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Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization

As of 9 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 100 of 136 outbound references and 0 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2506.22911.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2506.22911 v1

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measured 100 of 136 reference resolution

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measured 100 of 100 standing notices

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measured 0 of 0 inbound itemization

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Reference resolution

100 of 136 outbound references displayed

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Outbound references

Observation 57102e47-07a0-4150-8eb0-e73ed813ea3f · outbound

This paper cites Towards data auctions with externalities.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Towards data auctions with externalities

Reference 1

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Observation 9933a6d4-892f-4799-86d6-1176d1d1c0df · outbound

This paper cites Automated design of robust mecha- nisms.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Automated design of robust mecha- nisms

Reference 2

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Observation e04777cb-c2ce-4239-9eb0-fe2f499edff1 · outbound

This paper cites Backpropagation and stochastic gradient descent method.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Backpropagation and stochastic gradient descent method

Reference 3

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Observation 27f2512e-4196-4d47-a2e8-3b638cc35e98 · outbound

This paper cites Input convex neural networks.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Input convex neural networks

Reference 4

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Observation 5031d63b-1d47-4060-ae5c-ccfc2b3b9abd · outbound

This paper cites Near-optimal max-affine estimators for convex regression.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Near-optimal max-affine estimators for convex regression

Reference 5

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Observation 8553bc7d-2a80-4436-a6cf-61a9501db2a9 · outbound

This paper cites Sample complexity of automated mechanism design.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Sample complexity of automated mechanism design

Reference 6

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Observation 109808fa-8a06-40e7-9045-fb8d3d6ba908 · outbound

This paper cites MAC advice for facility loca- tion mechanism design.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization MAC advice for facility loca- tion mechanism design

Reference 7

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Observation 2a448ba1-bc40-4b43-a573-dda93216307d · outbound

This paper cites Universal approximation bounds for superpositions of a sigmoidal func- tion.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Universal approximation bounds for superpositions of a sigmoidal func- tion

Reference 8

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Observation f65c3bde-f4cd-403b-add1-4002e1c19551 · outbound

This paper cites Dynamic programming.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Dynamic programming

Reference 9

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Observation d953f4b1-0dd5-4c79-9876-9989801436de · outbound

This paper cites The curse of highly variable functions for local kernel machines.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization The curse of highly variable functions for local kernel machines

Reference 10

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Observation e1183996-5e50-488f-864d-c615b7cb428c · outbound

This paper cites Methodology for Designing Reasonably Expressive Mechanisms with Application to Ad Auctions.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Methodology for Designing Reasonably Expressive Mechanisms with Application to Ad Auctions

Reference 11

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Observation e4e44873-e310-4d4e-b341-be7af078900c · outbound

This paper cites Welfare and profit maximization with production costs.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Welfare and profit maximization with production costs

Reference 12

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Observation 91a7bd91-eeb2-4b90-bce6-4db9e5840b61 · outbound

This paper cites Large-scale machine learning with stochastic gradient descent.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Large-scale machine learning with stochastic gradient descent

Reference 13

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Observation a268b65a-2737-4803-923b-0480759fab43 · outbound

This paper cites Convex optimization.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Convex optimization

Reference 14

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Observation 77f8dc4a-f05d-4cbc-936d-bedddeb73354 · outbound

This paper cites An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design

Reference 15

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Observation dfed6679-c798-470e-a0fa-d9e12598583c · outbound

This paper cites Optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design: Reducing revenue to welfare maximization.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design: Reducing revenue to welfare maximization

Reference 16

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Observation 2600b9bb-d826-4f35-a4b8-65c1de008c94 · outbound

This paper cites Log-sum-exp neural net- works and posynomial models for convex and log-log-convex data.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Log-sum-exp neural net- works and posynomial models for convex and log-log-convex data

Reference 17

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Observation 83ee5b39-2457-4835-b4bd-7a3e02fa8e76 · outbound

