2b1c552c011091f3f2ab75774f305cdada138514d48294917c

Observation c089f70a-963d-4a6c-9dc9-cbe96515a13b · outbound

This paper cites Unconstrained submodular maximization with modular costs: Tight approximation and application to profit maximization.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Unconstrained submodular maximization with modular costs: Tight approximation and application to profit maximization

Reference 47

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.677813Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.941325Z digest=sha256:612e1a3f6d9a92876dcec7d3ac014eea07b87fbd834843e21fee6402d4188f7d

Observation d2cc6ff8-792d-4314-ba48-7e47d1135fd5 · outbound

This paper cites Beyond vcg: Frugality of truthful mechanisms.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Beyond vcg: Frugality of truthful mechanisms

Reference 48

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.663962Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.945623Z digest=sha256:a2b77ce81d2ea5fc05bd1acf949c474f6af001fd39b4f9adbd95a5cc47ac5e9d

Observation bb92b314-ac13-45bd-87a1-732cc1feb0a1 · outbound

This paper cites Regularized submodular maximization at scale.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Regularized submodular maximization at scale

Reference 49

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.650531Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.949914Z digest=sha256:2bfc64100d664eb1c5c5ebe5f6e05bd13a6fc522ce7720979c9bf1b442be9cb3

Observation a383b3ce-4b34-4b89-b439-70610d7f278f · outbound

This paper cites Job matching, coalition formation, and gross substitutes.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Job matching, coalition formation, and gross substitutes

Reference 50

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.636211Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.954379Z digest=sha256:8853050272708f5f6dc751925c0eb4ddc5c123491ac788d5ffba8e7103d77d35

Observation 43ba7fae-7abf-46a5-bded-f986314d84f0 · outbound

This paper cites Frugal and truthful auctions for vertex covers, flows and cuts.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Frugal and truthful auctions for vertex covers, flows and cuts

Reference 51

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.622157Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.958748Z digest=sha256:36b0bc8d5d4299368c8120e97742e245581f66dfb271828d7a010da9c0906da3

Observation 20da651f-ec3e-4378-9c7f-4d8ade84c2ae · outbound

This paper cites Segmentation problems.Journal of the ACM (JACM), 51(2):263–280, 2004.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Segmentation problems.Journal of the ACM (JACM), 51(2):263–280, 2004

Reference 52

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.608066Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.963656Z digest=sha256:0e12722a89314238d9aed4673a97acfdbc6af432d93b50376720e500f584976c

Observation bbf89ba3-9bf0-43be-a336-55740a9c6d62 · outbound

This paper cites Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities

Reference 53

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.593779Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.967984Z digest=sha256:d316ac314501d42eeb5c727f5f2b59d4c48a33d1a78d1ec07466a7170440cad7

Observation b3f98c59-f16f-4961-843a-3669065be5eb · outbound

This paper cites Obviously strategy-proof mechanisms.American Economic Review, 107(11):3257–3287, 2017.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Obviously strategy-proof mechanisms.American Economic Review, 107(11):3257–3287, 2017

Reference 54

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.578574Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.972378Z digest=sha256:2fc5d45c06c1fdc464eb9d687ab829aebab76785f0b38d7dfbc77b2502175a56

Observation 44fe4cce-08b1-4324-9781-a783d2eb1031 · outbound

This paper cites Regularized nonmonotone submodular maximization.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Regularized nonmonotone submodular maximization

Reference 55

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.562845Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.976555Z digest=sha256:ea3cb113ea0dbdf3bed5e5b656847f1c0ee4a7ee76a95e485062a1ec612e7e6d

Observation 2e110c00-f9ea-4f63-81aa-17690a878e0d · outbound

This paper cites Streaming algorithms for maximizing the difference of submodular functions and the sum of submodular and supermodular functions.Optimization Letters, pages 1–25, 2023.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Streaming algorithms for maximizing the difference of submodular functions and the sum of submodular and supermodular functions.Optimization Letters, pages 1–25, 2023

Reference 56

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.548726Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.981152Z digest=sha256:ad5044892703a2cfdbdf80fb9d83d498a3aa57326b7036e38d4856b0157e3ae4

