Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers

As of 14 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 38 of 38 outbound references and 1 inbound Pith citation observation for arXiv:2505.19453.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2505.19453 v1

Coverage vector

measured 38 of 38 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-07T14:23:08.392664Z

measured 39 of 39 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00

measured 1 of 1 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-04T18:54:44.355010Z

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: cited_works

Reference resolution

38 of 38 outbound references displayed

verified exact1
verified fuzzy33
unresolved4
parse uncertain0
malformed identifier0
metadata mismatch0

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

Observation 9b947fd0-5b84-4d8d-bac8-99cc386338e5 · outbound

This paper cites Approximating gains from trade in two-sided markets via simple mechanisms.

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers Approximating gains from trade in two-sided markets via simple mechanisms

Reference 1

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T14:23:13.268612Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.

Observation e2bb27be-1586-48d1-85a6-4a50e7cb33e6 · outbound

This paper cites Bertrand Networks.

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers Bertrand Networks

Reference 2

Resolution: verified exact; local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-07T14:23:08.526876Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.

Observation 930a110b-7638-4b79-bd89-8a9540f5b74e · outbound

This paper cites Price competition in online combinatorial markets.

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers Price competition in online combinatorial markets

Reference 3

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T14:23:13.259235Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.

Observation d728467a-ec28-4d20-9104-86e026b8421c · outbound

This paper cites Imperfect competition in auction designs.

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers Imperfect competition in auction designs

Reference 4

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T14:23:13.249457Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.

Observation 800e29f9-2d0e-4da5-acae-ca9a08fcec7f · outbound

This paper cites Matthew Weinberg.

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers Matthew Weinberg

Reference 5

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T14:23:13.240066Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.

Observation ab6a09e3-0695-4af3-906c-610fb552b253 · outbound

This paper cites Bundling in oligopoly: Revenue maximization with single-item competitors.

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers Bundling in oligopoly: Revenue maximization with single-item competitors

Reference 6

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T14:23:13.230058Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.

Observation 6f2b16ed-5d3b-4dd6-806d-710502db418e · outbound

This paper cites Matthew Weinberg.

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers Matthew Weinberg

Reference 7

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T14:23:13.221458Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.

Observation a8ee5129-1258-4848-b38d-20508db6642d · outbound

This paper cites Researches into the mathematical principles of the theory of wealth.

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers Researches into the mathematical principles of the theory of wealth

Reference 8

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T14:23:13.213026Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.

Observation 9fd5cf12-e3b0-4330-8ece-273824a213f3 · outbound

This paper cites Multiproduct duopolists.

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers Multiproduct duopolists

Reference 9

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T14:23:13.204353Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.

Observation 29981e03-de5f-4a69-aefe-9be6275c1a4d · outbound

This paper cites Bertrand competition in networks.

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers Bertrand competition in networks

Reference 10

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T14:23:13.195647Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.

Observation c2eea8d5-4606-4e34-8336-43178befa67c · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers Unresolved cited work

Reference 11

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T14:23:06.347321Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 4171d179-c384-4420-9d1e-4d7b6ea54eae · outbound

This paper cites Optimal auctions with simultaneous and costly participation.

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers Optimal auctions with simultaneous and costly participation

Reference 12

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T14:23:13.181747Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.

Observation 9345e710-4605-40e1-a3ef-bf56d26cc11f · outbound

This paper cites Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality.

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality

Reference 13

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T14:23:13.173456Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.

Observation eefd94c0-4128-4375-89ae-c9cbe8f4609b · outbound

This paper cites The Complexity of Optimal Mechanism Design.

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers The Complexity of Optimal Mechanism Design

Reference 14

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T14:23:13.164155Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.

Observation 40bafe5f-8afb-4886-a156-a0f3c37f3ccf · outbound

This paper cites Strong duality for a multiple-good monopolist.

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers Strong duality for a multiple-good monopolist

Reference 15

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T14:23:13.155357Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.

Observation 873e4bd8-e229-42fe-a316-6f4e4612d60f · outbound

This paper cites Devanur and S.

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers Devanur and S

Reference 16

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T14:23:13.146629Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.

Observation dbf30502-6aca-466d-8874-1d6e9767ff21 · outbound

This paper cites Matthew Weinberg.

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers Matthew Weinberg

Reference 17

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T14:23:13.137506Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.

Observation 35019309-c3d7-4db9-8382-f1e08cbcf9c5 · outbound

This paper cites Matthew Weinberg.

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers Matthew Weinberg

Reference 18

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T14:23:12.991255Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.

