Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations

As of 21 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 43 of 43 outbound references and 2 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2607.17811.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2607.17811 v1

Coverage vector

measured 43 of 43 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:14.513469Z

measured 45 of 45 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00

measured 2 of 2 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-14T04:28:19.069743Z

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: pith, observed 2026-08-14T04:28:19.147020Z

Reference resolution

43 of 43 outbound references displayed

verified exact9
verified fuzzy9
unresolved20
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External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

Observation 644d20df-577a-4546-8a43-881c1e8f1444 · outbound

This paper cites Fair allocation of indivisible goods and chores.Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 36(1):3, 2022.

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations Fair allocation of indivisible goods and chores.Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 36(1):3, 2022

Reference 1

Resolution: malformed identifier; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:15.491537Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation e74bc707-9435-468f-9a96-fc2b90d18086 · outbound

This paper cites Fair and truthful mechanisms for dichotomous valuations.

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations Fair and truthful mechanisms for dichotomous valuations

Reference 2

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:14.379972Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation a4b55486-af55-4e71-b1c5-73e1cb31ca77 · outbound

This paper cites Compatibility of Fairness and Nash Welfare under Subadditive Valuations.

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations Compatibility of Fairness and Nash Welfare under Subadditive Valuations

Reference 3

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:14.383463Z

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Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 5f748a9d-8cb8-4816-81e0-0940af4a9dc0 · outbound

This paper cites Introspectively envy-free and efficient allocation of indivisible mixed manna, 2025.

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations Introspectively envy-free and efficient allocation of indivisible mixed manna, 2025

Reference 4

Resolution: verified exact; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:15.306575Z

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No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation ef9eedb0-c2cb-46fb-8790-4ed359acc873 · outbound

This paper cites Finding fair and efficient allocations.

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations Finding fair and efficient allocations

Reference 5

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:14.391151Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 0a2670fd-d588-42eb-a994-86bafbbc3de8 · outbound

This paper cites Sundaram.

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations Sundaram

Reference 6

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:15.481634Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 0cd93ea5-f892-4cfa-80c5-1e8b37588f9c · outbound

This paper cites Optimal bounds on the price of fairness for indivisible goods.

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations Optimal bounds on the price of fairness for indivisible goods

Reference 7

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:15.472447Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 9e34d91e-2f1d-49e2-9911-da9295dd454d · outbound

This paper cites The price of fairness for indivisible goods.Theory of Computing Systems, 65(7):1069–1093, 2021.

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations The price of fairness for indivisible goods.Theory of Computing Systems, 65(7):1069–1093, 2021

Reference 8

Resolution: malformed identifier; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:15.463026Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation a4481773-5877-4a2a-92fe-5487a788c68f · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations Unresolved cited work

Reference 9

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:14.656505Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 99bf967c-29e9-4c90-b658-fd058936f878 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations Unresolved cited work

Reference 10

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:14.640859Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation ca6828ee-f819-40fc-9cab-10f64fda1a24 · outbound

This paper cites Finding fair and effi- cient allocations for matroid rank valuations.ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 9(4):21:1–21:41, 2021.

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations Finding fair and effi- cient allocations for matroid rank valuations.ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 9(4):21:1–21:41, 2021

Reference 11

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:14.411539Z

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Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation dcb496bb-cdaf-442e-b5d9-e6c3fb3e54d5 · outbound

This paper cites Procaccia, Nisarg Shah, and Junxing Wang.

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations Procaccia, Nisarg Shah, and Junxing Wang

Reference 12

Resolution: malformed identifier; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:14.421607Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 2a4a153c-388b-46a1-802b-1e1d3852c293 · outbound

This paper cites The combinatorial assignment problem: Approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes.Journal of Political Economy, 119(6):1061–1103, 2011.

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations The combinatorial assignment problem: Approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes.Journal of Political Economy, 119(6):1061–1103, 2011

Reference 13

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:14.418189Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 7c4ca775-7064-455c-aa56-10261eafa87c · outbound

This paper cites Procaccia, Nisarg Shah, and Junxing Wang.