Observation 4aeb1e97-bd41-480e-9eee-4e4f7a52afcb · outbound

This paper cites A dominant strategy double auction.Journal of economic Theory, 56(2):434–450, 1992.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization A dominant strategy double auction.Journal of economic Theory, 56(2):434–450, 1992

Reference 57

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.534456Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.985441Z digest=sha256:24b67dab84a73f06232b939eeb3f6157590a13bba6d3ffeeaa0ec18a719cbb87

Observation e6ed7939-403d-4400-8bef-51264673daaa · outbound

This paper cites Accelerated greedy algorithms for maximizing submodular set functions.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Accelerated greedy algorithms for maximizing submodular set functions

Reference 58

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.520633Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.989962Z digest=sha256:6274a78582e788a996802e4fe2dc19de248bd0dc66e3a26877cee75ab3a6e41c

Observation 137d6bd0-ad1b-48b8-8368-f8d93535f216 · outbound

This paper cites Submodular+ concave.Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, 34:11577–11591, 2021.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Submodular+ concave.Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, 34:11577–11591, 2021

Reference 59

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.506037Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.994044Z digest=sha256:2a667c55330620b973ab4acc1a4284864f8af00ac59f87b1b713731584a40cb5

Observation 27c8bc28-55d1-40e5-af50-ac209bf6eeb8 · outbound

This paper cites Optimal auction design.Mathematics of operations research, 6(1):58–73, 1981.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Optimal auction design.Mathematics of operations research, 6(1):58–73, 1981

Reference 60

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:19.998492Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:19.998492Z digest=sha256:d6a2b8e6579e34390566824e3ed11de538b1097217d3d116edd83701791e4c70

Observation aaf22045-8de9-4f2a-b51a-e35a483a1c84 · outbound

This paper cites Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading.Journal of economic theory, 29(2):265–281, 1983.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading.Journal of economic theory, 29(2):265–281, 1983

Reference 61

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.482749Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:20.002834Z digest=sha256:4203111676b30a01a0e9388dce217995ed0e3bb173044f928e76e6efb089354e

Observation 9f22f1d9-f157-4c5f-b9e0-695718471d64 · outbound

This paper cites An analysis of approximations for maximizing submodular set functions—i.Mathematical programming, 14:265–294, 1978.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization An analysis of approximations for maximizing submodular set functions—i.Mathematical programming, 14:265–294, 1978

Reference 62

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.007093Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:20.007093Z digest=sha256:e5fe69721e6b4571ceb0b5dc27ada04f089617ca57852de7a08a0a49a95bb124

Observation dc882e56-004c-457b-8050-ab49ec7eaad6 · outbound

This paper cites An efficient framework for balancing submodularity and cost.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization An efficient framework for balancing submodularity and cost

Reference 63

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.459499Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:20.011464Z digest=sha256:48c52ac882e1cdee52557003c271475fd23ca30f5577a7fa6267f05e67cb1fab

Observation 5ee78cbe-3fd7-4ce7-a068-02b0e51a1423 · outbound

This paper cites Algorithmic mechanism design.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Algorithmic mechanism design

Reference 64

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.445649Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:20.016007Z digest=sha256:320d1310a4bb0c89c2657576b1ace158c4c88a72d05fac561dffa6f208afc9ca

Observation e26197ea-1e12-42a5-b7db-53134cb9da85 · outbound

This paper cites Government Publishing Office.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Government Publishing Office

Reference 65

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.431610Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:20.020424Z digest=sha256:ad76911f4f48a12f2cbc18e54a170086cf7acb3f7110a73a1b060744772b9855

Observation 3f556942-d8de-47cc-89e3-2f75bdd9948c · outbound

This paper cites Gross substitutability: An algorithmic survey.Games and Economic Behavior, 106:294–316, 2017.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Gross substitutability: An algorithmic survey.Games and Economic Behavior, 106:294–316, 2017

Reference 66

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.417903Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:20.024842Z digest=sha256:9dc91af7d0cfbde3e034f462143943dc49180c9d850f1e61a9c2a535bb0ef954