This paper cites Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains

Reference 18

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Observation 26e51296-4403-45eb-be76-3b432c48ae5a · outbound

This paper cites Mechanism Design for Facility Location Problem: A Survey.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Mechanism Design for Facility Location Problem: A Survey

Reference 19

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Observation 4cb9130e-c0d3-4f25-8b56-daf5ce4dbf21 · outbound

This paper cites Optimal competitive auctions.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Optimal competitive auctions

Reference 20

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Observation 275b6d4c-3646-4ed6-a04c-d72eee03310a · outbound

This paper cites The complexity of optimal multidimensional pricing.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization The complexity of optimal multidimensional pricing

Reference 21

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Observation 55ce1b74-2f13-484f-afc0-3c207d50aa03 · outbound

This paper cites Strategy-proofness and “median voters.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Strategy-proofness and “median voters

Reference 22

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Observation b1fd6a1c-c126-4930-aa9c-ba6a4d72022c · outbound

This paper cites Multipart pricing of public goods.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Multipart pricing of public goods

Reference 23

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Observation 01c0499f-e87b-4c8b-96d8-aa4199122453 · outbound

This paper cites Incremental mechanism design.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Incremental mechanism design

Reference 24

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Observation b76e8258-4412-4a13-adc5-8924536a4684 · outbound

This paper cites Differentiable economics for ran- domized affine maximizer auctions.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Differentiable economics for ran- domized affine maximizer auctions

Reference 25

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Observation f0e9e74b-79ab-4245-b973-2e161f84e9b3 · outbound

This paper cites Automated design of affine maximizer mechanisms in dynamic set- tings.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Automated design of affine maximizer mechanisms in dynamic set- tings

Reference 26

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Observation 5613cbca-513d-4b88-8b74-d0e13ce3cba1 · outbound

This paper cites Certifying strategyproof auction networks.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Certifying strategyproof auction networks

Reference 27

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Observation 7588f277-fe1b-430a-ad32-3d5119eb6689 · outbound

This paper cites Optimal Automated Market Makers: Differentiable Economics and Strong Duality.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Optimal Automated Market Makers: Differentiable Economics and Strong Duality

Reference 28

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Observation 7a6a0215-c7fb-4f2a-9b89-9d0434edc277 · outbound

This paper cites Learning revenue-maximizing auctions with differentiable matching.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Learning revenue-maximizing auctions with differentiable matching

Reference 29

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Observation 42c4d617-3a1b-463f-8413-df0558621710 · outbound

This paper cites Approximation by superpositions of a sigmoidal function.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Approximation by superpositions of a sigmoidal function

Reference 30

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Observation 76620333-305d-4373-adb3-29141635fb82 · outbound

This paper cites Strong duality for a multiple-good monopolist.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Strong duality for a multiple-good monopolist

Reference 31

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Observation e987b88f-bc1b-4c00-90fd-52b24a4b26fc · outbound

This paper cites Identifying and attacking the saddle point problem in high-dimensional non-convex optimization.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Identifying and attacking the saddle point problem in high-dimensional non-convex optimization

Reference 32

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Observation 5febc184-bc6a-48e4-ac69-01484fdfa0eb · outbound

This paper cites Continuity properties of Paretian utility.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Continuity properties of Paretian utility

Reference 33

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Observation 53a96779-0ea2-4f5e-a62a-5df93b8c06ca · outbound

This paper cites Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization

Reference 34

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Observation c07f3f6d-e474-47af-a2d0-4bfb2607c753 · outbound

This paper cites A context-integrated transformer-based neural network for auction design.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization A context-integrated transformer-based neural network for auction design

Reference 35

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Observation 59b4249d-e197-4cbc-97e2-c298546c9a81 · outbound

This paper cites A scalable neural network for DSIC affine maximizer auction design.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization A scalable neural network for DSIC affine maximizer auction design

Reference 36

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Observation e1831598-7d6a-4973-8bf6-5e3c3d231c81 · outbound