Observation daa25b41-d0ff-4cf8-9686-a4d36cae1e99 · outbound

This paper cites Designing and learning optimal finite support auctions.

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers Designing and learning optimal finite support auctions

Reference 19

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T14:23:07.058478Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 4d1da72a-5d1f-47bb-b3c5-3c054498f9de · outbound

This paper cites The fedex problem.

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers The fedex problem

Reference 20

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T14:23:12.809341Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.

Observation 4cc4b4c5-3c78-49b5-b068-c2f6058519bc · outbound

This paper cites The value of information concealment.

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers The value of information concealment

Reference 21

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T14:23:12.658250Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.

Observation 373fdd82-9960-4a58-9e41-885822f82dfe · outbound

This paper cites Revenue maximization for buyers with costly participation.

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers Revenue maximization for buyers with costly participation

Reference 22

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T14:23:12.420752Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.

Observation ba17bd25-49ca-4048-bdf1-cf967437c0c2 · outbound

This paper cites On taxation and incentives: Further reflections on the limits to redistribution.

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers On taxation and incentives: Further reflections on the limits to redistribution

Reference 23

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T14:23:12.085817Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.

Observation 6635c687-5aaf-4ecd-9a33-8dade6a0e185 · outbound

This paper cites Straightforward individual incentive compatibility in large economies.

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers Straightforward individual incentive compatibility in large economies

Reference 24

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T14:23:11.929679Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.

Observation 76958549-b686-4663-9a52-fb06e4d878ee · outbound

This paper cites Annual survey of economic theory: the theory of monopoly.

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers Annual survey of economic theory: the theory of monopoly

Reference 25

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T14:23:11.692874Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.

Observation 57150b8f-16cf-4a83-aa99-58cd9d32b150 · outbound

This paper cites The menu-size complexity of auctions.

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers The menu-size complexity of auctions

Reference 26

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T14:23:11.458255Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.

Observation e1fa7a1d-f1e7-4004-905a-771a2eda0423 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers Unresolved cited work

Reference 27

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T14:23:11.229784Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.

Observation dfea1f45-c4ee-42d0-bd52-cecc7a349fe8 · outbound

This paper cites Advanced microeconomic theory.

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers Advanced microeconomic theory

Reference 28

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T14:23:10.899315Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.

Observation c8cce3a1-23d1-45f0-aa59-d41e8b0aa62c · outbound

This paper cites On the competition complexity of dynamic mechanism design.

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers On the competition complexity of dynamic mechanism design

Reference 29

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T14:23:10.564690Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.

Observation 078ce111-4de0-4642-a032-f3f2cd6d877c · outbound

This paper cites Mechanism design by competing sellers.

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers Mechanism design by competing sellers

Reference 30

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T14:23:10.307944Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.

Observation 0a38431c-a82d-44cf-9d29-fbb7d0fbbb44 · outbound

This paper cites Monopoly and product quality.

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers Monopoly and product quality

Reference 31

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T14:23:10.081580Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.

Observation d87814a0-e71f-45a3-9b20-71f0bdc4e914 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers Unresolved cited work

Reference 32

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T14:23:09.853732Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.

Observation 2f55335f-0e2e-4ecd-99f3-1dc650f226fe · outbound

This paper cites Optimal auction design.

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers Optimal auction design

Reference 33

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T14:23:09.635607Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.

Observation 3d5c5e73-ad1f-4df7-9960-9fc1eb4d2394 · outbound

This paper cites Optimal mechanism for selling two goods.

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers Optimal mechanism for selling two goods

Reference 34

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T14:23:09.339346Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.

Observation 33129154-7267-425b-b46f-4e5a6db4be6a · outbound

This paper cites Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices.

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices

Reference 35

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T14:23:09.205361Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.

Observation 60ab273c-6c9b-4ad7-8026-ebc00d2ab95c · outbound

This paper cites Haggling over substitutes.

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers Haggling over substitutes

Reference 36

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T14:23:09.054884Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.

Observation 90cf0418-2d2f-484f-8c0d-a6fd2005d1b6 · outbound

This paper cites Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools.

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools

Reference 37

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T14:23:08.903013Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.

Observation a152289f-297c-4f4b-8a61-6f42ea7f5674 · outbound

This paper cites The theory of the market economy.

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers The theory of the market economy

Reference 38

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T14:23:08.657703Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-14T06:32:32.682623+00:00.

Pith citing papers

Observation e944c896-d798-4e26-9153-0580209616d4 · inbound

Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions cites this paper.

Beyond the PPAD hardness of Auto-bidding Auctions Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers

Reference 99

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-04T18:54:44.355010Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.