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Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Clearing time randomization and transaction fees for auction market design

As of 9 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 0 of 0 outbound references and 2 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2405.09764.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2405.09764 v2

Coverage vector

measured 0 of 0 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links

measured 2 of 2 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00

measured 2 of 2 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-05T10:39:19.511033Z

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: pith, observed 2026-08-05T10:39:20.136540Z

Reference resolution

0 of 0 outbound references displayed

  • verified exact0
  • verified fuzzy0
  • unresolved0
  • parse uncertain0
  • malformed identifier0
  • metadata mismatch0

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

No outbound reference observations are available for this paper version.

Pith citing papers

Observation 17de645e-37e4-4cb3-b704-bfe7e2af6efc · inbound

Regulation or Competition:Major-Minor Optimal Liquidation across Dark and Lit Pools cites this paper.

Regulation or Competition:Major-Minor Optimal Liquidation across Dark and Lit Pools Clearing time randomization and transaction fees for auction market design

Reference 2025

Resolution
verified exact
local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-05T10:39:20.187461Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-05T10:39:19.511033Z digest=sha256:6176b5a0387cacf2d24964f3d834ac562d91e7059fed50a89036ba916f23064b

Observation 228db6db-7b21-4da3-9836-7e0fb4da3212 · inbound

Learning Market Making with Closing Auctions cites this paper.

Learning Market Making with Closing Auctions Clearing time randomization and transaction fees for auction market design

Reference 41

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T08:26:58.291831Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-03T08:26:58.291831Z digest=sha256:d2151067ecd3b52150c7d390d6e7064569d9566210088b929d2e7ba273211fc6