This paper cites Mechanism design for large language models.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Mechanism design for large language models

Reference 37

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Observation 5bb7bc22-329b-4af5-9955-cbcbd679854f · outbound

This paper cites Deep Reinforcement Learning in Large Discrete Action Spaces.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Deep Reinforcement Learning in Large Discrete Action Spaces

Reference 38

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Observation d546b0d9-6032-477a-bca6-82cbeb7e0c03 · outbound

This paper cites Optimal auctions through deep learning.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Optimal auctions through deep learning

Reference 39

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Observation 97a7b71f-2bc1-4e33-9d7c-14f1a296e33a · outbound

This paper cites Optimal auctions through deep learning: Advances in differentiable economics.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Optimal auctions through deep learning: Advances in differentiable economics

Reference 40

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:21.549822Z digest=sha256:732bd518e99c8346ebba7be18709a7ff92f4027206b5bbd23ab4ccbf8896ceea

Observation a60fa36e-4ebe-4c74-9521-8f9a523d43d3 · outbound

This paper cites Reverse Auction Relinquishing Broadcast Spectrum Rights.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Reverse Auction Relinquishing Broadcast Spectrum Rights

Reference 41

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:21.659417Z digest=sha256:3529d743a1d5774afa626e4ed25139f50d754f7a859e473e2639e94a4baf41d7

Observation 314d7992-7345-49b6-8d83-d00c9eaf0c1c · outbound

This paper cites College admissions and the stability of marriage.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization College admissions and the stability of marriage

Reference 42

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:21.693297Z digest=sha256:bf510d47efb87ad7289f86597fa59dbcd02616846872ec227f7e66c892a76dd1

Observation 13352a68-0fef-48ae-8a52-170c61b4fdb8 · outbound

This paper cites Stochastic relaxation, Gibbs distributions, and the Bayesian restoration of images.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Stochastic relaxation, Gibbs distributions, and the Bayesian restoration of images

Reference 43

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:21.800313Z digest=sha256:b47c21f5ee7b30fb75174e16c13e0bbdbcb14d13ab9d0e07d37cc3961b48f6b3

Observation f4752200-7fb1-4a3b-9de7-49d4f04aba6c · outbound

This paper cites Reverse auctions are different from auctions.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Reverse auctions are different from auctions

Reference 44

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malformed identifier
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:21.873613Z

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Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:21.873613Z digest=sha256:a2800656258b9dad0fe4cb23037273af3a2c4673fdc120b8a4fff7ef355d1144

Observation b4ef0632-2829-4f5b-a63a-6bb49d99a0f8 · outbound

This paper cites Duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions

Reference 45

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:21.977981Z digest=sha256:1b68e1e19d062f420ccb7ef848b14e151cadcb6a79a886a9edc37198e13065f1

Observation e7414f70-2694-49ea-837c-15fdf3deb8f1 · outbound

This paper cites Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result

Reference 46

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:22.053658Z digest=sha256:4cbcddaf85cba19eb7adac795de28f8e4276a7876d292bb6beb0ad87b9f65242

Observation 4f6ccd96-8f13-46aa-a718-e21bcd3f6e4d · outbound

This paper cites Competitive auctions for multiple digital goods.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Competitive auctions for multiple digital goods

Reference 47

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:22.141193Z digest=sha256:27167208075312b963b38653533c022df730fd7281a99c29ace7d3adb8547f00

Observation d14259cb-9f59-43cb-b941-dd063be670ac · outbound

This paper cites A lower bound on the competitive ratio of truthful auctions.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization A lower bound on the competitive ratio of truthful auctions

Reference 48

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:22.234620Z digest=sha256:ccd39cf9a40fc80ae1277b5b86303db6bfd6381a52662f6d7685fd60f22a1b4d

Observation 3bdab74b-647e-45b8-afdd-e110217df94f · outbound

This paper cites Deep learning for multi- facility location mechanism design.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Deep learning for multi- facility location mechanism design

