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Strong pulse illumination hacks self-differencing avalanche photodiode detectors in a high-speed quantum key distribution system

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arxiv 2205.04177 v1 pith:GNP5OQCR submitted 2022-05-09 quant-ph

Strong pulse illumination hacks self-differencing avalanche photodiode detectors in a high-speed quantum key distribution system

classification quant-ph
keywords high-speedattackilluminationpulsequantumstrongavalanchedetector
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal T4 reserved
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Implementation of high-speed quantum key distribution~(QKD) has become one of the major focus in the field, which produces high key-generation rate for applications. To achieve high-speed QKD, tailored techniques are developed and employed to quickly generate and detect quantum states. However, these techniques may introduce unique loopholes to compromise the security of QKD systems. In this paper, we investigate the loopholes of self-differencing~(SD) avalanche photodiode~(APD) detector, typically used for high-speed detection in a QKD system, and demonstrate experimental testing of SD APD detector under strong pulse illumination attack. This attack presents blinding stability and helps an eavesdropper to learn the secret key without introducing extra QBER. Based on this testing, we propose a set of criteria for protecting SD APD detectors from the strong pulse illumination attack.

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