Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

The Battling Influencers Game: Nash Equilibria Structure of a Potential Game and Implications to Value Alignment

As of 10 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 25 of 25 outbound references and 1 inbound Pith citation observation for arXiv:2502.01127.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2502.01127 v3

Coverage vector

measured 25 of 25 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-09T16:38:06.695681Z

measured 26 of 26 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00

measured 1 of 1 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-07T22:50:33.223884Z

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: pith, observed 2026-08-07T22:50:34.984924Z

Reference resolution

25 of 25 outbound references displayed

verified exact0
verified fuzzy7
unresolved18
parse uncertain0
malformed identifier0
metadata mismatch0

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

Observation 7b273ac9-1b06-4b66-85e4-86f70ffb78cf · outbound

This paper cites write newline.

The Battling Influencers Game: Nash Equilibria Structure of a Potential Game and Implications to Value Alignment write newline

Reference 1

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-09T16:38:06.600457Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation e5675758-5276-4812-89e0-376ea48049dc · outbound

This paper cites Fine-tuning language models to find agreement among humans with diverse preferences.

The Battling Influencers Game: Nash Equilibria Structure of a Potential Game and Implications to Value Alignment Fine-tuning language models to find agreement among humans with diverse preferences

Reference 2

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-09T16:38:06.605681Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 4fb34fac-36ce-43c7-8f3a-8c4677a0a2d9 · outbound

This paper cites and Vandenberghe, L.

The Battling Influencers Game: Nash Equilibria Structure of a Potential Game and Implications to Value Alignment and Vandenberghe, L

Reference 3

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-09T16:38:07.128595Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

Observation fd702c44-2b7b-46d9-bdf9-69bbeb8becb9 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

The Battling Influencers Game: Nash Equilibria Structure of a Potential Game and Implications to Value Alignment Unresolved cited work

Reference 4

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-09T16:38:06.614486Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 84305a38-5f1f-4bde-8b4a-a15f4f6a3849 · outbound

This paper cites PAL: Pluralistic Alignment Framework for Learning from Heterogeneous Preferences.

The Battling Influencers Game: Nash Equilibria Structure of a Potential Game and Implications to Value Alignment PAL: Pluralistic Alignment Framework for Learning from Heterogeneous Preferences

Reference 5

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-09T16:38:06.618663Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 936de323-fdb4-4c8b-b6f8-0b813f54690d · outbound

This paper cites Social Choice Should Guide AI Alignment in Dealing with Diverse Human Feedback.

The Battling Influencers Game: Nash Equilibria Structure of a Potential Game and Implications to Value Alignment Social Choice Should Guide AI Alignment in Dealing with Diverse Human Feedback

Reference 6

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-09T16:38:06.623418Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation a40991d8-351d-42d5-8749-0d45a3470396 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

The Battling Influencers Game: Nash Equilibria Structure of a Potential Game and Implications to Value Alignment Unresolved cited work

Reference 7

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-09T16:38:07.109281Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

Observation e4c26c1d-ba06-405a-9602-c300644a5c25 · outbound

This paper cites Online Learning from Strategic Human Feedback in LLM Fine-Tuning.

The Battling Influencers Game: Nash Equilibria Structure of a Potential Game and Implications to Value Alignment Online Learning from Strategic Human Feedback in LLM Fine-Tuning

Reference 8

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-09T16:38:06.631594Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 26624ea5-14c4-4d82-b7ba-eebe8bed4192 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

The Battling Influencers Game: Nash Equilibria Structure of a Potential Game and Implications to Value Alignment Unresolved cited work

Reference 9

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-09T16:38:07.097658Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

Observation 542de86e-a3d2-4c41-bc06-a3f360afd058 · outbound

This paper cites Nash Learning from Human Feedback.

The Battling Influencers Game: Nash Equilibria Structure of a Potential Game and Implications to Value Alignment Nash Learning from Human Feedback

Reference 10

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-09T16:38:06.639155Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation af44ca3f-0f7b-4bde-98ad-b7c4b33187c1 · outbound

This paper cites Correlated equilibrium and potential games.

The Battling Influencers Game: Nash Equilibria Structure of a Potential Game and Implications to Value Alignment Correlated equilibrium and potential games

Reference 11

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-09T16:38:07.086129Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

Observation 6b97e70e-8697-4004-a8fa-3a793cd99930 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

The Battling Influencers Game: Nash Equilibria Structure of a Potential Game and Implications to Value Alignment Unresolved cited work

Reference 12

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-09T16:38:07.074301Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

Observation 027b4929-dac6-482a-93dc-00a904906be7 · outbound

This paper cites Training language models to follow instructions with human feedback.