Reference 49

Resolution
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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:22.347124Z digest=sha256:b7ce34458f05ac730e863df80b95bcc7b8079da81dcca33b066b192afba8b489

Observation 5258b0e7-45c0-4eae-8435-5a85d04d4104 · outbound

This paper cites Deep Learning.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Deep Learning

Reference 50

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Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:22.436303Z digest=sha256:c1bc180786dc0e0835165f0b793b0ac8d678c5164bde946ce2f385fb59882c04

Observation 430a34aa-c9f5-40f1-aa13-124151e7bb41 · outbound

This paper cites Approximation guarantees of Median Mechanism in Rd.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Approximation guarantees of Median Mechanism in Rd

Reference 51

Resolution
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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:22.507627Z digest=sha256:99aeb3d131a4842a0769a9317e008c076c18f92b58373d1bb39c7a40c6ad4ca9

Observation f63f7dfb-eb01-40bf-9a17-dab415e51199 · outbound

This paper cites Incentives in teams.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Incentives in teams

Reference 52

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:22.617858Z digest=sha256:5fa1c2b6a145b306611f6102a871a6cee692a17f5e12415206c490cc678eea25

Observation 5b914a3f-312f-4460-9a8d-42c26db8f75e · outbound

This paper cites Settling the sample complexity of single- parameter revenue maximization.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Settling the sample complexity of single- parameter revenue maximization

Reference 53

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:22.704343Z digest=sha256:4edb462250786a3672704cd9aab03b2025828bb8679fb725a9f655ba3825fb29

Observation 8fbd5680-4c7b-44cb-a8ed-70b816e838a4 · outbound

This paper cites Computationally feasible automated mechanism design: General approach and case studies.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Computationally feasible automated mechanism design: General approach and case studies

Reference 54

Resolution
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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:22.817309Z digest=sha256:460f6289e13dd43026a8af967cab0dc244ab3c1c3de0b1a0c0dfa05fb9e7af89

Observation 0586909e-08ae-4f0e-aada-cd315e926e80 · outbound

This paper cites Optimizing affine maximizer auctions via linear programming: an application to revenue maximizing mechanism design for zero-day exploits markets.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Optimizing affine maximizer auctions via linear programming: an application to revenue maximizing mechanism design for zero-day exploits markets

Reference 55

Resolution
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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:22.955541Z digest=sha256:4e5490d35639aa011801dba1dec9fcf6d577abe316b71b0dfaf034c713cfccd7

Observation 53fa4dae-a350-472e-a315-c5362b82f2df · outbound

This paper cites Prior-Independent Auctions for Heterogeneous Bidders.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Prior-Independent Auctions for Heterogeneous Bidders

Reference 56

Resolution
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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:23.091781Z digest=sha256:044e9b0c1701e2f3b5e873ad442fe93119be571b988015e22d6a5c4136393074

Observation 5df34d58-7e08-49f6-b8d3-172eb45dd3b4 · outbound

This paper cites Automated on- line mechanism design and prophet inequalities.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Automated on- line mechanism design and prophet inequalities

Reference 57

Resolution
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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:23.190298Z digest=sha256:75321cd8cebb1e70cbef8864cfec951ec3188bdbff6e5c81818407f568f56d9c

Observation 8c8728d7-f23c-4dfa-878e-28e301d9d615 · outbound

This paper cites Straightforward individual incentive compatibility in large economies.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Straightforward individual incentive compatibility in large economies

Reference 58

Resolution
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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:23.297814Z digest=sha256:cb1c5ba73af1c17e60896ec3c71e482709f3c5a867f97fd9e37a3f91d66ddf16

Observation 51ebbfde-645c-43b3-b4f2-1fa159cf288b · outbound

This paper cites Universal approximation of symmetric and anti-symmetric functions.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Universal approximation of symmetric and anti-symmetric functions