Observation 84a5d5aa-df36-4d1d-aefb-8fae398fbca0 · outbound

This paper cites Nonbossy Mechanisms: Mechanism Design Robust to Secondary Goals.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Nonbossy Mechanisms: Mechanism Design Robust to Secondary Goals

Reference 67

Resolution
verified exact
local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.190263Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:20.029265Z digest=sha256:fc860ea432753a7b9d17f04e4be829e9c634399d1e1fcf9030255d16e59bac95

Observation e894fc7a-c00a-49e7-8603-431f15939d02 · outbound

This paper cites Optimization, approximation, and complexity classes.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Optimization, approximation, and complexity classes

Reference 68

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.403685Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:20.034210Z digest=sha256:6e19ad3b56213586bf187cbb81c4e7068a0b83f6d437f38a19e014993a1470e1

Observation 58c3b278-0ee8-4295-be50-0299f6c1d519 · outbound

This paper cites On maximizing sums of non-monotone submodular and linear functions.Algorithmica, pages 1–55, 2023.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization On maximizing sums of non-monotone submodular and linear functions.Algorithmica, pages 1–55, 2023

Reference 69

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.390117Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:20.038667Z digest=sha256:56d672fa7553e4362ac8b5a18dbc62a3dceab84b9462772e23d29b2c181cdc82

Observation 2e22370b-4806-47a1-82dc-b11d6199a810 · outbound

This paper cites Conducting truthful surveys, cheaply.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Conducting truthful surveys, cheaply

Reference 70

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.375386Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:20.042968Z digest=sha256:96341a67e090076ef1dd1a5cc706b5ca8566a444347992792b5081f22e273abf

Observation 2ea7d63c-679b-44d9-9a2d-91ca64940036 · outbound

This paper cites ingredients.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization ingredients

Reference 71

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.359543Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:20.047389Z digest=sha256:665c3b112f1df85f398fe45d4e52017c074160e14e36259a45e0c422c63f7467

Observation a8830ce4-40cd-4a13-bd23-a7cf76854d73 · outbound

This paper cites Budget feasible mechanisms.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Budget feasible mechanisms

Reference 72

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.345705Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:20.051884Z digest=sha256:727580256eaec0cb94c2f3478cb0337fc28507210fe56f1f1b9dac474720e494

Observation 47fb4000-dea4-44d3-89db-9214b1651c38 · outbound

This paper cites Pricing mechanisms for crowdsourcing markets.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Pricing mechanisms for crowdsourcing markets

Reference 73

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.331392Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:20.056185Z digest=sha256:e1855f41951d7205729e5b28f1f0f0c7eb66ddf16872bc66cc8455a77e9c320c

Observation 751fc9a4-8389-4f58-a97b-d6939ed3013f · outbound

This paper cites Optimal approximation for submodular and supermodular optimization with bounded curvature.Mathematics of Operations Research, 42(4): 1197–1218, 2017.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Optimal approximation for submodular and supermodular optimization with bounded curvature.Mathematics of Operations Research, 42(4): 1197–1218, 2017

Reference 74

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.317322Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:20.060392Z digest=sha256:916048fc768bb45f9a9d1243f9e8e1c0a703c61f21cb0f85ebaa60ae2d723d32

Observation d4067b56-f011-4899-91a1-a6e9553a9307 · outbound

This paper cites The price of truth: Frugality in truthful mechanisms.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization The price of truth: Frugality in truthful mechanisms

Reference 75

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.302938Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:20.064653Z digest=sha256:3452e5f4d31b632902661746562843f26eee930457806b3abe5f63554ef529f4

Observation 8c682223-94d4-4892-a6d8-9c2dfcc0f3f2 · outbound

This paper cites Adaptive Regularized Submodular Maximization.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Adaptive Regularized Submodular Maximization

Reference 76

Resolution
verified exact
local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.170242Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:20.069162Z digest=sha256:618d4ee47f4dfb7f59e13f6d0651a647ada073b7b7a92d29395c1077d16bed22