The Battling Influencers Game: Nash Equilibria Structure of a Potential Game and Implications to Value Alignment Training language models to follow instructions with human feedback

Reference 13

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-09T16:38:06.651669Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 37db2df4-b611-4676-94b2-6b3e810e469e · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

The Battling Influencers Game: Nash Equilibria Structure of a Potential Game and Implications to Value Alignment Unresolved cited work

Reference 14

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-09T16:38:07.056817Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

Observation d1dcb5cc-dff7-4ff1-b973-40d06df8be01 · outbound

This paper cites D., Ermon, S., and Finn, C.

The Battling Influencers Game: Nash Equilibria Structure of a Potential Game and Implications to Value Alignment D., Ermon, S., and Finn, C

Reference 15

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-09T16:38:06.658883Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation daa755f3-92f9-4e14-aab6-d366262647de · outbound

This paper cites Direct Nash Optimization: Teaching Language Models to Self-Improve with General Preferences.

The Battling Influencers Game: Nash Equilibria Structure of a Potential Game and Implications to Value Alignment Direct Nash Optimization: Teaching Language Models to Self-Improve with General Preferences

Reference 16

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-09T16:38:06.662442Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 18ffd68b-a3e3-45be-a090-96a41310cdcf · outbound

This paper cites Algorithmic game theory.

The Battling Influencers Game: Nash Equilibria Structure of a Potential Game and Implications to Value Alignment Algorithmic game theory

Reference 17

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-09T16:38:07.038756Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

Observation 7f193913-9306-4fa7-a0d3-8ffea61d5f00 · outbound

This paper cites and Schrijvers, O.

The Battling Influencers Game: Nash Equilibria Structure of a Potential Game and Implications to Value Alignment and Schrijvers, O

Reference 18

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-09T16:38:07.027063Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

Observation 5d314762-764f-4c96-8f5a-21ac96455f4a · outbound

This paper cites Whose opinions do language models reflect? In International Conference on Machine Learning, pp.\ 29971--30004.

The Battling Influencers Game: Nash Equilibria Structure of a Potential Game and Implications to Value Alignment Whose opinions do language models reflect? In International Conference on Machine Learning, pp.\ 29971--30004

Reference 19

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-09T16:38:06.673211Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 68a61d02-6cd3-48eb-a446-20d30c120550 · outbound

This paper cites Actively learning hemimetrics with applications to eliciting user preferences.

The Battling Influencers Game: Nash Equilibria Structure of a Potential Game and Implications to Value Alignment Actively learning hemimetrics with applications to eliciting user preferences

Reference 20

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-09T16:38:07.008972Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

Observation bddb810f-0ff5-44ec-b682-5671981de993 · outbound

This paper cites Truthful Aggregation of LLMs with an Application to Online Advertising.

The Battling Influencers Game: Nash Equilibria Structure of a Potential Game and Implications to Value Alignment Truthful Aggregation of LLMs with an Application to Online Advertising

Reference 21

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-09T16:38:06.680482Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 76536897-773a-4377-9ec6-0ad59668829d · outbound

This paper cites Mechanism design for llm fine-tuning with multiple reward models.

The Battling Influencers Game: Nash Equilibria Structure of a Potential Game and Implications to Value Alignment Mechanism design for llm fine-tuning with multiple reward models

Reference 22

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-09T16:38:06.684457Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation f26004cc-e154-439f-9919-dd402b564544 · outbound

This paper cites A Minimaximalist Approach to Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback.

The Battling Influencers Game: Nash Equilibria Structure of a Potential Game and Implications to Value Alignment A Minimaximalist Approach to Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback

Reference 23

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-09T16:38:06.687971Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation d5f1c3cb-cba8-4c80-8995-5157d1de416c · outbound

This paper cites Game Theory: An Introduction.

The Battling Influencers Game: Nash Equilibria Structure of a Potential Game and Implications to Value Alignment Game Theory: An Introduction

Reference 24

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-09T16:38:06.996547Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

Observation de2dc542-9ccb-4a2b-b37c-f77f3fa7a9ac · outbound

This paper cites and Davenport, M.

The Battling Influencers Game: Nash Equilibria Structure of a Potential Game and Implications to Value Alignment and Davenport, M

Reference 25

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-09T16:38:06.984520Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

Pith citing papers

Observation c5a8b40a-bdc6-4388-a481-38240038b71c · inbound

Game Theory Meets Large Language Models: A Systematic Survey with Taxonomy and New Frontiers cites this paper.

Game Theory Meets Large Language Models: A Systematic Survey with Taxonomy and New Frontiers The Battling Influencers Game: Nash Equilibria Structure of a Potential Game and Implications to Value Alignment

Reference 154

Resolution: verified exact; local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-07T22:50:34.988880Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.