Reference 59

Resolution
unresolved
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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:23.404589Z digest=sha256:a3fb74667c535db1eb7ab394a71c39c0594eff94d1358a06fc77af16a43472fe

Observation 6e4510f6-f578-4c5e-8924-2381b24ff546 · outbound

This paper cites Profit maximization in mechanism design.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Profit maximization in mechanism design

Reference 60

Resolution
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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:23.514389Z digest=sha256:5a6b148d79469a99cebe7d96800d322ab3c24c173466442eacb6fb3ea63b7d40

Observation 6bb739bb-d0f9-4d5a-9f8d-febfb358d084 · outbound

This paper cites Gaussian Error Linear Units (GELUs).

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Gaussian Error Linear Units (GELUs)

Reference 61

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:23.631653Z digest=sha256:a7eec1f473dc4deb77b1c43059ab3a4ed8f735c601dd3968c4188ed451c53350

Observation b25b6e4d-f007-4bda-a621-4500af4b4706 · outbound

This paper cites Welfare maximization with production costs: A primal dual approach.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Welfare maximization with production costs: A primal dual approach

Reference 62

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:49.863067Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:23.734138Z digest=sha256:ff2a7090a93f59f6290af3e6fa3432afae543c18135826373c523809821a52b0

Observation c6721c6f-079b-4441-a05c-4af4b738fa13 · outbound

This paper cites Optimal-er auctions through attention.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Optimal-er auctions through attention

Reference 63

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:49.636386Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:23.804975Z digest=sha256:0502492019279feaa187420f0a027fe4a86329b42890e2751d265e5ba051b4e8

Observation ef2e18dc-215a-47bb-8d47-37c859266f96 · outbound

This paper cites Posted Price Mechanisms for Online Allocation with Disec- onomies of Scale.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Posted Price Mechanisms for Online Allocation with Disec- onomies of Scale

Reference 64

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:49.379759Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:23.913680Z digest=sha256:46ced28db76eec853634a6e921b5a98a929d52d30b5e83e06143056196115fc9

Observation e34f5530-84c6-4701-8182-bb20ba1223dc · outbound

This paper cites An Online Intelligent Task Pricing Mechanism Based on Reverse Auction in Mobile Crowdsensing Networks for the Internet of Things.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization An Online Intelligent Task Pricing Mechanism Based on Reverse Auction in Mobile Crowdsensing Networks for the Internet of Things

Reference 65

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:49.112564Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:23.992501Z digest=sha256:fc5914384af69cf0bf9792e491ff13ac475d4c446b426861f3aa1c652aeea0be

Observation e17d3687-e1d4-423b-bfe6-549cc9bf8502 · outbound

This paper cites Estimation of particle transmission by random sampling.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Estimation of particle transmission by random sampling

Reference 66

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:48.880579Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:24.073807Z digest=sha256:79fcca1ef9d5ae06a0672e862575c080725ee0acac288026341fd2b9b9593993

Observation c93494be-dc5e-429e-973b-0ed2e68c4b29 · outbound

This paper cites Parameterized convex universal approximators for decision- making problems.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Parameterized convex universal approximators for decision- making problems

Reference 67

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:48.590802Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:24.140249Z digest=sha256:c157d4669bfda2b17b25ca68bd6319e55358bc4fbfe3981fa14ec72a129c03be

Observation b8ed81b5-07d6-4219-8ef8-0d51daa396ec · outbound

This paper cites Adam: A Method for Stochastic Optimization.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Adam: A Method for Stochastic Optimization

Reference 68

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unresolved
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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:24.218228Z digest=sha256:fc24af3bce9dc0086cb14643a8c96d1e1cfa5d9076a12c9ab927dfec8e04d689

Observation 4cb63ce5-d980-4203-b61a-bf9aea8f1d68 · outbound

This paper cites Bayesian estimates of equation system parameters: an application of integration by Monte Carlo.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Bayesian estimates of equation system parameters: an application of integration by Monte Carlo

