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Simple Proof of Security of the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution Protocol
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We prove the security of the 1984 protocol of Bennett and Brassard (BB84) for quantum key distribution. We first give a key distribution protocol based on entanglement purification, which can be proven secure using methods from Lo and Chau's proof of security for a similar protocol. We then show that the security of this protocol implies the security of BB84. The entanglement-purification based protocol uses Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) codes, and properties of these codes are used to remove the use of quantum computation from the Lo-Chau protocol.
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Optimal fidelity estimation when one state is pure via algorithmic Uhlmann transform
When at least one of two quantum states is pure, the Uhlmann fidelity can be estimated with Θ(1/ε) queries and Θ(1/ε²) samples without knowing which state is pure, matching the optimal lower bounds.
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