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations Procaccia, Nisarg Shah, and Junxing Wang

Reference 14

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:14.427894Z

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Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 218a5f76-34e4-4ed7-899c-dd39b33a774f · outbound

This paper cites Envy-freeness up to any item with high Nash welfare: The virtue of donating items.

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations Envy-freeness up to any item with high Nash welfare: The virtue of donating items

Reference 15

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:14.424743Z

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Observation cfe748d3-c724-4e63-b6e6-261b79205b4d · outbound

This paper cites Are gross substi- tutes a substitute for submodular valuations?, 2021.

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations Are gross substi- tutes a substitute for submodular valuations?, 2021

Reference 16

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:15.453071Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation b2be8fc4-5342-40c1-aed9-b277203d32e6 · outbound

This paper cites Fair and efficient allocations under subadditive valuations.

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations Fair and efficient allocations under subadditive valuations

Reference 17

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:14.619901Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 4b06f819-708f-4391-bd7f-2276cdb1d5fb · outbound

This paper cites Computing fair and efficient allocations with few utility values.Theoretical Computer Science, 962:113932, 2023.

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations Computing fair and efficient allocations with few utility values.Theoretical Computer Science, 962:113932, 2023

Reference 18

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:14.440337Z

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Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 821946b3-a249-41a0-a2b1-0dba5574f4bd · outbound

This paper cites How to fairly allocate easy and dif- ficult chores.

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations How to fairly allocate easy and dif- ficult chores

Reference 19

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:15.443756Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 9e327c58-c17e-4920-a9f4-1389dd836ed0 · outbound

This paper cites Fair and efficient allocations of chores under bivalued preferences.

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations Fair and efficient allocations of chores under bivalued preferences

Reference 20

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:14.609898Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 75ee464c-ee2e-4ce0-a601-bec4fdc63c70 · outbound

This paper cites EF1 for Mixed Manna with Unequal Entitlements.

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations EF1 for Mixed Manna with Unequal Entitlements

Reference 21

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:14.443626Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

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Observation 8f6f94d2-3ad4-4f4d-8e24-9af1cb23d5db · outbound

This paper cites Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes.Journal of Economic Theory, 87(1):95–124, 1999.

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes.Journal of Economic Theory, 87(1):95–124, 1999

Reference 22

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:14.453212Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 56dfd1dd-7597-472f-9d01-fd33de9c38fd · outbound

This paper cites Near fairness in matroids.

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations Near fairness in matroids

Reference 23

Resolution: malformed identifier; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:15.434226Z

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No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation e9560e03-3bed-49e5-b689-e3afb1e1370f · outbound

This paper cites Maximin share allocations for assign- ment valuations: Extended abstract.

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations Maximin share allocations for assign- ment valuations: Extended abstract

Reference 24

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:15.424592Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 22b3e674-2e12-46ab-b813-8b4e8de71a99 · outbound

This paper cites Kelso, Jr.

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations Kelso, Jr

Reference 25

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:14.456236Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 41ecf476-751f-4b71-974d-b510942ad4ec · outbound

This paper cites Gross substitutability: An algorithmic survey.Games and Economic Behavior, 106:294–316, 2017.

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations Gross substitutability: An algorithmic survey.Games and Economic Behavior, 106:294–316, 2017

Reference 26

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:14.465752Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 9a2a21bc-e592-4de3-908d-06d600c73155 · outbound

This paper cites Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities.Games and Economic Behavior, 55(2):270–296, 2006.

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities.Games and Economic Behavior, 55(2):270–296, 2006

Reference 27

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:14.594331Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 375e1517-7a69-43d2-a389-e891a9e781c1 · outbound

This paper cites Mixed fair division: A survey.

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations Mixed fair division: A survey

Reference 28

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:14.471998Z

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Observation 48c66fd3-21f9-4019-9ee5-511b52425f5f · outbound

This paper cites Lipton, Evangelos Markakis, Elchanan Mossel, and Amin Saberi.

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations Lipton, Evangelos Markakis, Elchanan Mossel, and Amin Saberi

Reference 29

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:14.469116Z

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Observation 7007a8e2-1eb2-46c6-a842-06a03a5c157c · outbound

This paper cites A polynomial-time algorithm for fair and efficient allocation with a fixed number of agents.