Reference 69

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:48.340250Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:24.303036Z digest=sha256:80fac5d2005a3b9d91201fdd6ed022040432a0c9e40690528dba88cb8bbea2ff

Observation 1b0f7ec0-904c-4c77-9e65-1ad33ea11f51 · outbound

This paper cites Total-cost procurement auctions: Impact of suppliers’ cost adjustments on auction format choice.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Total-cost procurement auctions: Impact of suppliers’ cost adjustments on auction format choice

Reference 70

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:48.012487Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:24.371591Z digest=sha256:19acd42be6b4264f1e7f5266743979cf723d4aa1463195d27e0f3488ac51e30b

Observation 6cc72ebd-f118-4784-b233-1d7c8b37a6a4 · outbound

This paper cites Faster first-order methods for extensive-form game solving.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Faster first-order methods for extensive-form game solving

Reference 71

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:47.710679Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:24.473727Z digest=sha256:983d85ebafe5d4b1df58654290688150afbdf19dd5d873eb8fce0b966f394a9f

Observation cfbfe6c9-4b61-4b4a-831f-16d4759af485 · outbound

This paper cites Towards a characterization of truthful combi- natorial auctions.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Towards a characterization of truthful combi- natorial auctions

Reference 72

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:47.388967Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:24.565841Z digest=sha256:a5dc0b3c825b269319dd7ce20e9b1fc5a88915a1e0f3535914ab92d56d9337c6

Observation f949a3ae-ef4f-41e1-a9d3-6d93edba9319 · outbound

This paper cites Two simplified proofs for Roberts’ theorem.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Two simplified proofs for Roberts’ theorem

Reference 73

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:46.824269Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:24.741994Z digest=sha256:f70b40f8febb18d4d9086595992ece6328eaf0c89ba354a44f2a193f6adb9a35

Observation 4e8a7139-734b-4a8f-9c46-c232d294cfff · outbound

This paper cites Truthful and near-optimal mechanism design via linear programming.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Truthful and near-optimal mechanism design via linear programming

Reference 74

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:46.502859Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:24.834317Z digest=sha256:1fa4b3496d40b6da270f25652000dcad6769adc06f44da8d108a6920269fc59e

Observation 6676b129-9c08-4de0-b955-0c7148d22cef · outbound

This paper cites Deep learning.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Deep learning

Reference 75

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:46.175708Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:24.917310Z digest=sha256:b4776ec2135423cd97723e66a30adc72a8c833b79902bc7b0508aa3b705fc373

Observation def9fba6-91ba-4c11-acbb-bdb14e4c8d72 · outbound

This paper cites Set transformer: A framework for attention-based permutation-invariant neural networks.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Set transformer: A framework for attention-based permutation-invariant neural networks

Reference 76

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:45.916232Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:25.028023Z digest=sha256:c79a752fedf51aabc9eedfc686c0893234c53984cc7eb8fd05e27f99b4eaf62a

Observation 189d8397-9c54-440c-80d6-452f0a2f6dcf · outbound

This paper cites Approximating revenue-maximizing combi- natorial auctions.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Approximating revenue-maximizing combi- natorial auctions

Reference 77

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:45.606448Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:25.081299Z digest=sha256:f2f0256a04c8b64ee7b2efd3be0878512ea2d4f187e7ce404987392ee361b769

Observation 9c840a5e-5613-4f26-adda-3703ae0cf455 · outbound

This paper cites Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist

Reference 78

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:45.356308Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:25.157008Z digest=sha256:3e932cbb2f23ee3eab37cfcc9942212aa491b9fb61d80cecbe74ba562e0cf83b

Observation 3bac1c1f-ec92-4795-b0fe-9f625261225a · outbound

This paper cites Microeconomic theory.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Microeconomic theory

Reference 79

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:45.061301Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:25.236568Z digest=sha256:9f8ef906500561e560d1ae249df7d4a667345f22b07884ff62bed597feefaad7