Observation d6846fca-012a-4d8f-8ba3-0bf8c386f8ba · outbound

This paper cites Submodular Optimization Beyond Nonnegativity: Adaptive Seed Selection in Incentivized Social Advertising.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Submodular Optimization Beyond Nonnegativity: Adaptive Seed Selection in Incentivized Social Advertising

Reference 77

Resolution
verified exact
local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.149765Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:20.073940Z digest=sha256:250b982963d2f0250d6f585ee6cdf965780478d7139dc927e35938ff092508d6

Observation be8c6d41-34b0-4133-ab14-bd8a595bf6c1 · outbound

This paper cites Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders.The Journal of Finance, 16(1):8–37, 1961.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders.The Journal of Finance, 16(1):8–37, 1961

Reference 78

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.078884Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:20.078884Z digest=sha256:1cbe8dd05e7966ad05e5ee7b811d93212baae8a7adcb06e7e32352a6f9e017ae

Observation 3006e247-ab99-40aa-b9c3-cec42b6bb27a · outbound

This paper cites Online bicriteria algorithms to balance coverage and cost in team formation.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Online bicriteria algorithms to balance coverage and cost in team formation

Reference 79

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.278408Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:20.083325Z digest=sha256:965c8140488fe3eec506a518f5afd77fe29ef0197e54f764dac14f49ea324aec

Observation 32d827ef-e558-4242-a3f5-39d29409bc6e · outbound

This paper cites On maximizing the difference between an approximately submodular function and a linear function subject to a matroid constraint.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization On maximizing the difference between an approximately submodular function and a linear function subject to a matroid constraint

Reference 80

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.263472Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:20.087490Z digest=sha256:6652d75b9e9e1c7958c8e59fa76edf4243265404c99f5c3f11a1f83feddb4128

Observation ed0108f1-4967-4e6e-b001-fbec8b34e274 · outbound

This paper cites Recently, Brustle et al.[11] provided a simple mechanism that gives a1/2−approximation to GFT under arbitrary distributions.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Recently, Brustle et al.[11] provided a simple mechanism that gives a1/2−approximation to GFT under arbitrary distributions

Reference 81

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.249094Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:20.091795Z digest=sha256:719ea69e032a1bab98c89ef2ff679140aece64ab10dae4f01cc161979e020a80

Observation 8a011db7-65a2-4f15-9237-a934b1b06ca6 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Unresolved cited work

Reference 82

Resolution
unresolved
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.233840Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:20.096620Z digest=sha256:9cc4168e285106c6c607dec08957f67d565a8764caa66af862f125796de90972

Observation 406c919a-eb0e-444f-b5c0-f89ff643f61f · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization Unresolved cited work

Reference 83

Resolution
unresolved
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.219685Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:20.100995Z digest=sha256:bf2e0e18b59111fe6d078195d24ccccec4473290d73add2cf435aa3b1c6033ca

Observation ab2d2cc8-ac71-4065-9b33-6b9ff224991e · outbound

This paper cites First, we recall a negative result from [34].

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization First, we recall a negative result from [34]

Reference 84

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-12T16:27:20.205281Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T16:27:20.105728Z digest=sha256:4949ec56c3ce0fe2cee36fe3a917ce06c6038d91fcab0822904951fb22109e4f

Pith citing papers

Observation 53a96779-0ea2-4f5e-a62a-5df93b8c06ca · inbound

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization cites this paper.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization

Reference 34

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:20.716950Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:20.716950Z digest=sha256:91514ce13e9b04cef5cd85543066f9b5b1168842ade8644a9ee8f6e68d72ea6e

Observation ba511367-7c89-4dd3-a6ce-c0fc36e0a8b7 · inbound

Pricing, Matching, and Bundling: an Equilibrium Analysis of Online Platforms cites this paper.

Pricing, Matching, and Bundling: an Equilibrium Analysis of Online Platforms Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization

Reference 207

Resolution
verified exact
arxiv_id, observed 2026-05-11T04:55:56.202582Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-05-11T01:00:26.562282Z digest=sha256:02666157837821ba995b905f8d8d9616077a63521f9f6c7e65b484fe9b5ce617