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations A polynomial-time algorithm for fair and efficient allocation with a fixed number of agents

Reference 30

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:14.572107Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation a7b142a4-5daa-4050-8955-470a86251796 · outbound

This paper cites Counterexamples to EFX for Submodular and Subadditive Valuations.

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations Counterexamples to EFX for Submodular and Subadditive Valuations

Reference 31

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:14.475085Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

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Observation add8159d-f178-4400-9c50-c5957e7f8e77 · outbound

This paper cites On fair and efficient allocations of indivisible goods.

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations On fair and efficient allocations of indivisible goods

Reference 32

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:14.561517Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 543a395f-0235-4ff5-9189-cf43b2a2b8d1 · outbound

This paper cites Existence of fair and efficient allocation of indivisible chores.

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations Existence of fair and efficient allocation of indivisible chores

Reference 33

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:15.414938Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation c4db99c2-85a4-49f0-8dac-4066ad9c24b6 · outbound

This paper cites Springer, 2003.

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations Springer, 2003

Reference 34

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:15.403675Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation a4dacf95-15ac-4681-82fd-5582f410e3ea · outbound

This paper cites Fair allocation rules.

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations Fair allocation rules

Reference 35

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:14.497005Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

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Observation 81785c26-4cb6-443b-bacd-de31976affe5 · outbound

This paper cites Almost envy-freeness with general valuations.SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics, 34(2):1039–1068, 2020.

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations Almost envy-freeness with general valuations.SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics, 34(2):1039–1068, 2020

Reference 36

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:14.490508Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 0a0f6309-a27e-421a-8d18-27daf6d984c8 · outbound

This paper cites A general framework for fair allocation under matroid rank valuations.

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations A general framework for fair allocation under matroid rank valuations

Reference 37

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:14.503334Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 381a9458-47e4-4308-9d36-cdf93718d38d · outbound

This paper cites Yankee swap: A fast and simple fair allocation mechanism for matroid rank valuations.

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations Yankee swap: A fast and simple fair allocation mechanism for matroid rank valuations

Reference 38

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:15.393983Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 23216426-793b-4404-afcc-753903a5828c · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations Unresolved cited work

Reference 39

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:14.500126Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation e33d3c67-6aed-4322-a7ec-401d1267740e · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations Unresolved cited work

Reference 42

Resolution: parse uncertain; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:15.384204Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation a8dfdff0-d285-46d4-9581-60ac4e6753d2 · outbound

This paper cites Again, by the definition ofρ, 1> 1 α (r+2ε)≥ 1 α v1(X1), r> 1 α t≥ 1 α v2(X2), and 1> 1 α r≥ 1 α vk(Xk) (k≥3).

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations Again, by the definition ofρ, 1> 1 α (r+2ε)≥ 1 α v1(X1), r> 1 α t≥ 1 α v2(X2), and 1> 1 α r≥ 1 α vk(Xk) (k≥3)

Reference 43

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:15.374305Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 0998fca6-7787-44fe-8e3e-2879cbdd15c5 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations Unresolved cited work

Reference 2020

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:14.666204Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.

Observation 269ab43a-8430-427f-8ee3-3d2417b39de3 · outbound

This paper cites URLhttps://arxiv.org/abs/2507.09544.

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations URLhttps://arxiv.org/abs/2507.09544

Reference 2026

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T15:45:14.484359Z

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Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Pith citing papers

Observation e3e59866-db37-4f07-bfb4-4bb2745c9bc8 · inbound

Fair Division with Strictly Increasing Valuations: A Tight Threshold for Two-Agent EF1 and PO cites this paper.

Fair Division with Strictly Increasing Valuations: A Tight Threshold for Two-Agent EF1 and PO When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations

Reference 15

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-07-31T23:47:36.977797Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

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Observation 1c2c325e-1a20-48f6-be13-1e0a9d5ea64d · inbound

Best-of-Both-Worlds Fairness and Pareto Optimality cites this paper.

Best-of-Both-Worlds Fairness and Pareto Optimality When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations

Reference 23

Resolution: verified exact; local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-14T04:28:19.154605Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.