Observation dabb16a4-eaf4-4589-b730-b4d29409548a · outbound

This paper cites The maximum numbers of faces of a convex polytope.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization The maximum numbers of faces of a convex polytope

Reference 80

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:44.643715Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:25.327173Z digest=sha256:67661a6f1d8cc1ba703d890113bed0ea756c6997f293d525728e4b8cc90d1b72

Observation 0cd149c2-179c-4d44-9637-867c465d9bf9 · outbound

This paper cites Equation of state calculations by fast computing machines.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Equation of state calculations by fast computing machines

Reference 81

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:44.336076Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:25.414799Z digest=sha256:0859b9adac9e16285b6e80092222ecc317c2f3803585692f3d128961548845af

Observation e8c13b39-5543-46f1-b6b7-529825804047 · outbound

This paper cites Envelope theorems for arbitrary choice sets.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Envelope theorems for arbitrary choice sets

Reference 82

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:43.988280Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:25.512515Z digest=sha256:7265a01f908c7eb3a0b958a60a5ee22f7faf4f29b614a72c018aab79f6455e58

Observation b17486ce-7d8f-4ce7-bc77-89b29dbb995b · outbound

This paper cites A theory of auctions and competitive bidding.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization A theory of auctions and competitive bidding

Reference 83

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:43.707633Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:25.598799Z digest=sha256:450523b526788fd775a247c2e6d05e1eb020fb80ef9a48f6c725c881a137f168

Observation 148936be-4ad2-4267-9c81-c8221ea77ed9 · outbound

This paper cites On strategy-proofness and single peakedness.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization On strategy-proofness and single peakedness

Reference 84

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:43.365450Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:25.732090Z digest=sha256:bf70336e79474ef35c8200607635613ff4b82b5d8fb8954e8a348f7e906fa88b

Observation 58fa8d15-8c99-4df3-87d2-03f4913cc44b · outbound

This paper cites Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem

Reference 85

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:42.996823Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:25.832642Z digest=sha256:aadda18056845f20273c33ce72e32300ea9ecd1559453796e770db4fef0de857

Observation 57ca2496-7631-4420-b933-b92d5a39b709 · outbound

This paper cites Optimal auction design.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Optimal auction design

Reference 86

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:42.688261Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:25.916118Z digest=sha256:8309267e727cc072928fe24ff09e24811139ee66456a7a994c60e3d9c13ff429

Observation f2b62b12-b57e-47c7-830a-277b7ff65739 · outbound

This paper cites Automated mech- anism design without money via machine learning.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Automated mech- anism design without money via machine learning

Reference 87

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:42.454373Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:25.996076Z digest=sha256:d41c1cd2e8b3659cff7bb4635826f1510b393bb545073d013bcf78f35e25b942

Observation 9674d893-5d9d-43dd-8d93-c6757ff486d7 · outbound

This paper cites Affine maximizers in domains with selfish valuations.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Affine maximizers in domains with selfish valuations

Reference 88

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:42.091491Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:26.076449Z digest=sha256:881d47fa4d06a9c239f14dfb406aec59db3239ed7ed277b51611c53ce76d033a

Observation dc29035f-6744-45f0-9f23-49ba1daf3d17 · outbound

This paper cites Sur une g´ en´ eralisation des int´ egrales de MJ Radon.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Sur une g´ en´ eralisation des int´ egrales de MJ Radon

Reference 89

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:41.773789Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:26.185405Z digest=sha256:d81898bc2a355feb2ce48e5e54f424cc323c88ef0856c202468cc54a9d748563

Observation 886d0fed-c6d9-41f4-8abf-cbd2ed2e02e6 · outbound

This paper cites Algorithmic Game Theory.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Algorithmic Game Theory

Reference 90

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:41.505796Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:26.267657Z digest=sha256:a895109e00ff34025aa1e67f921622ff8988c643292d93c89f1b43cd7bc85eb2

