Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.
Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-06-30T11:19:40.617501Z
Paper Citation Record · LEDGER
As of 18 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 29 of 29 outbound references and 1 inbound Pith citation observation for arXiv:2606.08621.
A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.
Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.
Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-06-30T11:19:40.617501Z
One-hop event checks from named stored sources.
Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00
Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.
Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-01T10:38:08.238807Z
A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.
Source: cited_works
29 of 29 outbound references displayed
External citation measurements
No source-named external measurement is stored.
Observation ae4f7660-ccb7-4eb8-9fab-7197efa0d723 · outbound
Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Learning- augmented mechanism design: leveraging predictions for facility location
Reference 1
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation 4ec7dec3-c26a-433a-8436-ef59ee180adf · outbound
Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Strategyproof ap- proximation of the minimax on networks.Mathematics of Operations Research, 35(3):513– 526, 2010
Reference 2
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation 82fa21e4-75dd-4782-851c-29acb3078bad · outbound
Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Facility Location Mechanism Design: Breaking The Deterministic Barrier
Reference 3
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation 1cd27999-e9b3-4d46-956d-14918620fc06 · outbound
Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Mechanism design for facility location problems: a survey
Reference 4
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation 0ee1c493-b9e4-444e-af3d-fff386e1a373 · outbound
Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Obnoxious facility location problems: Strate- gyproof mechanisms optimizingl p-aggregated utilities and costs
Reference 5
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation 8f601bd6-0be2-44af-a108-1a1e7bfe6b93 · outbound
Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Strategyproof facility location with prediction: minimizing the maximum cost.Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 40(1):22, 2026
Reference 6
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation 8aa15cce-9c91-4b36-bf75-8910d62ffa20 · outbound
Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Mechanism Design without Money via Stable Matching
Reference 7
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation 768f9f65-21ca-48ed-87c5-5310d01b3744 · outbound
Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Strategy-proof approximation mechanisms for an obnoxious facility game on networks.Theoretical Computer Science, 497:154–163, 2013
Reference 8
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation b431a28d-eb1c-4885-90a3-6c800434641f · outbound
Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Generalized assignment problem: Truthful mechanism design without money.Operations Research Letters, 45(1):72–76, 2017
Reference 9
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation 5b86793a-7986-42e3-81c3-5d3b750eb82e · outbound
Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Heterogeneous facility location games with fractional preferences and limited resources.Autonomous Agents and Multi- Agent Systems, 39(2):41, 2025
Reference 10
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation 213d75e6-d75d-420e-8247-28ee1130f05f · outbound
Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Approximately optimal mechanisms for strategyproof facility location: minimizing lp norm of costs.Mathematics of Operations Research, 42(2):434–447, 2017
Reference 11
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation 5f9f7c5d-edf5-4ba2-a6d5-85381a040339 · outbound
Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Strategyproof facility location and the least squares ob- jective
Reference 12
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation 17170dbc-3f9d-4b5b-b7fa-1662cecad3b1 · outbound
Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Truthful approximations to range voting
Reference 13
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation a6774a0b-ac5f-4ca7-93b6-b26fe3b87066 · outbound
Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Facility location games with fractional preferences
Reference 14
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation d910dbf8-e75d-4c99-925e-1ca394c4f18c · outbound
Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Strategyproof facility location for concave cost functions
Reference 15
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation c90e70e0-e9e6-4d61-bd5f-d67d8636a546 · outbound
Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Winner-imposing strategyproof mechanisms for multiple facility location games.Theoretical Computer Science, 472:90–103, 2013
Reference 16
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation 3da97673-ca79-4675-bfd7-04b3c5258ba6 · outbound
Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Optimality of the coordinate-wise median mech- anism for strategyproof facility location in two dimensions.Social Choice and Welfare, 61(1):11–34, 2023
Reference 17
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation 4bf8ec57-b3ac-468a-8a7d-942f0aa0ba9f · outbound
Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Approximation guarantees of median mechanism inR d
Reference 18
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation 42b6ea54-ba2c-4a56-8ca8-2d1ac9fae266 · outbound
Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Strategy-proof allocation of multiple items between two agents without payments or priors
Reference 19
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation 68eb1fed-3dd2-45e8-be8d-2cf82428260c · outbound
Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Hardy, J
Reference 20
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation db325c78-164b-4cd0-94f6-f253b99e9947 · outbound
Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Strategic Facility Location with $p$-Norm Social Costs
Reference 21
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation 9b7b5ccf-0ce9-4636-b9e8-e923f9f32573 · outbound
Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Constrained truthful obnoxious two-facility location with optional preferences: P
Reference 22
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation bbac693a-7424-4f81-bd70-659600594ce3 · outbound
Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Scheduling without payments.Theory of Computing Systems, 54(3):375– 387, 2014
Reference 23
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation d08e940e-c511-4ca9-a513-d6815cca7956 · outbound
Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Nearly complete characterization of 2-agent deterministic strategyproof mech- anisms for single facility location inl p space
Reference 24
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation 40313856-baf6-418f-96c7-4d72b49197a6 · outbound
Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Strategyproof facility location for three agents on a circle
Reference 25
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation 0e787de0-086b-4dce-a210-756dcb841bb8 · outbound
Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Approximate mechanism design without money
Reference 26
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation b08e47a3-849f-4cef-a1a4-c9bba39249b2 · outbound
Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Characterization of group-strategyproof mechanisms for facility location in strictly convex space
Reference 27
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation 1b90ed7d-670e-4597-9cad-71077c31f5b3 · outbound
Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Equitable mechanism design for facility location
Reference 28
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation 72b31d5e-4ccb-4edb-9504-68eb218a1736 · outbound
Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost Strategy-proof mechanism for obnoxious facility location on a line
Reference 29
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.
Observation 66df83fd-9730-410e-82b2-1323885b7581 · inbound
Improved Lower Bounds and Output Augmentation for Facility Location Mechanisms Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost
Reference 7
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.