Observation 584dfe81-c43c-4761-9d89-371c69d6dab0 · outbound

This paper cites Optimal mechanism for selling two goods.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Optimal mechanism for selling two goods

Reference 91

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:41.250654Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:26.353455Z digest=sha256:1766ad2d2f12a895a2de700c2849c2c8fe1bb1e5c5cba85188f8daa61b94f387

Observation 4ade873e-8565-4a46-8267-555bbb49dee5 · outbound

This paper cites Preferencenet: Encoding human preferences in auction design with deep learning.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Preferencenet: Encoding human preferences in auction design with deep learning

Reference 92

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:40.960148Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:26.426354Z digest=sha256:8388cb961f624811dfe25df4d8e189c7d98d26b01405c29333bc9cdc29b1d02a

Observation 8f190efa-73b7-485b-9f5a-9aee51abc9f1 · outbound

This paper cites Why and when can deep-but not shallow-networks avoid the curse of dimensionality: a review.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Why and when can deep-but not shallow-networks avoid the curse of dimensionality: a review

Reference 93

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:40.680453Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:26.541082Z digest=sha256:e820a988fc946aeeff505b6b3827f47c3d007d57d7aceb4abe49855d836ec198

Observation 250766bd-ad59-429f-a75a-a76cbf2c58ef · outbound

This paper cites Benefits of permutation-equivariance in auction mechanisms.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Benefits of permutation-equivariance in auction mechanisms

Reference 94

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:40.393667Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:26.623014Z digest=sha256:9a87b00ccdbef6c4f49d734594dfe90806b2b56acd219eed327addcfdd27bf78

Observation e6e161fe-97aa-4d86-93a2-98695f067020 · outbound

This paper cites Auction learning as a two-player game.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Auction learning as a two-player game

Reference 95

Resolution
verified exact
local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:31.531506Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:26.709583Z digest=sha256:2ed9085db970117bfe732f6c70afc260127f1052ff3895c38cda14e65f404d06

Observation a0ce2fd4-f2b8-4ae2-a153-8258c0f7feb3 · outbound

This paper cites Auction Learning as a Two-Player Game.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Auction Learning as a Two-Player Game

Reference 96

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:40.116497Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:26.805352Z digest=sha256:da3f464df61b2a65b41e85eaea4051bb9c280dbbf84395b2471fb06f4afea9d4

Observation facaccac-745d-49ea-8e6b-e1271ad372ca · outbound

This paper cites A permutation-equivariant neural network architecture for auction de- sign.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization A permutation-equivariant neural network architecture for auction de- sign

Reference 97

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:39.764959Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:26.922879Z digest=sha256:a8bd02d36cde296c4dcdf078ec1c1042be9d10588165c85bfae6e43de65ec18e

Observation 65e9af19-9bff-4393-8d4d-8560418118eb · outbound

This paper cites Deep Learning for Two-Sided Matching.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Deep Learning for Two-Sided Matching

Reference 98

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:27.031927Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:27.031927Z digest=sha256:2e7b6b2bea9be8a2b012593a8c93c693f299e0b117ac009898097dd4ba92fe43

Observation 599a11f6-2c2b-4caa-a647-cb7e23cee919 · outbound

This paper cites url: https : / / www.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization url: https : / / www

Reference 99

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:39.412386Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:27.126296Z digest=sha256:45234fd823f393724270c00cffab434b1fc9c5d82fe3ca7ac798f40d0f2477a8

Observation 54e00091-90d5-43f5-ae17-08c186330608 · outbound

This paper cites Exponential convergence of Langevin distribu- tions and their discrete approximations.

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization Exponential convergence of Langevin distribu- tions and their discrete approximations

Reference 100

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T22:03:39.156536Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-06T22:03:27.213453Z digest=sha256:dfbd4d5d8c7941005d8003141327d5105b5f9021c5c98efc17e5a3251daef630

Pith citing papers

No inbound Pith citation observations are available.